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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Linda Ann Kiltz for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Public Administration and Policy presented May 8, 2008.

Title: Creating a Theoretical Framework for Understanding Homeland Security
Using Multiple Frame Analysis

The purpose of this study was to begin the effort to build a theoretical
foundation for homeland security policy by analyzing the 1993 World Trade Center
terrorist attack using multiple frame analysis (MF A). MFA consisted of three
conceptual lenses: (!)-Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism as
Crime, (11)-Homeland Security as a International Relations Problem/Terrorism as
War, and (III)-Homeland Security as an Organization Design Problem/Terrorism as a
Network. These lenses were applied to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing using
a case study methodology, thus creating a framework to analyze a singular critical
event from multiple perspectives.
This research was successful at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of
the dominant lenses used to understand homeland security at the time of the 1993
WTC bombing, as well as, the importance of using more than one lens to attempt to
understand complex problems such as homeland security.

Each lens, when used
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alone, captured only a small part of the problem we were seeing and severely limited
our ability to predict the long term threat that was emerging at the time.
This research found that the fields of criminology, public administration, and
international relations, each bring unique theoretical perspectives that contribute
significantly to our understanding of homeland security. By identifying the
theoretical gaps, as well as, the overlaps within each disciplinary perspective, a new
approach to address homeland security can be developed in a holistic manner to
explain this new phenomenon.
The study concluded with a list of future studies to consider and
recommended that scholars and government leaders lead the process of continuing to
analyze our conceptual lenses as they relate to homeland security, so that new
conceptual lenses may be formed which are more integrated and comprehensive than
those used in this study. This is a necessary next step toward creating a general
theory of homeland security.
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CHAPTER 1: IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING A THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

2

Introduction

The Problem: Lack of Theoretical Framework for understanding homeland
security

At 12:18 p.m. on Friday, February 26, 1993, Islamic terrorists detonated a
van filled with homemade explosives in the underground parking garage of the New
York City World Trade Center. It killed six, injured more than 1,000, and presaged
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the same buildings. The goal of the attack was to
'

devastate the foundation of the north tower in such a way in that it would collapse
onto its twin. 1 The 110-story World Trade Center was rocked by the explosion, but
did not come crashing down as planned by the terrorists who masterminded and
executed the attack. A letter found on the computer ofNidal Ayyad, one of the
conspirators, warned that the World Trade Center would continue to be a target if
"our demands are not met" and that "next time it will be very precise. " 2 The next
time would be September 11, 2001.
At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, the first of two hijacked commercial
passenger jet airliners crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in
New York City. Fifteen minutes later a second hijacked aircraft crashed into the
south tower of the World Trade Center. Both towers collapsed within two hours of

1

Reeve, Simon. (2002). The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of
Terrorism. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
2
Bernstein, Richard. (December 15, 1993). Prosecutors link blast letter to defendant. New York Times.
B3.

3
being struck killing 2,752 people. 3 On that day, 19 men affiliated with al-Qaeda, an
Islamic terrorist organization, hijacked a total of four passenger jets. Two of these
planes crashed into the World Trade Center, one airplane crashed into the Pentagon
in Arlington County, Virginia killing 184 people, and the last aircraft crashed into a
field near the town of Shanksville in rural Somerset County, Pennsylvania as
passengers and members of the flight crew attempted to retake control of their plane
from the hijackers. Excluding the 19 hijackers, a confirmed 2,973 people died and
thousands were injured as a result of these attacks. 4
On August 10, 2006, British authorities thwarted a terrorist plot to blow up
nine airplanes enroute to the United States from Britain. The terrorist plotters had
planned on using liquid explosives in drink bottles that they had smuggled in carry
on baggage. 5 While in flight, these terrorists planned to combine these chemicals
into an explosive cocktail that was to be set off over the Atlantic Ocean killing the
hundreds of people on board. This plot sounded much like the much earlier Bojinka
Plot planned by Ramzi Yousef in 1995, the mastermind of the first WTC bombing.
In the Bojinka Plot at least five Al Qaeda operatives were to have set bombs made of
nitroglycerine (that was snuck on airplanes in contact lens solution bottles) on 11
United States-bound airliners that had stopovers all around East Asia and Southeast

3

CBS News. (October 30, 2003). New WTC Death Toll at 2752. At:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/29/attack/main580620.shtml. [accessed 20 August 06]
4
The 9/1 I Commission Report. (2004). New York: W.W. Norton.
5
Cowell, Alan. (August 10, 2006). British authorities say plot to blow up airlines was foiled. The New
York Times. At: www.nytimes.com/2006/08/10/world/europe/l lterrorend.htm. [accessed 20 August
06].
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Asia. 6 While each of these terrorist events is unique and has distinct characteristics,
they are all linked to the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993.
Though the 1993 plot to topple the towers failed, it did succeed in bringing
the first casualties from foreign terrorists to the U.S. homeland, and initiated
policymaking that has led to what is now known as the field of homeland security.
The World Trade Center (WTC) bombing of 1993 has long since been
overshadowed by the attack that finally brought the twin towers down on September
11, 2001. Yet, at the time it occurred, the attack loomed large on the American
landscape because it was the first terrorist attack on U.S. soil perpetrated by a wellorganized network of foreign terrorists. The 1993 attack stunned the nation because
foreign sponsored terrorism-which had long plagued Western Europe and parts of
the Middle East, Africa and Asia-had threatened the homeland security of the
United States. In light of the 9/11 attacks, many argue that our national response
after the 1993 WTC attacks to this new threat of transnational terrorism was a policy
failure. 7 Our inability to prevent or effectively respond to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 clearly showed the federal government's failure to learn from
the unprecedented, historical event that occurred on February 26, 1993. 8
Since the 2001 attacks, the term homeland security has been used regularly in
the media and in our daily lexicon and our "war on terrorism" has had a significant

6

Reeve, Simon. (2002). The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of
Terrorism. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
7
See The 9111 Commission Report. (2003). New York: W.W. Norton.
8

Ibid.
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impact on U.S. domestic and foreign policies, and on the lives of people throughout
the world. Fear of future terrorist attacks has spawned massive governmental
programs and policies aimed at protecting our homeland. At the federal level, a
massive reorganization merged 22 distinct federal agencies into the Department of
Homeland Security; this was the largest restructuring of the federal bureaucracy in
fifty years.9 Physical security at U.S. airports has increased dramatically with the
addition of more explosive detection systems, advanced check point X-ray devices,
and enhanced passenger screening processes.

10

The U.S. has made dramatic efforts

to, not only, improve aviation security, but also cargo, infrastructure and border
security through the creation of new laws, programs and policies. It is clear that
homeland security has been a prominent public policy focus since September 11,
2001 in part because overwhelming government response was needed to protect the
United States from future terrorist attacks, and because political and public
expectations made it so. Though the terms terrorism and homeland security are used
in our common language on a daily basis, a review of the literature shows that there
is no consensus on the meanings of terrorism or homeland security. Also there is no
coherent theory that explains the phenomenon of homeland security, or the
organizational designs and operations that have been developed in the field.

9

11

Nicholson, William C. (2005). Homeland Security Law and Policy. Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas.
10
Costello, Frank. (2005). Post 9-11 challenges for aviation security. In Nicholson, William C. (Ed.).
Homeland Security Law and Policy. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 234-248.
11
Nicholson, William C. (2005). Homeland Security Law and Policy. Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas talks about no theory of agreed upon definition of homeland security. On terrorism theory
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Purpose: Creating a theoretical foundation for homeland security

The purpose of this dissertation is to begin the effort to build a theoretical
foundation for homeland security policy by analyzing the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing using multiple frame analysis. The most quoted definition of homeland
security in the literature 12 is from the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
which defines homeland security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." 13 The National
Strategy for Homeland Security is a key document in understanding homeland
security but it does not outline a theoretical foundation to explain homeland security
policy. Rather it is primarily a statement of the goals and plans for the federal
government's activities regarding homeland security. When President Bush sent it to
Congress on July 16, 2002, he described the document as a "comprehensive plan"
that "lays out clear lines of authority and clear responsibilities; responsibilities for
federal employees and for governors and mayors and community and business
leaders and the American Citizens." 14 This plan explained what federal agencies are

see White, Jonathan. (2002). Terrorism. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth; Long, David E. (1990). The
Anatomy of Terrorism. New York: The Free Press. Schmid, Alex. (1988). Political Terrorism. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
12
See texts on homeland security including: Carafano, James. (2005). Homeland Security. New
York: McGraw Hill. White, Jonathan. (2006). Terrorism and Homeland Security. Belmont, CA:
Thomson-Wadsworth. Nicholson, William C. (2005). Homeland Security Law and Policy.
Sfringfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
1
Office of Homeland Security. (2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security. Retrieved from:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book.. [accessed 1 August 2006].
14
Office of the Press Secretary. (16 July 2002). At:
http://www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020716-2.html. [accessed 2 August 2007].
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responsible for specific homeland security missions and tasks but it did not reference
specific theories to explain the "new terrorism" we face today, or present a specific
theory guiding homeland security policy design, development or implementation.
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and in 2001 and our
government's response have been explained in part by theories from the fields of
political science, criminal justice, public administration, sociology and others.
However, each of these discipline-specific theories offers but a piece of the puzzle in
understanding homeland security policy and the threat of terrorism as a social and
political phenomenon. A comprehensive, integrated theory of homeland security is
needed in order to move forward more effectively and efficiently to secure our
homeland from future terrorist attacks.
The challenge of an integrated theory has been suggested in criminology 15
and "entails the combining of parts of two or more pre-existing theories into a
separate new theory that promises to provide greater explanatory power, prediction,
or understanding" of homeland security than its component theories alone. 16 In this
dissertation, theoretical integration will involve multidisciplinary integration, in that
the theories will be drawn from different academic disciplines including
criminology, political science, international relations, and public administration. In
addition, this study will integrate theories that cut across levels of analysis or will be
15

Messner, S.F., M.D. Krohn, and A.E. Liska. (1989). Theoretical Integration in the Study of
Deviance and Crime: Problems and Prospects. Albany, New York: State University ofNew York
Press.
16
Paternoster, Raymond and Ronet Bachman. (2001). Explaining Criminals and Crime. Los Angeles,
CA: Roxbury Publishing Company. 305.

8
multilevel. 17 The multilevel and multidisciplinary integration of theories will be the
basis for the comprehensive and integrated theoretical foundation for homeland
security.

Research Question
The research question for this study is: How can we create a foundation for a
comprehensive and integrated theory of homeland security? To understand the
complex interactions within the phenomenon of homeland security, the theory that is
created must be able to explain a wide range of activities, programs and policies over
a period of time; thus it must be comprehensive enough to integrate the theories from
multiple disciplines because this is a new phenomenon that spans many academic
and organizational boundaries. The challenges that are raised in the policy domain
of homeland security are not readily confined to just the political science or criminal
justice domains but cut across disciplinary boundaries. 18 Finally, this effort to
construct a theoretical foundation will be a result of synthesizing or integrating many
different elements of other theories.

17

Ibid.
See the following texts: The 9/11 Commission Report. (2003). New York: W.W. Norton. Kettl,
Donald F. (2004). System Under Stress. Washington D.C: CQ Press. Charters David A. (2004).
After 9/11: Terrorism and Crime in a Globalised World New Brunswick, Canada: Centre for
Conflict Studies.
18

9
Value of the Research

A theoretical foundation of homeland security policy is needed because it is a
new phenomenon that has unique characteristics. Homeland security is a newly
defined policy domain that has already had a dramatic impact on the United States in
a very short time. In addition, homeland security presents ever more problems than
other policy domains, such as the budget deficit or balance of trade, because small
errors in homeland security can have huge and punishing effects. The cost of failure
in any part of our homeland security efforts can mean a tremendous loss of life and
property, can undermine public confidence in government institutions, and can lead
to policy decisions that undermine our democratic way of life. Additionally, the
movement of large amounts of money and human resources into this policy domain
has dramatically affected other public programs and services. 19
The creation of a theoretical foundation of homeland security can provide a
basis for and encourage further research that will identify how to break down some
of the intellectual, social, political and organizational barriers within the field of
homeland security. This research will build a theoretical foundation by identifying
the gaps in some of the dominant theories that have been applied to this policy
domain as well as the areas of overlap in which greater research can be conducted.

19

Office of Management and Budget, Budget ofthe United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006.
Matthew Schmit, "Federal Funding for Homeland Security," Congressional Budget Office Economic
and Budget Issue Brief, April 30, 2004, p. 3, at:
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocsl54xxldoc54J4/homeland security.pd[. [accessed 14 March 2005].

This study will contribute to the research traditions of many academic disciplines
because it will not only approach the problem of homeland security from multiple
disciplinary perspectives, but also build on their existing theories. This study will not
only be of value for scholars but also for practitioners in a variety of organizations
with homeland security tasks and missions.

Value to the Development of Theory
This research is important because it can make a significant contribution to
fundamental knowledge by applying the theoretical traditions of specific social
science disciplines in a new and creative way. A foundation for a theoretical
framework for homeland security will be created through theoretical synthesis. That
is, parts and components of theories from the academic disciplines of public
administration, political science, international relations and criminal justice will be
combined to form a new theoretical foundation to explain the phenomenon of
homeland security. In this process, the theoretical contributions of these academic
disciplines in understanding concepts of terrorism, homeland security, and the
organizations that form from these fields, will be highlighted and contrasted thus
showing both their strengths and weaknesses. By identifying the theoretical gaps, as
well as, the over~aps within each disciplinary perspective, a new approach can be
built in a holistic manner to explain the new phenomenon.

11

The fields of criminology, political science, public administration ~d
international relations each bring unique theoretical perspectives that can contribute
to our understanding of terrorism and homeland security. To this point, the fields
that have engaged this subject have not produced a coherent theoretical perspective
within their field, nor have they engaged colleagues across fields in an effective and
productive manner.

Value to Practice, Policy Formation and Evaluation

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 th , a torrent of legislation has been
passed to counter the terrorist threat and large scale government re-organization has
occurred with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Among the far
reaching legislation that was passed in the months following 9/11 was the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, better known as the USA PATRIOT Act. This
law was passed a mere six weeks after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and was designed to "deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and
around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
purposes. " 20 The Patriot Act has provoked a great deal of debate because opponents
fear that the new police powers given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation will lead

20

USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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to a significant loss of civil liberties.21 In addition, the anned hijackings and
bombings on 9/11 revealed the significant weaknesses in U.S. aviation security. As
a result, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act on
November 19, 2001. 22 The heart of this act was the creation of the largest federal
law enforcement agency in history, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). TSA has responsibility for securing all modes of transportation but most of
its initial efforts have been directed toward aviation security where passenger and
baggage screening has been greatly improved at all major airports in the U.S. 23
However, these responses to 9/11 have been reactive and not grounded in a
theory of homeland security. Many of these policies were enacted in such haste that
thoughtful deliberation in the legislative process and careful policy development
simply did not take place. Instead, homeland security policies have taken on a
"scatter-shot" approach in which the target (or threat) is not clear, thus there is a lack
of cohesiveness and coordination of key policy initiatives. 24 Often there is no clear
intergovernmental division oflabor in many homeland security activities. For
example, most vital infrastructure, such as ports, transportation systems, electrical
grids, and energy infrastructure, is owned by the private sector and regulatory

21

See American Civil Liberties Union Report. Insatiable Appetite: The Government's Demand for

New and Unnecessary Powers after September 11. In Nicholson, William C. (ed.). (2005).Homeland

Security Law and Policy. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 179-196.
22
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71. (2001).
23
Costello, Frank. (2005). Post 9-11 Challenges for Aviation Security. In Nicholson, William C. (ed.).
(2005).Homeland Security law and Policy. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 234-248.
24
Caruson, Kiki. (2004). Mission Impossible? The Challenge oflmplementing an Integrated
Homeland Security Strategy. Journal ofHomeland Security and Emergency Management. Vol.I,
Issue 4. AT: www.bepress.com.jhsem. [accesses 15 July 2007].
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responsibility for some industries is divided between levels of government in
frequently complicated ways. 25 A theory of homeland security could be invaluable
to practitioners by giving order and cohesiveness to homeland security policy.
A theoretical foundation will also create common definitions and
characteristics that can be used across disciplines to develop, implement and evaluate
homeland security policies and programs. At present, there is a lack of consensus in
the definitions and uses of important concepts in homeland security policy. In
addition, by linking practice to theoretical foundations, practitioners will be more
effective and efficient in organizing, managing and coordinating tasks dedicated to
homeland security.
This study seeks to provide a valuable learning tool for practitioners and
scholars by demonstrating that the problems of homeland security can be explained
in many ways outside of their existing conceptual framework, and yet integrates their
perspectives in a holistic manner. This study also seeks to show that the resolution
of these complex problems must consider multiple alternative perspectives rather
than single prescriptions advocated by their own practice or academic discipline. For
example, at the 2006 American Society for Public Administration Conference, the
author presented a paper on two conceptual models of understanding the
phenomenon of terrorism (one which viewed terrorism as a crime and one which

25

The Rockefeller Institute of Government. (March 24, 2003). The Role of "Home" in Homeland
Security: The Federalism Challenge. Symposium Series No. 7, Albany, New York. At:
http://www.rockinst.org/publications/bomeland security/HomelandOverJuly2003 .pdf. [accessed 15
July 2007].
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viewed it as a form of asymmetrical warfare) to a mixed audience of Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) professionals, police personnel, emergency managers and
public administration scholars. The law enforcement practitioners and those from
DHS found the models enlightening because it expanded their knowledge and
understanding of the problem of terrorism and presented new solutions. This
growing awareness by practitioners of many possible solutions should encourage
greater cooperation and coordination among multiple stakeholders, thus making
homeland security efforts more effective and efficient in the long run.
Finally, this research will develop a theoretical foundation for future research
on homeland security policy analysis, implementation and evaluation. It will be
important to analyze policy failures in the area of homeland security in the future so
we can develop more creative and imaginative solutions to the complex and
constantly changing problem of terrorism.

Identifying Gaps in the Existing Literature
The most glaring gap in the literature on homeland security is the lack of an
agreed upon definition of homeland security. First, there are few texts published on
the topic of homeland security and most do not offer definitions for homeland
security. In Homeland Security Law and Policy, Robert Smith developed a
definition of homeland security by a content analysis of the terms extracted from 100

15
course syllabi on homeland security. 26 From this analysis, Smith defined homeland
security as "a system of emergency preparedness that requires military and civilian
response to perceived, potential, or imminent terrorist threats against U.S. citizens
and interests at home." 27 Smith's definition has a clear emergency management
focus largely because many of the first courses offered in homeland security were
provided by instructors in the field of emergency management. However, homeland
security includes more than emergency response to terrorism.
Second, the definition of homeland security cited most often in the textbooks
and literature on homeland security is that found in the National Strategy for
Homeland Security. The federal government defines homeland security as "a
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recover from
attacks that do occur."28 President Bush stated: "Homeland security encompasses
those activities that are focused on combating terrorism and occur within the United
States and its territories. Such activities include efforts to detect, deter, protect
against and, if needed, respond to terrorist attacks. " 29

26

Smith Robert W. (2005). Defining "Homeland Security': Content and context groooded in

curricula. In Homeland Security Law and Policy. William C. Nicholson (ed.). Springfield, IL:

Charles C. Thomas Publisher. 10-22.
Ibid. 20.
28
Office of Homeland Security. (July, 2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security. 2. At:
www.whitehouse.gov. [accessed 15 July 2007].
29
Bush, George W. (2002). "Securing the Homeland: Strengthening the Nation." Washington D.C:
White House. 27. At: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland security book.pdf.
[accessed 15 July 2007].
27
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This official definition can be interpreted in a variety of ways depending on
how one defines "terrorism," "detection," "deterrence," "protection against," and
"response to attacks." Scholars in the field of criminal justice, for example, have
different definitions and theories of deterrence than those in the field of international
relations. For criminologists, deterrence occurs when someone refrains from
committing a crime because he fears the certainty, swiftness, and severity of legal
punishment. 30 Deterrence from an international relations perspective, on the other
hand, refers to a policy aimed at dissuading an adversary (usually a nation state)
from using military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives through the threat
of military retaliation. 31 With these very different concepts of deterrence, one must
consider what is meant by deterrence in the federal government's current definition
of homeland security. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states we will
deter all potential terrorists from attacking America through "our uncompromising
commitment to defeating terrorism wherever it appears. " 32
If we take the term deterrence from criminology we would assume that we

are going to deter terrorism by passing new legislation raising the penalties for
specific criminal acts that may be defined as terrorism. However, if we use the
30
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theories of deterrence from on international relations perspective, we would assume
that military action would be used against all terrorists wherever they appear. Both of
these uses of deterrence pose unique policy solutions that may not be effective
against the many forms of terrorism we are likely to face in the future. A theoretical
foundation for homeland security is critical in creating common definitions and
characteristics that can be used across academic disciplines and by policy makers to
design and develop a broad range of short and long term policy solutions against
terrorism.
Homeland security is an exceedingly complex phenomenon that involves
both foreign and domestic counterterrorism and antiterrorism policies and programs
that are influenced by scholars and practitioners in a variety of fields including:
agriculture, business, computer science, criminal justice, engineering, emergency
management, international relations, history, law, military science, political science,
public relations, public health, risk management, security, and strategic studies.
Scholars and practitioners at the 2005 American Society of Industrial Security
Symposium shared the view that the concept of homeland security is not clearly
defined and its meaning varies across disciplines and professions. 33 In addition,
despite the increase in education and training programs relevant to homeland
security, there is no consensus of what constitutes a common body of knowledge to
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establish homeland security as an academic discipline, or even a clear field. 34 This is
due in part to the fact that the study of homeland security in higher education is
being developed in a wide variety of academic disciplines based on the needs of the
Department of Homeland Security and other public organizations as well as the
private sector. 35
The literature on homeland security consists for the most part of reactive
responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by offering a wide range of policy prescriptions
aimed as specific hazards (Al Qaeda) and specific responses. 36 For example, a great
deal of the criminal justice literature post 9/11 focuses on the expanding role of local
law enforcement in counterterrorism. 37 The literature on homeland security thus far
indicates that there is no integrated and comprehensive theory in which to link
homeland security policy and practice. To build a theoretical foundation for
homeland security, this study will focus on the academic literatures that most directly
address the phenomenon of homeland security and terrorism found in criminal
justice, organizational behavior, public administration and international relations.
This literature will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 which will define the lenses
for each of these fields. Most of the definitions of homeland security in the literature
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contain the word terrorism thus a theoretical foundation for homeland security must
include a consideration of what we know about terrorism.
The study of terrorism is first and foremost a study in human behavior that is
highly volatile and constantly changing. Texts on terrorism focus on terrorist events,
ideas, motivations, theories and histories that result in terrorist violence. 38 Upon
review of these texts and scholarly journals one finds that the study of terrorism is
one of the most multidisciplinary subjects in the social sciences. 39 The study of
terrorism can be found in the disciplines of international relations40, political
science41 , criminaljustice42 , sociology43 , history44 , psychology45 , conflict

38

Martin. Gus. (2006).Understanding Terrorism. (2 nd ed.). Thousand, Oaks, CA: Sage; Simonsen,
Clifford E. and Jeremy Spindlove. (2007). Terrorism Today (3 rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall. White, Jonathan. (2006). Terrorism and Homeland Security (5 th ed.). Belmont,
CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. White, Jonathan. (2002). Terrorism: An Introduction (3rd ed.). Belmont,
CA: Thomson-Wadsworth.
39
Texts with multidisciplinary perspectives include: Zimmerman, Ekkart (1983). Political Violence,
Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing.
Alexander, Yonah. (ed.). (1977). Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: John Jay
Press.
40
See: Pillar, Paul. (2001). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington D.C: The Brookings
Institution. Booth, Ken and Tim Dunne. (Ed.) (2002): Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of
Global Order. New York: Palgrave. Hoge, James F. and Gideon Rose (ed.). (2005). Understanding
the War on Terror. New York: Council on Foreign Affairs. Enders, Walter. (2006). The Political
Economy of Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
41
Crenshaw, Martha (ed.). (1983). Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press. Davis, John (ed.). (2005). The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American
Response. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Wilkinson, Paul. (1986). Terrorism and the Liberal
State. New York: New York University Press.
42
Charters, David A. (ed.). (2003). After 9/11: Terrorism and Crime in a Globalised World New
Brunswick: Centre for Conflict Studies. Ross, Jeffrey Ian. (2003). The Dynamics ofPolitical Crime.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Smith, Brent L. (1994). Terrorism in America. Albany, NY: State
University ofNew York Press. Wardlaw, Grant. (1982). Political Terrorism. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
43
Hudson, Rex. (1999). Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: 1999 Government Report on Profiling
Terrorists. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press. Hewitt, Christopher. (1993). Consequences ofPolitical
Violence. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing.
44
Carr, Caleb. (2002). The lessons ofterror: a history ofwarfare against civilians. New York:
Random House.

20
resolution46 and philosophy47 to name a few.

Like the term homeland security,

there is no agreed upon definition of terrorism in the literature but each discipline
conceptualizes the phenomenon in unique ways.
To date there has been no single integrated theory on terrorism because of a
number of challenges. First, there is no agreed upon definition of terrorism or
general theory ofterrorism. 48 In fact some scholars, such as Walter Laqueur,
discourage attempts to define terrorism. Laqueur argued that "many terrorisms exist,
and their character has changed over time and from country to country. The
endeavor to find a general theory of terrorism, one overall explanation of its roots, is
a futile and misguided exercise."49 While other scholars argued that a general
definition of terrorism is possible, they are aware of how difficult such an endeavor
would be given the nature of terrorism research. 50 Second, Crelinsten wrote," that
an inherent weakness in the study of terrorism is that it is a truncated object of study
in which researchers focus on terrorism perpetrated by small groups of non-state
Laqueur, Walter. (2001). A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
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Mind. Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Moghaddam, Fathali M. and Anthony
Marsella. (ed.). (2004). Understanding Terrorism. Washington D.C: American Psychological
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actors and exclude terrorism perpetrated by nation states." 51 Thus, there is a great
deal of information on most insurgent groups, their methods and their organizations,
but very little research on state actors or religious terrorist organizations. 52
Third, terrorism research often has a narrow policy orientation because it is
usually conducted by government organizations and think tanks at the request of
policy makers who are attempting to identify policy solutions to a specific terrorist
threat, and actions that support a foreign policy purpose. 53 The moral outrage that
was created after major terrorist events such as the 1993 and 2001 World Trade
Center attacks, fosters a sense of urgency for governments and policy makers to
solve the serious problem of terrorism. Most research on terrorism is used to advice
policy makers on how best to prevent or control the kinds of terrorism with which
they are most concerned.
Today the U.S. government is focused on defeating Al Qaeda, thus research
has focused on religious terrorism because of the tendency to define this group in
terms of a radical approach to Islam. This focus on a specific type of terrorist
organization can lead to a narrowing of conceptual and methodological frameworks,
51
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which in turn can lead to a narrow conception of what is a very complex problem. 54
As a result, terrorism research becomes "prescriptive in that it seeks specific
solutions to narrowly perceived problems." 55
This has a significant impact on homeland security policy because there is a
close connection between how terrorism is defined and conceived and what
government organization is charged with its prevention and control. For example,
table 1 shows that a uniform definition does not exist even across government
agencies of the United States.
In most definitions of terrorism there are common elements that include the
illegal use of violence or force by subnational actors in order to achieve political
objectives. 56 In addition, terrorism involves acts that are organized or planned in
advance with the purpose of affecting an audience through fear and coercion.
Terrorists are distinguished by their motives, methods and targets. It is clear from
the formal definitions below that they are focused on terrorist groups rather than
nation states.
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Table 1 : Definitions of Terrorism Adopted by Various U.S. Agencies

U.S. Definitions of Terrorism
Agency

Definition

Department of Defense

The calculated use of unlawful
violence to inculcate fear,
intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or
societies in the pursuit of goals
that are generally political,
religious, or ideological. 57
The unlawful use of force and
FBI
violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce
a government, the civilian
population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives 58
State Department
Premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets
by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an
audience. 59
In order to create a broad theoretical foundation for homeland security policy,
all forms of terrorism and all contexts in which terror tactics are employed over a
period of time must be considered. These same sorts of issues that result from a
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narrow conceptual focus can be found when homeland security is conceptualized as
a problem that needs to be addressed by a specific academic discipline, practice or
organization.

Organization of the Study

In order to create a theoretical foundation of homeland security, three
conceptual lenses were developed out of the existing literatures in criminal justice,
public administration, organization behavior and international relations. These
conceptual lenses include: (!)-Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice
Problem/Terrorism as Crime, (II)-Homeland Security as a International Relations
Problem/Terrorism as War, and (III)-Homeland Security as an Organization Design
Problem/Terrorism as a Network. The first part of this research consisted of
developing the theoretical characteristics for each of these lenses which is described
in chapter two. The research focused on applying each lens to a case study, the 1993
World Trade Center bombing. The research is, in fact, three cases in which one
event is looked at from three different conceptual lenses using multiple theories.
These are described in chapters three, four and five.
The framework in which to analyze this critical case is called multiple frame
analysis because each lens will help to frame the phenomenon of homeland security
for analytical purposes. The term frame in this context is not meant to imply a
cohesive set of properties.

The structure of the study incorporates lessons from

25
Graham Allison's Essence ofDecision60 in that three conceptual lenses will be
developed and used to analyze a critical event. While these lenses will be different
than those created by Allison, they will be used in the same manner in which to
analyze a specific case. While Allison's analysis highlights the differences between
each of his models, this research seeks to identify the similarities and overlaps in
each of the lenses in order to build a theoretical foundation for homeland security.

Lens I-Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism as a Crime

If one assumes that terrorism is a political crime, then the study of terrorism
should fall within the field of criminology. A review of the criminology literature,
identified a lack of criminological studies on the issue of terrorism. Thirty years ago,
Stephen Schafer stated that terrorism "has been largely ignored in criminological
studies and has been the subject oflittle research and analysis."61 While this
criticism has resurfaced in criminology since then, 62 it has been even harsher since
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. For example, Kennedy and Lum stated
that criminologists "have generally remained silent about the issue of terrorism."63
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Kennedy and Lum further wrote that the study of terrorism "remains unrefined in
criminology ... with little specification of the subject matter to be explored, the
knowledge base, or the methodologies that can be used." 64 Rosenfeld also
complained that criminologists have not embraced the study of terrorism because of
a lack of "intellectual imagination." 65
Though Hamm (2005) agreed that terrorism is understudied in criminology
and that criminologists have done little to advance testable theories of terrorism, he
identified how criminologists have contributed to the body of knowledge on
terrorism by identifying key studies that have been done both before and after 9/11. 66
However, Kennedy and Lum (2003) argued that criminologists need to become more
engaged in terrorism research because criminology and criminal justice researchers
can make a significant contribution by "improving the conceptualization, analysis
and understanding of this form of violence and aid in the development of meaningful
and informed policy."67 This is important to practitioners in criminal justice because
many anti-terrorism policies directly affect issues about which criminologists often
inform policy makers, such as, policing strategies, penal reform, and crime trends. 68
Developing a conceptual lens of homeland security from a criminal

64

Ibid. 2.
Rosenfeld, Richard. (2002). Why criminologists should study terrorism. The Criminologist. 27 (6):
1-3.
66
Hamm, Mark S. (May, 2005). After September 11: Terrorism research and the crisis in criminology.
Theoretical Criminology. Vol. 9, Issue 2. 237.
67
Kennedy, Leslie W. and Cynthia M. Lum. (2003). Developing a Foundation for Policy Relevant
Terrorism Research in Criminology. Washington D.C: Institute of Justice. I.
68 Ibid.
65

27

justice/criminologist perspective is not only important in advancing research in
criminology but also in identifying strengths and weaknesses of homeland security
policies derived from this perspective. In Lens I-Homeland Security as a Criminal
Justice Problem/Terrorism as a Crime, a number of characteristics are highlighted
and will be explained further in Chapter 2.

Lens II- Homeland Security as an International Relations Problem/Terrorism as
War
In the days following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President
George W. Bush called the American people to arms against terrorism. In his
September 20th address to the Joint Session of Congress, President Bush stated, "We
will direct every resource at our command-every means of diplomacy and
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and
every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of the global
terror network."69 After this speech, the U.S. initiated military operations in
Afghanistan and then in Iraq in our new "War on Terror." This response clearly
identified Al Qaeda and the nation state of Iraq as adversaries engaged in a war with
the United States. Thus, developing a conceptual lens from the discipline of
international relations is important because it highlights the behavior of nation states
and transnational actors.
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The study of international relations focuses "upon relations between officially
constituted decision-makers, or governments, as well as those at an unofficial,
transnational level."70 The behavior of transnational organizations such as Al Qaeda
may so affect the domestic politics of a state that its official decision makers are in
tum influenced in their foreign policy decisions. In this lens, terrorism is explained
as a form of asymmetrical warfare71 by nation states and non-state actors within the
international system, thus offering another critical perspective in building a
theoretical foundation for homeland security policy.
In the international relations literature, terrorism was a largely ignored topic
of study pre 9/11. In a literature review of homeland security, the researcher found
few articles on the topic of homeland security pre 9/11/01 in the United States.
However, after searching in 25 different international relations journals, the
researcher found 22 articles on homeland security that focused primarily on border
security and the role of the armed forces (National Guard, Reserves) in homeland
security. Virtually all of the articles on terrorism found in these same international
relations journals were post 9/11/01. 72
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Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the issue of terrorism was largely
peripheral to mainstream analyses of U.S. foreign policy. 73 Jane Boulden provided
an assessment of the international relations literature as it relates to terrorism. 74
Boulden wrote, "In the scheme of things, terrorism was a lower-level concern when
measured against the security issues generated by the Cold War and subsequently by
the security concerns resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union."75 The
international relations literature in the 1990s focused on the concept of new
terrorism. New terrorism arose at the end of the Cold War when there was an
upsurge in terrorist attacks directed against the United States, as well as fears
associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the possibility that nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons were no longer under strict control, and the
appearance of Osama bin Laden and his transnational network. 76 New terrorism was
different than terrorism of the past, it is argued, because more terrorist organizations
are religiously (rather than politically) motivated and that they are intent on inflicting
harm on a massive scale. 77 Despite this growing interest in religious terrorism,
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religion as an important influence on international relations has largely been ignored
by international relations scholars. 78
Historically, theories of international relations have been concerned with
explaining the behavior of nation states. The dominant theories in international
relations are realism and liberalism, both of which make the nation state as the
primary actor in the world system. 79 For over a half a century, realism has been the
dominant paradigm in international relations. Realists believe that struggles between
states to secure their frequently conflicting national interests are the main action on
the world stage. 80 The basic assumptions of realism include the idea that the
international realm is anarchic and consists of independent sovereign states whose
basic motive is survival or the maintenance of sovereignty. Also, realists believe that
power determines which country prevails, thus they believe that politics is aimed at
increasing power, keeping power, or demonstrating power. 81 From the point of view
of realists, the national interest can be defined as those actions that enhance or
preserve the state's security, its influence, and its military and economic power. 82

If terrorism is a form of international warfare, it should be analyzed as a
result of underlying changes in the international system, particularly differential
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growth in national power. Though realism has had a significant impact on the
discipline of international relations and can be used to help explain state sponsorship
of terrorism, it does not fully explain this transnational phenomenon in the world
system. Realism, argued Louis Klaravas, "is a worldview ill-equipped to deal with
the challenges to security in the 21 st century, as it greatly underestimates the critical
role played by non-state actors."83
In Lens II-Homeland Security as an International Relations
Problem/Terrorism as a War Frame, a number of characteristics are highlighted and
will be explained further in Chapter 2.

Lens Ill-Homeland Security as an Organization Design Problemll'errorism as a
Network
The two distinct ways of conceptualizing homeland security that are
discussed in Lens I and Lens II, in tum, are addressed by government organizations
that have been tasked by our elected representatives with specific missions and goals.
In the United States, the lead agencies for dealing with terrorism have traditionally
been the Department of Justice for domestic terrorism and the State Department and
Department of Defense for international terrorism incidents. Thus, there has been a
focus on both the law enforcement and national security aspects of terrorism. As a
result, the problem of terrorism has largely been defined by these lead agencies, and
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counterterrorism policies and programs have taken on the character of these
organizations. 84
Each of the organizations involved in homeland security has unique
organizational structures, cultures, policies and processes that impact our ability to
deter, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks within the United States. 85 How
organizations behave and are designed for homeland security can be explained in
part by theories of organizational development86, behavior87 and change 88 found in
the disciplines of sociology, 89 psychology90, and public administration.91 Creating
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any organizational system for homeland security is extremely complex because there
are many ways to look at organizations and multiple levels of analysis. Ultimately
homeland security is about understanding the threat of terrorism and organizing
ourselves to prevent and deter attacks and to respond to such attacks in a manner that
maximizes security while safeguarding our constitutional foundations, rule oflaw,
and civil liberties. One of the greatest challenges in our homeland security efforts
has been in organization.
Over the past six years, there has been on going debate over the appropriate
organizational structure to combat terrorism with various proposals emanating from
various commissions and committees studying the problem. For example the
Gilmore Commission reported in its second annual report in 2000: "Over the past
five years, there have been a half a dozen Congressional attempts to reorganize the
Executive Branch's efforts to combat terrorism, all of which failed." 92 The report
found, "The organization of the Federal government's programs for combating
terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable."93 In 2001,
the Hart-Rudman Commission also found problems with our organizational
structures. The commission stated that "the assets and organizations that now exist
for homeland security are scattered across more than two dozen departments and
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agencies, and all fifty states."94 This commission recommended a statutorily created
national homeland security agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating,
and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. 95
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, large scale organizational changes
have taken place within the federal bureaucracy. The creation of the Department of
Homeland Security was one of the most massive reorganizations of government in
American history. Created under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
Department of Homeland Security joined together more than 179,000 federal
employees from 22 existing federal agencies under the umbrella of a single, cabinet
level bureaucratic organization. 96 When faced with a new, complex problem it is no
surprise that our elected officials chose an organizational design, a classic
bureaucratic structure, that was successful in the past in implementing large, new
federal programs.
In the twentieth century, hierarchical government bureaucracy was the
dominant organizational model used to deliver public services and fulfill public
policy goals. This emphasis on bureaucratic organization is seen throughout U.S.
public administration history because it has been seen as the most rational and
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efficient means of organizing.97 The hierarchical organization proved to be
extremely effective and efficient during the industrial era in building the nation's
infrastructure, in coordinating and implementing social programs of the New Deal,
and in mobilizing the country to fight and win two world wars. The Weberian model
of bureaucracy has made for an enduring, predictable and organized machine that has
been capable in implementing complex government programs and projects because it
allows for a great deal of command and control of people and resources, for a high
level of accountability, and for a means of efficiently providing direct services to
citizens.98 Given the hierarchical logic of bureaucracy, it is no surprise that
reorganization efforts often lead to the creation of supra agencies such as the
Department of Homeland Security. However, significant weaknesses of bureaucratic
organizational structures have been identified by public administration scholars over
the past 60 years. 99
Given the inherent weaknesses of bureaucratic organizational structures, one
has to wonder why alternative organizational designs and governance structures for
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homeland security have not been advocated in the public administration and
organization design literatures. Charles Wise wrote one of the few articles on
organizing for homeland security. Wise wrote, "Many times, recommendations for a
particular organizational solution or design of an organization are made on the basis
of past practice or emphasize one or two dimensions of organizational functioning.
Too infrequently, such organizational prescriptions are advanced without a thorough
analysis of the multiple goals required of the organization, the environment in which
it will be required to operate, or the inter-organizational relationships and constraints
that will influence its functioning." 100
Our experience with 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina showed that there are
significant structural limitations with bureaucratic organizational structures when the
events are large and complex. 101 In the 21 st century, problems have become
increasingly more complex and span across cities, states, regions and nation-states.
Bureaucratic systems that operate with command and control procedures and inward
looking cultures are ill-suited to addressing problems that transcend organizational
boundaries such as homeland security.
In Lens III-Homeland Security as an Organizational Design
Problem/Terrorism as Network a number of characteristics are highlighted and
explained in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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Research Methodology and Design

A qualitative research methodology is used for this research for a number of
reasons. First, qualitative research methods are the best means for answering the
research question for this study which asks, "How can we create a foundation for a
comprehensive and integrated theory of homeland security?" Yin argued that the
type of research question is the most important condition to identify the type of
research to be conducted. 102 Cresswell pointed out that one must match the type of
social research problem with a specific approach. For this research a qualitative
methodology was the best means to answer the research question. Second, a
qualitative methodology is especially suited for identifying unanticipated phenomena
and influences, and generating new theory about the latter. 103 Cresswell explained
that qualitative approaches should be used if a concept or phenomenon needs to be
understood because little research has been done on it; the topic is new, the topic has
never been addressed with a certain sample or group of people, or existing theories
do not apply with a certain sample or group under study. 104 To date there has been
little research on homeland security because it is a relatively new phenomenon that
was formulated following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In addition, existing theories on terrorism do not
102

Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. (3 rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
103
Maxwell, Joseph A. (1996). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage. 103 Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. (1990). Basics ofQualitative Research:
Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
104
Cresswell, John W. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method
Approaches. (in'1 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

38

adequately define and explain all types of terrorism. Finally after an extensive
literature review, no coherent theory of homeland security could be found.
An important purpose of this research was to gain greater understanding of
the complex interrelationships and processes that exist in the realm of homeland
security. To accomplish this, the research methodology had to be holistic in that it
needed to allow the researcher to see the whole picture or see the phenomenon from
multiple perspectives. Qualitative research searches for understanding the whole
through macro analysis instead of micro analysis. 105 Berg wrote that "qualitative
research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors,
symbols and descriptions ofthings." 106 In this research, the definitions, meanings,
symbols and descriptions of terrorism and homeland security were identified and
analyzed from multiple perspectives and realities using multiple frame analysis.
Multiple frame analysis is the process of using three different conceptual lenses to
understand a critical case of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Case Study Methodology
This research employed a case study methodology. There are numerous
definitions of case study. For example, a case study was defined by Feagin as "an
in-depth, multifaceted investigation using qualitative research methods, of a single
105
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social phenomenon."

107

Yin further described a case study as an "empirical study

that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" and that it
is used when ''the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not
clearly evident."

108

In this research, a case study of the 1993 World Trade Center

bombing allowed the researcher to not only focus on understanding the dynamics of
how government agencies respond to terrorist attacks in the U.S., but also revealed
the multiplicity of factors which have interacted to produce the unique character of
this terrorist event and the U.S response to this threat.
There are a number of reasons for conducting case studies that are identified
by Yin (2003), Stake (1995) and Burns (1990). 109

First, Burns stated that case

studies are valuable as preliminaries to major investigations as they generate rich
data that may suggest themes for more intensive investigation. 110 Yin and Berg
argued that case studies are valuable in that they provide extremely rich, detailed and
in-depth information about a phenomenon.

111

Second, Burns stated that since case

studies "have the aim of probing deeply and analyzing intensely the many
phenomenons that make up the activities of the unit under study" then
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generalizations to the wider population may be possible.

112

Third, Stake and Feagin

wrote that case studies benefit social research because they focus on holistic
description and explanation. 113 Holistic case study calls for the examination of a
complex phenomenon within a number of contexts including the physical, economic,
political, and ethical. 114 Feagin argued that the holistic approach is a common
feature of case studies because it offers a researcher theoretical gains in
understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions, and motives.11 5 Fourth, a
case study approach is preferred when pertinent behaviors cannot be manipulated. 116
Fifth, a case study may be the best possible description of a unique historical event
such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Finally, case study research can be
used to accomplish a number of purposes including to provide description 117, test
theory 118 or generate theory.11 9
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This research fits into a number of the suggested reasons for carrying out case
study research. First, the purpose of this research was less to test known theories but
rather to discover and develop a new theoretical foundation. Hamel argued that all
theories are initially based on a particular case or object. 120 Hamel wrote, "The indepth study of this case will elicit one or more theories that could be validated by
other objects or cases. 121 Second the behavior of the terrorist actors and goyernment
officials in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing could not be manipulated as
would be required for an experimental study. Third, rich, detailed information from
a broad range of sources were collected in order to support the interpretations and
generalizations arising from the data analysis. Fourth, three different conceptual
lenses were used to provide holistic description and explanation. By using a holistic
approach this research uncovered the complex interactions of the significant factors
of this event or phenomenon. Finally, this research focused on a unique historical
case that represented a critical case in the study of terrorist attacks against the United
States and the government response to this threat.

1993 WTC Bombing Selected as a Critical Case

Selection of a case or cases is an important aspect of building theory from
case studies. 122 Yin argued that the selection criteria for a case should include
whether the case is critical for the theory being tested or developed, whether the case
120
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is the best example of the phenomenon being studied, and whether the research is
feasible in that data is readily available and easy to access. 123 Using these criteria, the
1993 World Trade Center bombing was selected for this case study.
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing is the critical case that was studied
for a number of reasons. Eckstein points out that cases are chosen because they are
typical and are able to provide the most definitive type of evidence to closely fit a
theory "if one is to have confidence in the theory's validity, or, conversely, must not
fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed." 124

In this situation, the 1993

WTC bombing was selected because it was most likely to confirm as well as
invalidate current theories on terrorism. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was
committed by a religious terrorist organization that was transnational in scope and
character thus representing "new terrorism." Also this attack was carried out be a
small terrorist cell that was linked to overseas terrorist organizations and to a
possible state sponsor of terrorism (Iraq).
Eckstein further wrote that a critical or crucial case can be one that is
atypical; it is one that it is so significant that it pushes the boundaries of what is
expected, or it challenges propositions and theories that already exist. 125 Though the
United States has experienced domestic terrorism throughout its history, the 1993
World Trade Center bombing is unique because it was the first terrorist attack
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committed within the United States by members of a foreign terrorist organization. 126
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was selected because it represents a unique
case that meets Eckstein's criteria.
Understanding this new form ofterrorism 127 by transnational terrorist
organizations is critical in shaping our homeland security efforts today. 128 How the
U.S. responded to the 1993 WTC attack was determined by how the threat of
terrorism was perceived in the U.S. at that time. 129 The failure of the U.S. to deter or
prevent the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 not
only demonstrated a lack of understanding of the threat, but also, a significant
weakness in our initial homeland security efforts. It is clear today that the 1993
attack was linked with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as, with current terrorist
activity by Al Qaeda. 130

This case was selected because one of the purposes of this

research is to gain a broader understanding of why individuals, groups and nationstates commit acts of terrorism against the U.S., and how we should structure our
government organizations to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism as part of our
homeland security efforts. Also on the domestic side, it opens the door to examine
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the way criminal justice and international relations scholars and practitioners
understand homeland security. Finally, this case was a precursor to a reconsideration
of the way in which we organize for and manage homeland security policy.
The final rationale for choosing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing rather
than the September 11 th attacks was because it has greater feasibility. The 1993
WTC bombing was selected as a case because there is extensive historical data and
evidence available describing people, places, and events before, during and after the
attack. 131 This research depended a great deal on data collected from documents,
archival records, newspaper accounts, government testimony and reports.
Documents and archival records were accessible and fairly easy to retrieve since
much of the information were found in legal documents related to the criminal trials
of the defendants,

132

as well as, in the federal legislation that was passed between

1993 and 2001. 133 The 9/11 attack would have been harder to study because many of
the documents are classified, the perpetrators are dead or still being pursued, and
individuals involved in responding to 9/11 may be reluctant to talk about the case
because it is too current and may be a conflict of interest for them. Though the 1993
World Trade Center terrorist attack is now overshadowed by the terrorist attacks on
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these same towers in 2001, it is an excellent case from which to build a theoretical
foundation for the study of homeland security policy.

Data Collection
One of the major strengths of using a case study method is that it relies on
multiple sources of evidence. Yin identified six sources of evidence for case studies:
documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation,
and physical artifacts. Since the case study for this research was an historical event,
the primary source of evidence was obtained from available data in the form of
public documents and official records, private documents, mass media, and national
security, political science and social science data archives. There are a number of
benefits in using documentation as a source of evidence in case study research. 134
First, documents can be reviewed repeatedly and are often fairly easy to retrieve. 135
It is evident that library materials are available with much less effort for example
than the gathering of comparable materials through interviews or field work. In
addition, library materials can be easily copied and catalogued using computer
software programs. In addition, documents on the internet or via the library is
relatively less time consuming than doing field work. Second, documents are often
exact in that they contain exact names, dates, references and details of an event. 136
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Third, documents often a broad coverage of the phenomenon or event by covering a
long span of time and many events. 137 Finally, the use of documents and archival
data is unobtrusive. 138 That is the researcher is not intruding into the lives of
subjects as they would in direct observation or interviews. While there are a number
of benefits to using available data such as documents and archival records as
evidence, there are also a number of weaknesses.

Research Quality and Limitations

As a researcher gathers evidence in a case study, a researcher must determine
how relevant the evidence is to emerging research questions and evolving concepts
and how accurate and strong the evidence is that found. 139 The question of relevance
can be a difficult one, especially in historical research. Tilly stated, "All documents
are not equally valuable in reconstructing the past." 140 In addition, some evidence
may stimulate new avenues of inquiry and a search for additional confirming
evidence. Thus a major challenge in this research was ensuring the researcher was
open to new evidence during the entire course of the research project. Glaser and
Strauss warned researchers against depending on "caches of materials" because they
argued that theory generation is most effective when data is drawn from a variety of
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sources that are subjected to _comparative analysis. 141 In this research data was
verified from multiple sources including court records, newspaper accounts and
Congressional testimony. Also this researcher did not find caches of information but
had to go to multiple sources to obtain information for each lens.
Yin (2003), Neumann (2000) and Berg (2004) and others discussed the
importance of evaluating the quality of the data being collected. 142 In this research,
locating and gathering primary sources that contain descriptions of the event from
witnesses and participants was important. Documents were obtained from libraries,
archives, and newspapers, from agencies or organizations involved, and from
individual biographies and testimonies. Primary source data were subject to two
kinds of criticism-external and internal criticism.

143

"External criticism means

evaluating the authenticity of a document itself to be certain that it is not a fake or
forgery." 144 Therefore it was crucial for the researcher to determine, as far as
possible, how, when, where and by whom the document was created. In addition,
the researcher must recognize the inherent bias in all documentary evidence. Yin
warned, "You need to remember that every document was written for some specific
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purpose and some specific audience other than those of the case study being
done." 145
Once the document passed as being authentic, the researcher used internal
criticism which means examining the document's contents to establish credibility. 146
With internal criticism the researcher first must determine if the document is based
on an eyewitness or secondhand account of the event. To determine this, the
researcher noted the people or facts mentioned in the primary document and then
determine if they can be verified with other sources. Next, the researcher examined
"implicit assumptions or value positions, and the relevant conditions under which the
document was produced. " 147 The most effective way of ensuring credibility and
reliability of documents and archival data is to use several different sources of
evidence. 148 Many of the other sources of evidence included secondary sources,
such as newspaper articles, government reports, books and scholarly articles. The
use of secondary sources posed some potential problems for this research.
There are a number of limitations of secondary data and historical evidence.
First, historians and scholars writing about past events often do not present theory
free, objective facts. They, like the researcher, approach the phenomenon with
biases. Secondary sources are written by individuals who attempt to construct the
145
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event from their own perspectives and academic paradigms. Singleton wrote,
"Historical events invariably are subject to a variety of interpretations." It is possible
for more than one interpretation to be valid, especially if the interpretations represent
different levels (e.g. psychological versus sociological) or focus on different aspects
of the event." 149
To reduce the appearance of bias and subjectivity in this research,
triangulation was used as a means of ensuring the validity of claims by offering
different facets of the phenomenon being studied. 150 Denzin identified four types of
triangulation: 1) data triangulation: the use of a variety of data sources in the study
such as documents, surveys, interviews; 2) investigator triangulation: use of several
different researchers; 3) theory triangulation: the use of multiple perspectives to
interpret a single set of data; and 4) methodological triangulation: use of multiple
methods to study a single phenomenon that can include both qualitative and
quantitative methods. 151 In this research, data and theory triangulation was done
throughout the research as a means of refining, broadening and strengthening
conceptual linkages as well as to offer varied perspectives other than that of the
researcher.
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Second with secondary sources and historical records, it is often not clear
how the researcher selected data. When writing about an historical event, the
researcher must often take thousands of pages of information from newspapers,
letters, and other documents and boil this information down into selected summaries
and quotes. Thus, as a researcher one does not know whether information that is left
out is relevant for his or her purposes. 152 For this study, the researcher initially
reviewed books by news reporters, intelligence analysts for the CIA, and terrorism
scholars that had detailed information on the 1993 WTC bombing case. Using the
bibliography and sources from these books, the researcher identified court
documents, government documents and testimony and news articles relevant to the
study. Often this line of inquiry led the researcher to other sources of information.
In addition, the researcher reviewed biographical books of key leaders during
the Clinton administration to identify the decision making processes and priorities
during this time period, and identify key events, polices and programs that were
implemented that impacted this case. Third, the researcher submitted Freedom of
Information Request forms to the City of New York, New York Police Department,
Fire Department of New York, City of New York Budget Office and the Office of
Emergency Management for after action reports on the 1993 WTC bombing. In all
cases, the agency did not have reports for this event or had lost reports. As a result,
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other sources of information were used such as Congressional testimony or news
articles.
In a case study methodology the researcher must ensure that the selection
procedure for evidence is transparent. To ensure objectivity the researcher must be
able to articulate the procedures used to collect and analyze data so that others can
repeat the research if they choose. 153 Yin recommended that to increase reliability,
objectivity and transparency the researcher should maintain a "chain of evidence." 154
In this research, a research log was initially established and maintained that
identified where materials were obtained, how materials were organized, and
conclusions reached from the data. However, this became cumbersome and
impossible to use when the researcher was often visiting hundreds of websites in a
day to find a broad range of information and to verify other information found in
other documents. Some of the 1993 WTC materials were initially not available
because of their classification status and later became unclassified. Instead of
attempting to record every website or article that was read, the researcher
summarized the work in a research notebook, and established a filing system to store
key documents that included the dates and location where the documents were
obtained.
The final limitation of secondary historical evidence is the nature of the
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World Trade Center bombing. In this historical narrative, material was organized
chronologically around a singular event. Neuman wrote that the major difficulty of
the narrative "is that the organizing tool-time order or position in a sequence of
events-does not alone denote theoretical or historical causality." 155 In addition
often historical narratives do not explicitly outline causal theories or concepts.
Finally, in analyzing a historical event, it can be difficult not to analyze the behavior
of individual actors and organizations from a current perspective that gives one the
benefit of hindsight. With the 1993 World Trade Center bombing it was challenging
for the researcher not to think of this event in its historical perspective given the
overshadowing events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the same buildings.

Organization of the Dissertation

In this research, three conceptual lenses were developed with specific
theories and concepts in which to analyze the events of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing. These lenses are described in depth in Chapter 2. A narrative description
of the 1993 WTC bombing from the perspective of Lens I-Homeland Security as a
Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism as Crime is described in Chapter 3, from Lens
II-Homeland Security as a International Relations Problem/Terrorism as War is
described in Chapter 4, and Lens III-Homeland Security as an Organization Design
Problem/Terrorism as a Network is described in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 analyzes the
155

Neuman, W. Lawrence. (2000). Criminal Justice Research Methods. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon. 376.
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information presented in each of the cases using the three lenses. This chapter
highlights the gaps that are created in our knowledge of terrorism and homeland
security when operating from just one of these lenses. At the same time, the analysis
shows the strength of analyzing and assessing complex phenomenon and events from
multiple theoretical perspectives. Finally, chapter 6 concludes with
recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL LENSES IN

MULTIPLE FRAME ANALYSIS

55

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to create a foundation for a comprehensive and
integrated theory of homeland security. In order to understand the problem of
terrorism and the challenges in developing homeland security policy, three
conceptual lenses were identified in the literature from criminology and criminal
justice, public administration and international .relations, and applied to the 1993
World Trade Center bombing using a case study methodology. In this research, each
conceptual lens consists of theories, practices, values, beliefs and assumptions that
serve to shape how the threat of terrorism is perceived as a problem, and how the
problem should be resolved in the form of homeland security policy and programs.
These conceptual lenses highlight how perceptual filters can significantly alter how
individuals and organizations understand and explain phenomena or events. These
conceptual lenses include: (!)-Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice
Problem/Terrorism as a Crime, (11)-Homeland Security as an International Relations
Problem/Terrorism as War, and (111)-Homeland Security as an Organization Design
Problem/Terrorism as a Network. This chapter will explain the characteristics and
assumptions of each of these conceptual lenses based on the literature review for this
research.
The first part of this chapter will describe the characteristics of Lens (!)Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism as a Crime, the second
part will focus on Lens (11)-Homeland Security as a International Relations
Problem/Terrorism as War, and part three will describe Lens(Ill)-Homeland Security

56
as an Organization Design Problem/Terrorism as a Network. The characteristics of
each lens are based on those items most frequently represented in the literature.
However, there is no one paradigm or clear consensus in the academic disciplines on
how homeland security is understood, and therefore what homeland security policies
might be most effective against this threat.
Scholars and practitioners in criminal justice, international relations and
public administration bring different educational backgrounds, experiences, values
and beliefs to their study of historical events and new phenomena. Thus, these
individuals may see completely different things when they look at the same events. 1
In Multiple Frame Analysis, three conceptual lenses are developed to analyze the
1993 World Trade Center bombing (See figure 1). Each lens has distinct theories,
definitions, meanings and strategies.

1

The influence of paradigms on researchers and scholars is described in Thomas Kuhn. (1970). The
Structure ofScientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Samuel P. Huntington.
(March, 1974). Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two and the Many. Political
Science Quarterly. Vol. 89. 1-26.
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Figure 1. Multiple Frame Analysis
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LENS I: HOMELAND SECURITY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROBLEMffERRORISM AS A CRIME
On February 26, 1993, a truck bomb exploded in the basement of the World

Trade Center and killed six and injured more than a thousand people. 2 This bombing
signaled a new terrorist challenge to the U.S. yet it was understood and handled like
any other crime. The FBI investigated that crime and within a few months multiple
terrorist conspirators were prosecuted and convicted. This would appear to be a

success yet the 9/11 report states that the "unfortunate consequence of this superb

2

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. (2004). The 9/11 Report. New York: St. Martin's
Paperbacks.
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investigative and prosecutorial effort was that it created the impression that law
enforcement was well equipped to cope with terrorism."3 In addition, the successful
use of the legal system to address this bombing had the "side effect of obscuring the
need to examine the character and extent of the new threat facing the United States.',4
Terrorism attacks within the U.S. were perceived at this point in history as a criminal
justice problem. 5
This section will describe the major characteristics of Lens (!)-Homeland
Security as a Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism as a Crime that was developed
primarily from the academic literature in the fields of criminology and criminal
justice. First, a summary of the key elements of this lens is provided. Next, each of
these elements is explained to form the framework that was used to analyze the 1993
World Trade Center Bombing from this perspective.

Key Elements of the Criminal Justice Lens
By looking at terrorism as crime and from a criminal justice lens, key
characteristics of homeland security and terrorism are highlighted. First, the criminal
justice lens defines terrorism as a crime that is politically motivated. As such, it is an
act designated to be illegal by state and national criminal codes as well as
international conventions. Second, terrorism is defined as an act of violence whose

3

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. (2004). The 9/11 Report. New York: St. Martin's
Paperbacks. 106.
4
Ibid. 106.
5
Hewitt, Christopher. (2003). Understanding Terrorism in America. New York: Routledge. He
writes, "In the U.S., until recently, terrorism was regarded as a criminal matter, to be handled by the
police, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies." p. 82.
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purpose is to coerce or intimidate a government or population to obtain political or
social benefits. Third, terrorism is distinct from ordinary domestic crime in a
number of ways. Fourth, the causes of terrorism are diverse and can be explained in
part by psychologists, sociologists and criminologists, and other academic
disciplines. Fifth, terrorist violence is a result of feelings of intense anger,
aggression, and frustration by individuals and groups. Sixth, environmental
conditions such as poverty, lack of education, and political disenfranchisement
contribute to causing terrorist violence but these conditions change over time.
Seventh, like most criminals, terrorists can be seen as rational actors who will make
choices from a range of behavioral options; that is they will choose what they
perceive to be in their best interest after conducting a cost/benefit analysis before
engaging in the behavior. In other words, the criminal justice lens identifies
homeland security as a criminal justice problem that should be handled by local,
state, national and international law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement
agencies are concerned with preventing and deterring crime, gathering evidence,
determining the guilt of the individuals responsible for a particular act, and
apprehending and bringing the perpetrators to trial. The criminal justice approach
offers a broad range of counterterrorist strategies to deter, prevent and respond to
terrorism that is quite different from an international relations and organizational
design perspective.
This section is divided into a number of parts that will describe each of the
above characteristics. First, there is a discussion on the legal aspects of terrorism
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including how terrorism has been defined in the criminal codes of the United States
and what criminal statutes have used to prosecute those committing acts of terrorism
against the United States. Second, there is a discussion of some of the theories of
criminology and criminal justice that serve to explain the behavior of individuals and
groups involved in terrorist acts and to identify homeland security policy solutions.
Finally, the role of the criminal justice system in preventing and deterring terrorist
behavior by apprehending, adjudicating and sanctioning law breakers is described as
a key component of this lens.

Terrorism as a Crime

From a criminal justice perspective, terrorists are criminals who commit
crimes from murder and kidnapping, to arson and assassinations. 6 These expressions
of terrorist violence are criminal offenses in national and international law. Thus, a
general characteristic of terrorism has been that it is a crime. In general, crime is
defined as "an act committed in violation of a law prohibiting it, an act omitted in
violation of a law ordering it, or an offense against morality." 7 More specifically,
crime is an act that is deemed socially harmful or dangerous, and is specifically
defined, prohibited, and punished under criminal law. 8
From this definition, crime is identified as a legal concept and is socially and
politically determined. Friedman explains that "behind every legal judgment of
6

7

Christopher Hewitt. (2003). Understanding Terrorism in America. New York: Routledge
National Crime Prevention Institute. (1986). Understanding Crime Prevention. Boston: Butterworth.

4.
8

Siegel, Larry J. (2005). Criminology. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. 13.
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criminality is a more powerful basic social judgment, a judgment that this behavior
deserves to be outlawed and punished." 9 Because what is identified as a crime is
socially constructed and based on the beliefs, values and norms of a particular
culture, what we in the U.S. perceive as terrorism may not be perceived the same
way in another society or culture. For example, the statement "One man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter," has become, not only, a cliche but one of the most

°

difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism. 1 For example, most U.S. citizens would
consider acts of violence directed against Israeli citizens by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization as acts of terrorism. However, the PLO would argue these
acts were part of a legitimate struggle by oppressed and subjugated nations against
foreign occupation of any kind. 11 However in the United States, and in most
countries of the world, terrorism is a criminal behavior which is prohibited by federal
criminal codes.
Definitions of terrorism that are used or are relevant to the criminal justice
system are often found in state and federal statutes. What makes a crime an act of
terrorism is sometimes contained in the elements of the offense even though there
may be no specific definition of terrorism in the statutes. For example, the federal
statutes on terrorism (18 USC 2331) define international and domestic terrorism as
"activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
9

Friedman, Lawrence. (1993). Crime and Punishment in American History. New York: Harper
Collins. 4.
10
Ganor, Boaz. (2003). Defining Terrorism: Is one Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?
In Violence and Terrorism (6th Ed). Edited by Thomas Badey. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill. Chapter
2. 11-19.
11
Ibid. 12.

62
violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, and appear intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or to attempt to affect the conduct of government by mass
destruction, assassination or kidnapping." 12 In the same vein, the FBI defines
terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population in furtherance of political
or social objectives." 13
From these statutes and definitions we can identify common characteristics in
how terrorism is defined from a criminal justice perspective. First, terrorism is
focused on criminal conduct, and is normally not defined in the same broad sense as
sedition was in the World War I era legislation then used to punish what is now
clearly understood to be protected free speech.

14

Second, terrorism involves an act

of violence or threatened act of violence that can be directed at people or property.
Violence is defmed as "the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, cause
damage to, persons or property."

15

Third, what distinguishes terrorism from other

forms of violence is that it is considered a form of political violence. Theodore
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Abrams, Norman. (2003). Anti-Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement. St. Paul, MN: Westgroup. 62.
Poland, James. (2005). Understanding Terrorism. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 11. The
FBI definition is codified in Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations Section 0.85 which is not a criminal
statute.
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Schenken Publishing. 7.
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Honderich defines political violence as the "use of force against persons or things; a
use of force prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, system, territory
of jurisdiction, or personnel of a government or governments, and hence also
directed to changes in the lives of individuals within societies." 16 Unlike other
offenders investigated by the FBI, those identified as terrorists have committed or are
suspected of having committed crimes for political reasons. This was clearly seen in
the case against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in 1993 and against the eco-terrorists in
2007. While there are common features of current law, at the time of the first World
Trade Center bombing, law enforcement officers and prosecutors employed
whatever existing legal foundations they could find to convict suspected terrorists.
In 1993, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a blind Egyptian cleric living in New
Jersey, was convicted of seditious conspiracy 17 for inciting his followers to wage
religious warfare.

18

Seditious conspiracy is a rarely used federal statute that allows

defendants to be convicted for conspiring to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by
force the Government of the United States. Rahman did not participate in the actual
plotting or planning to blow up the United Nations and New York federal buildings
or the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels in New York in 1993, but he was convicted for
providing religious encouragement to the nine co-conspirators. 19

16

Merkl, Peter. (1986). Political Violence and Terror. Los Angeles. University of California Press.
20.
17
This is a federal offense that is defined in USC 2384.
18
United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp.254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
19
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the constitutionality of the sedition law is
Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969) which outlines the three elements required to test for
constitutionality.
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In a 2007 eco-terrorist case in Oregon, the sentencing court made clear what
distinguished eco-terrorism from other crimes were its political intentions.20 In this
case, Judge Ann Aiken had to decide whether the sentencing enhancement for
terrorism21 applied to the defendants in this case who conspired to commit arson and
destruction of public and private property on behalf of the Animal Liberation Front
and Earth Liberation Front. Judge Aiken traced the history of the terrorism
enhancement from 1994 forward and concluded: "Thus, in order to apply the
terrorism enhancement, the court must find the offense of conviction involved or was
intended to promote an enumerated offense intended to influence, affect, or retaliate
against government conduct."22 Judge Aiken chose to use the terrorism
enhancement in sentencing some of the defendants because their acts were intended
to influence and affect government conduct.
What distinguishes terrorism from common domestic crimes is that the
conduct is motivated by political, military, ideological and religious ends; that is it is
a type of political crime. 23 Political crimes are usually defined as violations of the
law motivated by the desire to influence existing public policy, the political system,
or power relations. 24 It is clear that motive is critical in distinguishing political
crimes, such as terrorism, from other types of crimes, yet the motive of a crime is not
20

See United States v. Thurston, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38185.
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. Pub. L. 103-322
that amended the sentencing guidelines to provide an enhancement for conduct relating to terrorism
offenses.
·
22
United States v. Thurston, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38185. At 19.
23
Blakesley, Christopher. (1992). Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection ofHuman
Liberty. New York: Transnational Publishers.
24
Minor, William. (1975). Political crime, political justice, and political prisoners. Criminology. 12.
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65
normally recognized as an intrinsic element of any criminal offense. Stephen
Schafer writes, "Criminal laws do not even distinguish between ordinary and
political crimes, criminal codes just talk about crimes in general, even if the
definition of one or another crime indicates the element of "political" motives, and
only a few codes, if any, qualify certain criminal offenses explicitly as political
crimes."25 This is certainly the case for terrorism.
Individuals arrested and indicted for acts of terror in the United States pre
9/11 have most often not been formally charged with the crime of"terrorism." In
fact, the FBI acknowledged that although various Executive Orders, Presidential
Decision Directives, and Congressional statutes addressed the issue of terrorism,
there was no single federal law specifically making terrorism a crime. 26 Terrorists
were arrested and convicted under existing criminal statutes before 9/11. 27 As a
result, indicted terrorists have over time been charged with a broad range of criminal
offenses. For example, Timothy McVeigh was arrested and convicted for the 1995
Oklahoma City Bombing that killed 168 people. McVeigh was convicted of charges
including homicide offenses, maliciously damaging and destroying a building by
means of explosives, and using a weapon of mass destruction. 28

25

Schafer, Stephen. (1974). The Political Criminal. New York: The Free Press. 28.
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation. (1997). Terrorism in the U.S. p. i. Retrieved from:
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In the Oregon eco-terrorism case, United States v. Thurston, defendants were
found guilty of conspiracy to commit arson, destruction of an energy facility, and
attempted arson of property used in or affecting interstate commerce. Terrorism
often involves a broad range of criminal law violations. Thus, terror suspects are
often charged for violating multiple criminal statutes that may include importing,
manufacturing, and/or storage of explosives, :firearms on board aircraft, kidnapping
and hostage, taking providing material support of terrorists, and fraud and misuses of
visas to name a few. 29
The federal government has, in recent years, recognized the gaps and
ambiguities in existing criminal law, explicitly defining and dealing with terrorism
and has sought to enact new legislation. This has often been the result of major
terrorist events where the federal government has moved to tighten existing laws to
prosecute terror suspects. For example, following the terrorist attack at Centennial
Park during the Atlanta Olympics, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
was passed in 1996.30 Among the provisions of this act were having a federal death
penalty for deaths that result from acts of terrorism, requiring taggant agents in
plastic explosives to identify the time and place of manufacture, making fundraising
for a terrorist organization a criminal offense, and criminalizing participation in
international terrorist activities on U.S. soil. 31 After the terrorist attacks on the

29

See the FBl's Terrorism in the United States reports for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000/2001
at: www.terrorism.info.mipt.org/pdf/terrorism. [accessed 23 May 2007].
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P.L. 104-132; 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
31
Ibid. and Federal Bureau oflnvestigation. (1996). Terrorism in the United States. Retrieved from:
www.terrorism.info.mipt.org/pdf/terrorisminus1996.pdf.: [accessed 23 May 2007].
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World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT
Act' 2 which created new federal crimes for terrorist attacks on mass transportation
facilities, for biological weapons offenses, for harboring terrorists and for providing
material support to individuals or groups that commit crimes of terrorism. 33
Criminal justice analysts have, recognized that there are inherent difficulties
in trying to write legislation that makes an act criminal because it was intended to
invoke political change or influence an audience beyond its immediate victims. 34
Brent Smith argued that "the problem in criminalizing terrorism lies in translating
academic definitions into legally permissible definitions of terrorism."35

In the

absence of an explicitly identified crime of terrorism, U.S. attorneys have had to rely
upon traditional criminal statutes. This strategy, Smith explained, "Portrays
terrorists as mere criminals-persons engaged in crimes for purely personal, rather
than social and political goals."36 However, Smith and others have stated that those
engaged in terrorism are fundamentally different than traditional criminals and, as
such, are treated more harshly in the criminal justice system. 37
This debate was clearly seen in the Oregon eco terrorism sentencing case,

United States v Thurston. A core argument was that the use of a terrorism finding
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would ensure harsher treatment of the defendants in the federal corrections system.
The Justice Department argued that the defendants were part of a cell responsible for
a "campaign of domestic terrorism" that caused over $40 million in damages in
California, Colorado, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming between 1996 and 2001. 38
The defendants argued the terrorism enhancement could not be used because the
government could not establish that "their predicate offenses were calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to
retaliate against government conduct."39 In this case, many of the defendants
received a terrorism enhancement to their sentence and were sentenced from seven to
thirteen years in prison. 40 This case highlights the difficulty for the courts in
determining if specific criminal acts are, in fact, acts of terrorism.
This debate is also found when trying to classify hate crimes which are
offenses against a person or property that is motivated, in whole or in part, by an
offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. 41
Just as legislators, law enforcement officials and prosecutors have had to grapple
with how to define and identify hate crime, and how to prosecute, punish, and

38

Ten Ecoterrorists sentenced in Oregon. June 13, 2007.

At:http://www.adl.orgllearn/extremism_in_america_updates/movements/ecoterrorisrn/the_family_alf

elf_sentenced.htm. [accessed 10 October 2007].
~ United States v. Thurston, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38185.
40
The terrorism enhancement, Section 3Al.4 of federal sentencing guidelines, can add up to twenty
years to each sentence and makes it possible for the defendants to face incarceration in maximum
security prisons.
41
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation. (2005). Crime in the United States 2004: Hate Crime. Washington
D.C: U.S. Department of Justice.

69
prevent hate crime, they will ~ontinue to face these same questions on the issue of
terrorism.

Distinguishing between terrorists and criminals

In this lens, some criminologists and criminal justice scholars have attempted
to characterize and understand the unique behavior of terrorists that distinguishes
them from ordinary criminals. A number of scholars have identified clear
differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals. 42 First, according to Bodrero,
criminals are characterized as opportunistic, impulsive, self-centered and
undisciplined. 43 Thus, most street criminals do not plan their crimes and they react
to easy opportunities on the spur of the moment. For most criminals, crime is a way
for obtaining goods and violence is employed as a means to obtain money or
material goods for the criminal's own self-interest. Gottfredson and Hirschi
described criminal behavior "as acts that involve simple and immediate gratification
but few long term benefits, and are exciting and risky but require little skill or
planning."44 Terrorists, by contrast, normally plan their operations and their violent
acts are intended to have consequences (political or social), most often to create
psychological repercussions beyond the act itself. 45 Martha Crenshaw argued that
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terrorist behavior is a product of strategic choice whereby terrorists make rational,
logical choices of tactics and targets based on such factors as place, size, time,
popular support and government power and capabilities. 46
Second, most criminals try to avoid committing their crimes in public and are
not concerned about influencing public opinion. Terrorists, however, use political
violence as "theatre" or a way to make a symbolic statement about a political
cause. 47 The primary advantage of terrorism to those who sponsor and perpetuate it
is that it has an extremely useful agenda-setting function. That is, terrorist violence,
if its purported cause is skillfully articulated, can put the issue of political change on
the public agenda. In addition, terrorism can be used to create revolutionary
conditions or inspire resistance by the population by example. 48
Third, terrorists are motivated by ideology or religion, while criminals are
generally not committed to any specific ideology. Finally, most criminals are
generally undisciplined, untrained and oriented toward escape, while terrorists are
the opposite.49 Terrorists prepare for their missions, are willing to take risks, and are
attack-oriented. 50
While there are differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals, there
are clear similarities and connections between transnational organized criminal
46
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syndicates and terrorist organizations. 51 First, both terrorist groups and criminal
enterprises are engaged in secretive, illegal activities that transcend national
boundaries. Second, both organizations use covert international networks to plan
and carry out their criminal activities. Third, both types of organizations are national
security threats to nation states because their activities can have damaging effects on
political structures and on international financial markets. For example, South
American drug cartels have had a destabilizing effect on governments through their
financial support of foreign terrorist organizations such as the Sendero Luminoso in
Peru and the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Columbia. 52 Fourth, terrorists and
transnational criminals use many of the same strategies and tactics to promote their
operations including money laundering, use of fraudulent identification cards and
passports, smuggling weapons, and using information and communications
technology to plan their activities. Fifth, criminal enterprises may carry out terrorist
acts against government officials in order to weaken or co-opt government regimes
that may be interfering with their criminal activities. 53 Organized criminal
syndicates such as the Chinese Triads and Columbia drug cartels are usually
politically passive and engage in political violence reactively to resist government
law enforcement campaigns. 54
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Finally, there is growing concern by U.S. policymakers about the inherent
danger these groups pose when there is cooperation and coordination between
them. 55 Transnational criminal enterprises have covertly provided terrorist groups
with arms and other goods because they are adept at smuggling drugs and weapons
across boundaries through covert international networks. In addition, the drug trade
has become particularly prominent in the financing of some terrorist and extremist
movements including Al Qaeda.

In the case of Afghanistan, numerous reports indicated that the drug trade
was a major source of income for the Taliban from 1996 to 2001, and that the
Taliban regime used poppy-derived income to arm, train and support fundamentalist
groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Al Qaeda.

56

Since

the U.S. led invasion in 2001, Afghanistan has had record crops of poppies from
which 90% of the world's heroine has been produced. 57 U.S. and British
counterterrorism experts say Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies are increasingly
financing operations with opium sales. 58
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The merger of transnational crime and terrorism will continue to have a
profound impact on U.S. homeland and national security policies. Today, the
delineation between organized crime, terrorism, and illegal trafficking has become
blurred and there is increasing overlap between these activities. Alliances between
profit motivated traditional criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations will pose
significant challenges to homeland security in the future.
Understanding the distinct behaviors between traditional criminals and
terrorists, as well as, the linkages between terrorists and criminal syndicates are
important for policymakers who are attempting to craft new counterterrorism
strategies. While these distinctions are key to crafting crime prevention and
deterrence strategies, the tendency has been to view terrorists as criminals, and as
such, to fall back on more familiar crime control concepts and theories. In the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, homeland security is defined in part as
those activities that serve to deter and prevent terrorism. From the criminal justice
lens, criminal law serves as a mechanism of social control to deter individuals from
committing crimes. So framed, it is clear why it is linked by their scholars to one of
the most important theories in criminology which is deterrence theory.

Theories of Criminology to Understand Homeland Security

Criminology seeks to answer questions such as: what are the major causes of
crime; why do these causes increase the likelihood of crime; how are the causes of
crime related to one another in affecting crime; and what are the timing and form of
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causal effects. 59 If terrorism is perceived as a crime, then theories of crime and
criminal behavior should help to describe the broad behavior identified as terrorism.
The disciplines of criminology and criminal justice have many theories to describe
criminal behavior, but for this study those most relevant to homeland security are
highlighted. The following section discusses deterrence and crime prevention
theories, as well as, strain theory from the field of criminology and criminal justice.

Defining Deterrence from a Criminal Justice Perspective

The primary purpose of criminal law has been deterrence. "To deter is to
dissuade an agent from a course of action by alerting him/her to consequences that
he does not desire." 60 In classical criminology, deterrence occurs when someone
refrains from committing a crime because he/she fears the certainty, swiftness and
severity oflegal punishment. 61 Deterrence studies have had a significant impact on
criminological research for many years.
Two prominent findings in deterrence research are that the certainty of
punishment more consistently found to deter crime than the severity of punishment,
and that extralegal consequences of crime seem at least as great a deterrent as do the
legal consequences. 62 Nagin's research indicated that extralegal sanctions, such as
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the fear of peer disapproval, embarrassment or social stigma, discourage offending
behavior of traditional criminals. 63 Grasmick and Bursik argued that the term
deterrence should be expanded from its focus on legal sanctions to include socially
imposed costs such as embarrassment and loss of respect that actors might
experience when they break the law and violate the norms of the community. 64 Their
research showed that threats of shame and legal sanctions inhibit actors from
committing the offenses of tax cheating, petty theft and drunk driving. 65
Deterrence theory assumes that individuals are rational actors who choose to
obey or violate the law by a rational calculation of the risk of pain from
incarceration, social stigma, death penalty versus the potential pleasure and
economic gain derived from the criminal act. 66 Criminal action is the result of a
calculated cost-benefit analysis whereby criminals take into account the expected
costs in terms of legal penalties and the chances of getting caught with the rewards to
be gained. 67 Thus, the concept of general deterrence assumes that crime is prevented
and deterred by the efficacy of legal sanctions administered by the state. Ackers
wrote, "To prevent crime, criminal law must provide reasonable penalties which are
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applied in a reasonable fashion to encourage citizens to obey rather than violate the
· law."68
The idea that lengthy imprisonment, determinate sentencing, mandatory
minimum sentences, and severe habitual offender laws (such as "three strike" laws)
will ensure greater community safety is grounded in the expected utility principle of
deterrence theory. 69 Enhanced terms of incarceration mandated by these laws, in
theory, should result in decreased levels of crime. This was the case in the research
of Daniel Kessler and Steven Levitt which concluded that sentence enhancements
that came into effect in California in June, 1982 as a result of Proposition 8 were
responsible for a subsequent drop in serious crime in this state. 70 However, research
conducted by Tomislav Kovandzic and John Sloan on the effects of "three strikes"
laws on homicide rates in 188 large cities between 1980 and 1999, found that
homicide rates increased by 10-12% in the short term and that that there was
virtually no evidence that these laws had any crime reduction impact through
deterrence or incapacitation. 71 These research conclusions highlight the difficulty in
conducting deterrence research and formulating policy prescriptions to a broad range
of crime issues based on general deterrence theory.

68

Ibid. 17.
Becker, Gary. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal ofPolitical
Economy. 16: 169-217. Also see: Ehrlich, Issac. (1973). Participation in illegitimate activities: A
theoretical and empirical investigation. Journal ofPolitical Economy. 81: 521-565.
7
Kessler, Daniel and Steven Levitt. (April, 1999). Using sentence enhancements to distinguish
between deterrence and incapacitation. Journal ofLaw and Economics. Vol. 42 (1). 343-363.
71
Kovandzic, Tomislav. And John Sloan. (2002). Criminology. Vol. 1 (3). 399-424.
69

°

77
Homeland security policy developed since 9/11 includes those activities that
are focused on preventing and deterring terrorism in the United States. From a
criminal justice perspective, common policy reactions to acts of terrorism within the
U.S. have been to call for more severe penalties, and increased certainty of
conviction and punishment. For example, following the attacks on September 11,
2001, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act that created new terrorism related crimes
such as acts of violence against mass transportation systems and harboring
terrorists. 72 Second, legislation was passed that criminalized the activities that
terrorists need to engage in if they are to function (e.g., engaging in money raising,
eliciting support, or openly recruiting)'. 73 For example, section 371 of the Patriot Act
is aimed at terrorists who might infiltrate the U.S. with large quantities of cash to
support terrorist cells. Third, this legislation has given extraordinary investigative
powers to law enforcement and other investigative agencies that have responsibility
in investigating terrorist crimes. For example, the Patriot Act allows the FBI to
conduct preliminary investigations without having evidence of a specific crime, and
has numerous provisions that enhance law enforcement authority to conduct
surveillance of suspected terrorist targets.
The primary weakness of using legal sanctions as a deterrent of terrorism is
that the actual or perceived threat of formally applied punishment by the state has not
been proven to provide a significant marginal deterrent effect as it does with
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criminals. 74 While deterrence theory may explain why some criminal behavior is
prevented it has numerous weaknesses when applied to terrorists that will be
discussed in Chapter Three.
Those operating from a criminal justice lens assume that the threat of
punishment may not always deter certain types of terrorists, however, they may be
influenced by the actions of law enforcement professionals. Since classic
criminologists would argue terrorists are predominantly rational actors who make
cost/benefit calculations to identify whether the risks are worth the rewards, then
increasing their risk of being caught or that they will be unsuccessful in achieving
their objectives may deter them from attempting a specific attack. 75 Thus, the
criminal justice system may employ a broad range of strategies to prevent and deter
terrorism.

Preventing Terrorism with Crime Prevention Strategies
In addition to a heavy reliance on deterrence, the major tactics and strategies
used to prevent terrorism from the criminal justice lens have been based on crime
prevention strategies. Crime prevention is defined by the Crime Prevention
Coalition of America as "a pattern of attitudes and behaviors directed both at
reducing the threat of crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security to
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positively influence the quality of life in our society and to develop environments
where crime cannot flourish." 76 Michael Tonry and David Farrington identified four
major crime prevention strategies: law enforcement, developmental, community and
situational prevention. 77 Law enforcement or criminal justice prevention is founded
on the expectation that the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws deter
potential offenders by fear of punishment and incarceration. 78 Thus, part of this
strategy is to prevent crimes by revising criminal codes. However studies over time
have shown that alterations in sanctioning policies are unlikely to substantially
influence crime rates. 79

As a result, Tonry and Farrington argued that governments

should pursue a wider range of crime prevention strategies that include
developmental, community and situational crime prevention.
Tonry and Farrington defined developmental prevention as those
interventions "designed to prevent the development of criminal potential in
individuals, especially those targeting risk and protective factors discovered in
studies of human development. " 80 Developmental prevention strategies focus on
reducing the risk factors that are predictive of delinquency, crime and antisocial
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behavior. Thus interventions include enhancing children's physical and mental
health, improving school performance, and reducing risks of child abuse.
Tonry and Farrington defined community prevention as those interventions
"designed to change the social conditions that influence offending in residential
communities."81 Community prevention is based on the ecological and community
explanations of crime that were first studied by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay of
the University of Chicago. 82 Community crime prevention efforts have included
altering building and neighborhood designs to increase natural surveillance,
improving the physical appearance of areas, and organizing community residents in
Neighborhood Watch programs. Thus, after the events of 9/11, President Bush
called for greater citizen involvement in homeland security through initiatives such
as Citizen Corps and Freedom Corps with the belief that neighborhood crime
prevention strategies would combat crime including crimes associated with
terrorism. The reality has been, even for ordinary crimes, that people organize such
groups when there is a current crime and disorder problem that needs resolution and
most programs flounder once the crime problem subsides.
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In their four part model, Tonry and Farrington defined situational prevention
as those interventions "designed to prevent the occurrence of crimes, especially by
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reducing opportunities and increasing risks. " 84 Ronald Clarke stated that situational
crime prevention comprises measures that are directed at highly specific forms of
crime, and involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate
environment in a systematic way. 85 These measures include various forms of target
hardening and defensible space architecture and crime prevention through
environmental design. 86
In this approach, the physical design features of a community or building are
manipulated to reduce the opportunities for crime. For example, Newman's study of
New York public housing highlighted the negative design features of high rise
housing projects, such as hidden entrances, easy accessibility of the buildings to
strangers, and an inability to observe lobbies, which increased the fear of crime. 87
One of the most obvious ways to reduce criminal opportunities, including terrorism
from this perspective, is to obstruct or "target harden"-to increase the physical
security of targets. Target hardening includes the installation of locks, bars for
windows, intruder alarms; fences, and other devices that make crime more difficult
to carry out.
Situational crime prevention strategies often include physical, electronic and
procedural measures that serve to deter criminals from attacking, detecting them if
84
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they do attack, delaying them so they can be apprehended, and denying them access
to certain targets. 88 These strategies have been applied to prevent terrorist attacks
against key infrastructure within the United States. For example, following the 9/11
attacks, there was an increase in physical, electronic and procedural security
measures in many areas. Airports, ports, and chemical and nuclear plants have
added perimeter barriers, electronic surveillance systems, and adopted procedures
and technologies to search people and property. There are inherent challenges in
using some of the crime prevention strategies described by Tonry and Farrington in
preventing a broad range of behaviors that can be classified as terrorism. These will
be discussed in Chapter 6.

Strain Theories to Explain Terrorist Behavior

The field of criminology, like political science and international relations,
offers multiple perspectives to explain criminal behavior that focuses on individual
(biological, psychological, and choice theories), social (structural and process
theories), political and economic (conflict theory), and multiple developmental
factors. 89 The biological or psychological perspective of criminology assumes that
crime is a function of chemical, neurological, genetic, personality, intelligence and
mental traits.
One of the strongest proponents of the theory that terrorist behavior is a
product of psychological forces is Jerrold Post. While Crenshaw wrote that terrorists
88
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resort to violence as a willful choice that is selected from a range of perceived
alternatives, Post stated that "political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence
as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their psycho-logic is constructed
to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit. " 90 Post contended
that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of
terrorism. His position supports the narcissistic rage hypothesis which is primarily
concerned about the early development of the terrorist.91 This hypothesis assumes
that individuals have damaged self concepts due to psychological damage during
childhood. This hypothesis is supported, in part, by social process theories in
criminology which argue that crime is a function of upbringing, learning, and
control, and that peers, parents and teachers influence behavior. 92 As a result, those
who threaten homeland security can de described as sociopathic, arrogant and
lacking in regard for others.93 In addition, these individuals need an outside enemy
to blame for their own inadequacies and wealrnesses.
The psychology of terrorists is reflected in their rhetoric which becomes the
justification for their violence. Post points out that this rhetoric is polarizing and
absolutist-- an "us versus them" mentality with no shades of gray. 94 Often the
rhetoric identifies a perceived hostile government as the source of all evil that must
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be destroyed. This is clearly seen in the fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden in 1998
that calls on every Muslim "to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever
and whenever they find it."95 The implications of this hypothesis for counterterrorist
strategy is that "terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being
terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their
very reason for being."96 Thus, the most effective way to countering terrorism is to
reduce external support, to facilitate pathways out of terrorism, and to reduce the
attractiveness of terrorism for alienated youth. 97
Besides the narcissistic rage hypothesis, another general hypothesis of
terrorism from the field of psychology and sociology includes the frustrationaggression hypothesis which is linked to anomie and strain theories in criminology.
The frustration-aggression hypothesis suggests that every frustration leads to some
form of aggression, and that every aggressive act relieves that frustration to some
extent.98 Margolin wrote, "Much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of
various political, economic, and personal needs or objectives. A terrorist act is
frequently intended to elicit a response that will demonstrate that a government will
continue to frustrate the terrorist's 'legitimate aspirations.' A government's response
establishes a context within which the terrorist activity is explained and
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nonnalized."99 This hypothesis assumes that stress builds up in an individual or
group, until it reaches a breaking point that motivates a person or group to
violence. 100 The violence, then, is a means to release negative energy as a form of
ventilation or catharsis. Nieburg argued that the concepts of frustration and
aggression are too complex and diverse to be reduced to nothing more than a simple
reflex. 101 Criminology offers a more complex understanding of the frustrationaggression hypothesis in general strain theory.
General strain theory argues that strains or stressors lead to crime because
they contribute to a number of negative emotions, such as anger and frustration.
Agnew stated, "These emotions in turn create pressure for corrective action, and they
may also reduce ability of individuals to cope in a legal manner, reduce concern for
the costs of crime, and increase the individual's disposition for crime." 102 In
addition, strain theory argues that many lower class individuals have high aspirations
which they are unable to achieve through legitimate channels; as a result some of
these individuals become frustrated and turn to violence. 103
Robert Merton (1938) stated that "crime is a symptom of specific sort of
social disorganization: the unequal distribution of means of success in society
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necessary to achieve the American dream." 104 This inequality of opportunity creates
situations in which individuals engage in crime in order to achieve culturally defined
success. Merton argued that the American dream promotes the idea that equal
opportunity and therefore success is available to all.
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Merton explained that equal

opportunity for success does not exist for everyone because disadvantaged minority
groups and the lower class do not have the same access to such legitimate
opportunities such as conventional educational and occupational opportunities. 106
Later studies found that violent crime is linked to inequality of opportunity. 107
According to strain theorists, the stressors that lead to crime have been
categorized into three general categories: (1) the failure to achieve positively valued
goals such as money, status, and autonomy; (2) the loss of positively valued stimuli
such as property and civil rights; (3) and the presentation of negatively valued
stimuli, such as oppression or physical abuse. 108 Strain theory assumes that there
are environmental conditions, such as poverty, lack of education and political
disenfranchisement, which cause individuals to turn to violent criminal behavior,
including terrorism.
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Strain theory also argues that stress can be produced when there is a
disjunction between expectations and achievements. For example, the black
uprisings in America in the 1960's were a result of the growing frustration felt by
blacks over racial discrimination Davies argued that people are likely to revolt or
rebel when there is widespread and intense frustration due to an intolerable gap
between what people want and what they get economically, socially and
politically. 109 This is clearly seen in the Arab world today in which many young,
middle class men are unable to find work or work commensurate with their
education and skills. In Egypt and Algeria for example, hundreds of thousands of
young people graduate from universities each year; of these only about half will find
a job. 110 This is one factor that has contributed to radicalization of Muslim youth in
the Middle East. While theories from criminology can explain some aspects of
terrorist behavior, they do not provide the complete picture.
Merton identified the most widespread deviant response to strain as
"innovation'.' in which one maintains commitment to successful goals but takes
advantage of illegitimate means to attain them. 111 For example, for a person may
take up burglarizing homes as a mean of obtaining the items that demonstrate
material success. Another reaction, according to Merton, is "rebellion" in which one
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rejects the system altogether and tries to replace it with a new one. 112 Rebellion can
include politically motivated terrorism which is motivated by individuals with a
deeply held sense of grievance over some form of political, social or economic
injustice. Modem terrorist organizations justify their actions, not only, with stated
political aims, but also, by appeals to some higher universal truth and the demand for
political transformation. 113
It is often assumed in popular discussions on terrorism, that terrorist acts are
a response to injustice or intolerable conditions, be it poverty, or political or social
oppression. Poverty, especially because of its severely unequal distribution among
nations, is a factor that is often considered in discussions of the root causes of
terrorism. 114 For example, Thomas Friedman argued that Islamic rage against the
U.S. is caused in part by the relative failure of Islamic nations to achieve economic
success. 115 This thesis was confirmed by the research by Jessica Stem which found
that most people who join terrorist groups are from the poorest classes within a
nation. 116 Rampant poverty, inequality and large numbers of young people in the
developing world facing dim economic prospects, pose a serious threat to the U.S.
because it is in failed or weakened states where terrorist organizations are able to
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find safe havens and recruit legions of young men and women to their causes. 117
Poverty makes the life of terrorist cadres seem to be a relatively attractive option. 118
Contrary to accepting poverty as a motivating factor, Laqueur found that the
historical evidence does not support the idea that a direct correlation exists between
terrorism and poverty, and that the data are inconclusive on whether terrorists are
primarily recruited from the lowest classes of a nation or region. 119 A study by
scholars Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova reached the conclusion that the terrorists
are not poor people and do not come from poor societies.
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In fact, a number of

terrorist organizations, from the Basques in Spain to Al Qaeda, recruit most of their
members from middle class families. While poverty may not have a direct
correlation to terrorism, economic inequality, perceived injustice and other
grievances draw individuals into terrorist organizations. 121
While theories from criminology can explain some aspects of terrorist
behavior, they do not provide the complete picture. The theories discussed in this
section focus on factors that contribute to individual and group violence, and do not
explain why terrorism is used by nation states against their own populations or as a
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policy tool to destabilize the government regimes of other nation states. In the final
section, the criminal justice lens looks at how homeland security is addressed by the
criminal justice system.

Role of the Criminal Justice System in Homeland Security
The contemporary criminal justice system in the United States has played a
key role in homeland security when terrorism has been perceived as a crime, because
all parts of the criminal justice system are activated when an individual or group
commits an act of terrorism within the United States and they are caught, prosecuted
and found guilty of the crimes. The criminal justice system consists of three main
components: law enforcement agencies charged with investigating crimes and
apprehending suspects; the court system where a determination is made whether a
suspect is guilty as charged; and the correctional system charged with treating and
rehabilitating offenders and with incapacitating them.
In the criminal justice lens, local, state and federal law enforcement agencies
play a critical role in homeland security. At the national level, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has been designated the lead federal agency in investigating terrorist
groups in the United States and acts of terrorism directed at Americans overseas.
The FBI received this authority through a series of presidential directives and
legislation including President Reagan's national security decision directive #30, 122
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and President

Although the FBI has had this role

for over twenty years, throughout most of the 1990s counterterrorism was not seen as
the priority in this organization. Before 9/11, the highest priority goal for the FBI
was the reduction of violent crime, including organized crime and drug and gang
related violence. 125 However since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the highest priority
for the department has been to protect Americans by preventing acts of terrorism.
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In the pre 9/11 era, terrorist attacks against the U.S. did not significantly alter
the strategy or operations of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
th
However, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, law enforcement agencies have

had to shift their focus to homeland security. Vincent Henry wrote, "The attacks
have had, and will continue to have, a profound effect upon the way police, law
enforcement and other public safety agencies do business, ultimately requiring that
these agencies substantially alter their traditional policies, training, operations and
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interactions with other agencies as well as with the communities they serve." 127
Though the National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes the role of the
federal government in homeland security, it is clear that local police agencies have a
significant role to play.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) argued that all
"terrorism is local" and that regardless of the global and international connections,
any actual terrorism attack is going to occur at the local level, and it will be local
first responders that will initially deal with the attack. 128 As first responders to a
terrorist attack, local police officers will be responsible for assessing the crime scene
for hazards, calling for and providing medical assistance, identifying victims and
witnesses, securing the crime scene and physical evidence, and notifying supervisors
and investigators who will be handling the case. 129 In addition to responding and
investigating terrorist attacks after they occur, local police are required to be more
proactive in preventing and detecting acts of terrorism by intelligence gathering and
analysis and by completing threat and vulnerability assessments in their
jurisdictions. 130 In addition, since 9/11 there has been increased collaboration
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between local law enforcement agencies and the FBI through Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, and the creation of fusion centers or intelligence operations centers. 131
From the criminal justice perspective, terrorism is considered a criminal matter to. be
handled by local, state and national law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement is
concerned with gathering evidence, determining the guilt of the individuals
responsible for a particular act, and apprehending and bringing the perpetrators to
trial.
Criminal justice is not only viewed as a system, but also as a process that
takes offenders through a series of decision points beginning with the investigation
of a crime and arrest of suspects, to adjudication where determination of guilt or
innocence is determined in a trial, and concludes with correctional treatment and
release. 132 While this process is more complex than this and can vary based on if the
crimes are classified as misdemeanors or felonies, what is critical about this process
is that it is bound by specific constitutional procedures and protections. The formal
justice process implies that criminal defendants charged with a serious crime are
entitled to a full range of rights under the law including the right to refuse to answer
questions when placed in police custody, the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury, and the right to have trial procedures subject to review by a higher
authority to name a few. The parts and processes of the criminal justice system are
131

Bodero, D. Douglas. (February, 2002). Law Enforcement's New Challenge to Investigate, Interdict
and Prevent Terrorism. Police Chief 41-48.
132
For a detailed explanation of the criminal justice process see: Senna, Joseph and Larry
Siegel.(2001). Essentials of Criminal Justice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 11-17. And Bureau of
Justice Statistics. (1997). The criminal justice system flowchart. At:
http://www.ojp.usdoi.gov/bjs/flowchart.htm#efiles. [accessed 3 March 2007].

94
authority to name a few. The parts and processes of the criminal justice system are
clearly seen in the investigation and prosecution of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing which will be discussed in Chapter 3.
In the criminal justice lens terrorism is defined as a crime and the criminal
codes of the United States are used to prosecute defendants and to guide sentencing
for acts of terrorism against the United States. In addition, the criminal justice lens is
influenced by theories of criminology which try to explain the behavior of criminals.
Understanding why specific crimes, such as terrorism, occur is a prelude to
developing strategies to prevent or deter specific criminal behaviors. Different
criminology theories suggest alternative ways of reducing crime and countering
terrorism; this in turn influences the type of policy solutions in homeland security.
Finally, this lens identifies homeland security as a criminal justice problem that is
best resolved by utilizing the institutions and processes of the criminal justice
system. The criminal justice approach offers a broad range of counterterrorist
strategies to deter, prevent and respond to terrorism that is quite different from an
international relations perspective.
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LENS II: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PROBLEM/TERRORISM AS WAR

At 7:00 p.m. on April 15, 1986, the United States naval and air forces struck
designated targets in Libya in retaliation for the bombing of La Belle Disco in
Berlin133 and in order to deter and preempt Muammar el-Quadda:fi' s continuing
terror campaign. 134 President Ronald Reagan stated in a televised address later in the
day, "When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world, on the direct
orders of a hostile regime-we will respond ... We believe this preemptive action
against his terrorist installation will not only diminish Colonel Quadda:fi's capacity to
export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal
behavior." 135 Thus, the U.S. used preemptive military strikes against a state sponsor
and supporter of terrorism as a means of deterring future acts of terrorism against the
United States. The nature of the terrorist threat would evolve into a transnational
actor by the 21 st century that would have a significant impact on the world system.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. declared itself to
be at war against global terrorism. 136 President George W. Bush argued that this
terrorist threat posed a new kind of war: "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda,
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach
133
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has been found, stopped and defeated." 137 Operation Enduring Freedom began with
the October, 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The immediate objectives of this
military campaign were to destroy the safe havens and training camps of Al Qaeda in
Taliban controlled Afghanistan, collect intelligence, capture and kill terrorists, and
disrupt the international terrorist network. 138
This section will describe the major characteristics of Lens (11)-Homeland
Security as an International Relations Problem/Terrorism as War that was developed
primarily from the academic literature in the fields of international relations and
national security. First, a summary of the key elements of this lens is provided.
Next, each of these elements is explained to form the framework that is used to
analyze the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing from this perspective. Chapter 4
provides an analysis of this case from the International Relations lens. Finally, an
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these elements is discussed in Chapter 6.

Key Elements of the International Relations Lens
This lens conceptualizes terrorism as a form of warfare and is grounded in an
international relations foundation thus, presenting key characteristics that are distinct
from the other lenses. First, homeland security is linked to national security in
protecting the U.S. and its interests at home and abroad. Second, terrorism is
perceived as a strategy of asymmetrical warfare that is directed at people,
particularly civilians and noncombatants, in violation of the laws of war. It is a
137
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rational strategy of asymmetrical warfare that can be distinguished from guerrilla
activities. Terrorists are seen as rational actors who make decisions that are in their
best interest. Third, terrorism is an act of violence whose purpose it to coerce or
intimidate a government or population in order to obtain primarily political goals.
Fourth, terrorism is a form of psychological warfare that targets civilians as a means
if instilling fear in a population. Fifth, terrorism can be perpetrated by individuals as
well as domestic, international and transnational groups and agents of nation-states.
Sixth, terrorism can be used as a tool of foreign policy by nation states as
means of balancing power in the world system, of destabilizing hostile regimes, and
of avoiding direct military confrontation with a more powerful nation state. A
weaker nation state and transnational organizations will use terrorism as a foreign
policy strategy over conventional warfare because conventional warfare will simply
be too costly in terms of personnel and resources. Seventh, there are many possible
causes of terrorism that can be explained by a wide range of international relations
theories. Terrorist violence by groups and individuals may be the result of feelings
of intense anger, aggression and frustration due to environmental conditions such as
globalization, deprivation or oppression. Eighth, environmental factors such as
poverty, lack of economic development, religion and ideology, and political
disenfranchisement contribute to causing terrorist violence but these conditions
change over time. Ninth, Cold War theories of deterrence may not be effective
against transnational terrorist organizations.
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Finally, the international relations lens considers terrorism as a form of
warfare that is an international relations problem that should be handled by national
intelligence agencies, the State Department, the National Security Council, and the
United States military. These agencies are focused on the national security of the
United States and are concerned with preventing, deterring. and responding to
international terrorism through a broad range of offensive and defensive
counterterrorism strategies. These strategies are influenced in part by realist theories
of international relations.
This section is divided into three parts that describe each of the above
characteristics. First, there is a discussion on how terrorism has been seen as a form
of asymmetrical warfare that is conducted by nation states as well as transnational
organizations to meet a variety of political objectives. Second, there is a discussion
of some of the theories of international relations that serve to explain the behavior of
groups and nation states involved in terrorist acts, and to identify how these theories,
in turn, shape homeland security policy. This research recognizes that there are
many international relations theories that can be used included in this case, but chose
to focus on globalization and realism. Finally, the role of national security
institutions (such as the CIA, Department of Defense, and State Department) in
preventing, deterring and responding to terrorism is described as a key component of
this lens.
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Terrorism as War
In 1998, Osama bin Laden called on Muslims throughout the world "to kill
the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it." 139 In
this fatwa, Osama bin Laden was openly calling Muslims into a holy war with the
U.S. International relations scholars Walter Laqueur and Anthony Cordesman
argued that transnational and international terrorism 140 are a form ofwar. 141 There
are a variety of definitions for the term "war." For example, Webster's dictionary
defines war as "opened armed conflict as between nations" as well as "any active
hostility and struggle." 142 Carl von Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence
intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will."

143

Von Clausewitz viewed war

as a rational instrument (primarily for nation states) that was waged in order to
achieve a goal and based on estimated costs and gains. 144

Homeland security in

this lens is understood as defending the U.S. against terrorism, and that, in tum, is
viewed as a form of warfare which is used as a rational instrument or tool by nation
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states and organizations to achieve strategic objectives. 145 Warfare is defined "as the
action of waging war", or "conflict of any kind." 146 In this lens, terrorism is viewed
as a strategy by which an organization or nation state uses force or the threat of force
for political, social or ideological ends. Colin Gray defined strategy as "the bridge
that relates military power to political purpose .. .It is the use that is made of force
147
Terrorism is a strategy of
and the threat of force for the ends of policy."

asymmetrical warfare whereby surprise, ambush, psychological tactics, avoidance of
direct military confrontation, and abandonment of conventional rules of conduct are
148
the primary stratagem to achieve political goals.

Some scholars have argued that there is a critical difference between
terrorists and "freedom fighters" or guerrillas, in that, terrorists use military tactics
and strategies, such as the targeting of civilians in suicide attacks, in violation of the
rules of war in an effort to coerce, and seek to influence and intimidate an audience
in order to bring about social or political change.

149

Many legal scholars have

explained that the law of armed conflict absolutely and unconditionally bans
terrorism irrespective of the justness of the terrorist's cause.
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however, has long been a strategy of insurgent movements because terrorist attacks
serve to disrupt and weaken government control of a population, to create conditions
of anarchy, to demonstrate the strength of insurgents and gain popular support, and
to publicize the terrorist's political cause. 151 In today's international arena, it is often
difficult to distinguish between terrorists and insurgents because both use strategies
and tactics of asymmetrical warfare.
Terrorist organizations realize they are much smaller and weaker than most
national armies, thus they engage in asymmetrical warfare. 152 Asymmetrical warfare
is defined by the U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff as "attempts to circumvent or undermine
an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ
significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operations. It consists of
unanticipated or non-traditional approaches to circumvent or undermine an
adversary's strengths while exploiting his vulnerabilities through unexpected
technologies or innovative means" 153 In asymmetrical warfare, the less powerful side
does not fight the more powerful side under the conventional rules of war because it
cannot win using these tactics. 154 The weaker side uses unconventional methods of
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fighting, such as, the use of car bombs against civilian targets, assassination of
political leaders, use of chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons, attacks
against information systems and critical infrastructure, and environmental
destruction. 155
The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review stated that a future adversary might
"employ asymmetric methods to delay or deny U.S. access to critical facilities;
disrupt our command, control, communications and intelligence networks; or inflict
higher than expected casualties in an attempt to weaken our national resolve." 156
The attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 revealed how conventional weapons
could be used in unusual and innovative ways by a transnational terrorist
organization to inflict mass casualties, and have tremendous political, social, and
psychological effects.
Terror has been a common military technique to induce fear and attempt to
break enemy morale in conflicts throughout world history. Thus terrorism can be
considered a form of psychological warfare. 157 Wheeler wrote, "Terrorism, a
psychological technique relying on the effects of surprise and shock to unnerve or to
coerce, aims at an opponent's eventual demoralization and surrender on the issue in
dispute ... The objective of war is not necessarily physical defeat of an enemy or
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conquest of territory, but rather breaking his will." 158 Terrorism as psychological
warfare is aimed at society as a whole, rather than one victim or a state's armed
forces. Terrorists view their victims as a means to an end. Their real target is public
opinion. 159 By brutal acts against civilians, terrorists seek to create the impression
that no one anywhere at anytime is safe from attack. They hope that the fear sown
will destabilize society, alienate people from support of their governments, and thus
break the opposition's will through demoralization. 160 The emphasis on
psychological shock by terrorists is reinforced by their disregard for the rules of war
and their preference to target civilian targets. Terrorism is not only a strategy for
insurgents and terrorist organizations but also for nation states.

Understanding State Sponsored Terrorism in the IR Lens
International relations and terrorism scholars have written extensively about
state sponsored terrorism and its impact on the world system. They have identified a
number of ways in which states can be involved in terrorism.

161

First, states can

support terrorist organizations by providing financial aid, ideological support, and
military or operational assistance. For example, Sudan has provided a safe haven
and training hub for members of Al Qaeda. Other states, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria,
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Libya, North Korea, and Cuba are designated by the State Department as state
sponsors of international terrorism. 162 Second, states can initiate, direct and commit
terrorist activities through proxies or groups outside their own institutions. Finally,
states can perpetrate terrorist acts abroad through their own security or intelligence
services. For example, in December, 1988 intelligence agents from Libya planted a
bomb on a Pan American flight that blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 280
people. 163
During the Cold War, the CIA often claimed that the Soviet Union was
deeply involved in support of revolutionary violence that frequently entailed acts of
international terrorism. 164 During the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
were involved with a wide range of terrorist movements throughout the world that
attempted to destabilize and embarrass their enemies. 165 Brian Jenkins argued that
nation states support international terrorists as an arm of foreign policy, thus
engaging in terrorism as surrogate warfare. 166 Jenkins suggested that with the
development of weapons of mass destruction it is becoming increasingly impractical
and undesirable for nations to become involved in conventional war. The alternative
of protracted, low-level war is also debilitating and unattractive because it requires
significant resources. Jenkins stated, "Terrorists could be employed to provoke
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international incidents, create alarm in an adversary's country, compel it to divert
valuable resources to protect itself, destroy its morale and carry out specific forms of
sabotage." 167
The rise of state sponsorship was one of the most important developments in
international terrorism in the late twentieth century. State sponsored terrorism
continues to be a deadly and serious challenge for the U.S. because of the increased
availability of weapons of mass destruction following the break up of the Soviet
Union. 168 Cordesman has argued that terrorism is too narrowly defined by U.S.
government agencies and does not consider the full range of asymmetrical threats
including the use of weapons of mass destruction. 169 He wrote, "The term terrorism
has often been taken to imply attacks by small groups or independent organizations,
rather than attacks by well organized non-state actors or asymmetric warfare by
states." 170 To better understand why nation states sponsor terrorism and how
transnational terrorist organizations have impacted the world system, we can tum to
a number of international relations theories.
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Theories of International Relations to Understand Terrorism and
Homeland Security Policy

Political scientists and international relations scholars have developed a broad
range of complex theories to explain the behavior of both state and non-state actors
in the world system. In the 21 st century, transnational actors, such as, multinational
corporations, nongovernmental organizations and transnational terrorist
organizations, have emerged on the world scene as a result of globalization and have
made a significant impact in international politics. 171 However, international
relations theory is predominantly state centric. James Dougherty and Robert
Pfaltzgraff observed, "Most international political theorists hold that the nation-state
is a long-lived, highly adaptable institution, and that the very same technological and
economic developments which have allegedly rendered the nation-state obsolete
have also enables it to consolidate its internal strength, making itself more
indispensable than ever to its citizens." 172
It is beyond the scope of this research to provide a detailed analysis of all of

the international relations theories that may explain why states sponsor terrorism,
why there has been a rise in transnational terrorist organizations, and why the U.S
has chosen specific policies to prevent, prevent and respond to acts of terrorism both
past and present. However, those international relations theories that are most
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relevant in highlighting this case include realist theories, deterrence theories, and
theories on globalization.

Realist Theory in International Relations

Realist theory has dominated the field of international relations for many
years, especially in the United States from the 1940s to the 1960s. Though there are
many critics of realism, 173 the realist tradition continues to influence U.S. foreign
policy because these theories have served to explain great power behavior in the
world system. 174 Realists argue that order is created and maintained by state power
and shifts in the existing order are ultimately driven by shifts in the distribution of
state power. 175 Among the most influential realist scholars are Hans Morganthau,
Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. 176
There are a number of basic assumptions of realist theory. First, realists
assume the international realm is anarchic 177 and consists of independent, sovereign
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nation states. Mearsheimer defined anarchy as "an ordering principle, which says the
system comprises of independent states that have no central authority over them."

178

In anarchy, states compete with other states for security, markets, and influence. As a
result, the first priority of states is survival because. Under anarchy the survival of a
state cannot be guaranteed because in this environment states cannot assume other
states will come to their defense even if they are allies. In the international system,
there is no higher authority than the state to prevent or counter the use of force. As a
result, security can only be achieved through self-help. 179 The primary duty of a
nation's leader is to rationally calculate the most appropriate polices that should be
taken so as to safeguard the life and interests of the state in a hostile and threatening
environment. From the point of view of realists, the national interest can be defined
as those actions that enhance or preserve the state's security, its influence, and its
military and economic power. 180
Second, states are the primary actors in the world system and possess
offensive military capability or power which makes them potentially dangerous to
each other. 181 In the course of providing one's security, the state in question will
automatically be fueling the insecurity of other states. This spiral of insecurity is the
security dilemma. According to Wheeler and Booth, security dilemmas exist "when
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the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind
of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only to
enhance its security in an uncertain world, or whether they are for offensive purposes
(to change the status quo to its advantage)." 182 As a result of the security dilemma,
states find it difficult to trust one another and often view the intentions of others in a
negative light.
Third, the nature of state interaction is competitive and conflictual but
sometimes cooperative when it serves short-term interests. Mearsheimer wrote,
"States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self
interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the
interests of the so-called international community." 183
Finally, power determines which country prevails thus politics is aimed at
increasing power, keeping power, or demonstrating power. 184 Morgenthau wrote,
"International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Power is always the
immediate aim." 185 Thus, nation states pay close attention to how power is
distributed among them and look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by
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acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. 186 States
can use military, economic and diplomatic means to shift the balance of power in
their favor. 187 Morgenthau's theory ofrealism is called human nature realism
because it is based on the assumption that states are led by human beings who have a
"limitless lust for power" or a "will to power." Thus they are constantly looking for
opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states.
Mearsheimer's offensive realism theory argued that the "overriding goal of
each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at
the expense of other states" and that "their ultimate goal is to be the hegemon-that
is the only great power in the system." 188 Since the end of the Cold War, the United
States has become the world's strongest state. Because other great powers cannot be
certain ofU.S intentions, Mearsheimer argued that other great powers have been
balancing or buck passing. According to Mearsheimer, "with balancing, a great
power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the
balance of power" while a buck passer attempts to get another state to bear the
burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor, while it remains on the
sidelines. 189 Balancing actions can include explicit threats made against a hegemon,
the construction of defensive alliances against the potential hegemon, and internal
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balancing whereby the balancer boosts its military power by enlarging its armed
forces and by producing more military hardware. 190
Unlike Mearsheimer and Morganthau, Waltz's theory of defensive realism
does not assume that great powers are inherently aggressive because they have a will
to power. Rather, he assumed states merely aim to survive. 191 Waltz argued that
states have security as their principal interest and therefore seek only the requisite
amount of power to ensure their own survival. 192 Waltz stated that that structure of
the anarchical international system forces great powers to be concerned with the
balance ofpower. 193 Waltz emphasized that when great powers behave aggressively
the potential victims usually balance against the aggressor and thwart its efforts to
gain power. 194
Another defensive realist, Stephen Walt argued that a hegemonic power can
be seen as benevolent, rather than threatening and that other nation states balance
against the state that poses the greatest threat to their security. 195 That is, the state
posing the greatest threat to others is not necessarily the strongest state in the system.
According to Walt, threat is a function of several factors including a state's
aggregate power (based on population, economic and military capabilities),
possession of military capabilities, and the degree to which others perceive that the
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state harbors aggressive intentions. 196 The U.S., as the lone superpower, is perceived
by some nation states as a hegemon and its military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan
post 9/11 have been perceived by many nation states as an aggressive act.
As the realist theories suggest, nation states within the world system will take
action to balance the distribution of power in response to the U.S. One strategy that
is used against the United States by weaker nation states, such as Iran and North
Korea, is the use of asymmetrical warfare through state sponsorship of terrorism.
Layne argued that in the future, "both rising great powers and regional powers likely
will be attracted to asymmetric strategies as a means of offsetting superior U.S.
military capabilities." 197 For example, Iran has sponsored Hezbollah to train, fund
and arm insurgents in Iraq to attack U.S. and Iraqi forces in Iraq a means of getting
U.S. forces to withdraw from the region. 198 In addition, Layne stated that the
behavior of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda reflect some key attributes of
balancing behavior because it signifies opposition or resistance to a hegemon. 199
This opposition or resistance can include suicide terrorism according to
Robert Pape. Pape's research on the logic of suicide terrorism argued that the major
objective of every group mounting such a campaign over the past two decades has
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been to coerce a foreign state that the terrorists see as occupying their homeland to
remove its military forces. 200
Although in realist theory balancing behavior is considered a form of state
behavior, Layne argued "terrorists cannot balance against a hegemon, but they can
engage in a related form of behavior aimed at undermining a hegemon such as the
United States politically or by raising the costs of maintaining hegemony." 201 Thus
attacks on the U.S. by transnational terrorist organizations can be seem as calculated
acts to achieve well defined geopolitical objectives. Specifically, Al Qaeda wants to
compel the United States to remove its military forces from Saudi Arabia and to alter
its stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While realist theory seems to explain
some of the behavior of nation states in the war on terror, it does not fully address
the behavior of non-state actors.
The U.S. responses to the attacks on September 11, 2001 support the theories
of offensive realism and reinforced the hegemonic strategy of the U.S. following the
Cold War. Within a month of the 9/11 attacks, on October 7, 2001, the U.S.
launched a large scale military operation in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban
regime that was harboring Al Qaeda, to find Osama bin Laden and to defeat terrorist
elements within the country. From a realist perspective, the attack against the nation
of Afghanistan was expected because the U.S. had the right to invade their nation in
an effort to defeat a threat and to maximize their security. In a self-help system,
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states cannot depend on others for their own security and must provide for its own
survival.
The U.S. fundamentally altered its perception of terrorism after 9/11 to the
war frame and chose to use military force as a major counterterrorism strategy.
More significantly, the attacks on 9/11 propelled terrorism from a third tier foreign
policy issue to center stage. Stephen Walt asserted that the September 11 attack had
triggered the most rapid and dramatic change ever in the history of U.S. foreign
policy.202
In the wake of9/11, the U.S. implemented a new national security strategy
policy of preventive war and preemption to prevent and deter future acts of
terrorism; this is evidence of U.S. determination to maintaining the military
capabilities needed to maintain U.S. hegemony. President Bush outlined his strategy
of preemption, known as the Bush doctrine, in the National Security Strategy of
2002. In a commencement speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, President Bush

stated that "deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation against nations-means
nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend." 203
In the National Security Strategy, pre-emption replaces deterrence as the dominant
security strategy because it is argued that the concepts of deterrence and containment
from the Cold War do not work against rogue states seeking weapons of mass
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destruction, or against transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.204
Thus, the President argued that we cannot wait until after we are attacked to respond
to acts of terrorism but rather we must act preemptively to forestall or prevent hostile
acts by our adversaries. 205 President Bush stated, "We will not hesitate to act alone,
if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country."206
Preemption is defined as "an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible
evidence that an enemy attack is imminent," and has been accepted as a legitimate
under international law. 207 However, the Bush Doctrine has broadened the meaning
of preemption to encompass preventive war as well. President Bush argued that
since our enemies are seeking and wanting to deploy weapons of mass destruction
against the U.S. that "as a matter of common sense and self defense. America will
act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed." 208 Preventive war is
a "war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable,
and that to delay would involve great risk."209 The inclusion of preventive war into
the definition of preemption is important because preventive war is not supported by
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international law because aggressive action is being taken when the threat is neither
certain nor imminent.
The Bush Doctrine has raised a great deal of controversy among scholars,210
elected officials and our allies because it fundamentally changes how the U.S. has
conceptualized the theory of deterrence. Since the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the United States has redefined
the concept of deterrence which has been a key principle of U.S. foreign policy since
the beginning of the Cold War. Deterrence is a critical component of the
international relations lens that is significantly different than that presented in the
criminal justice lens.

Principles of deterrence in international relations

When homeland security is defined by the federal government, often the
terms prevention, deterrence and response are included, but these individual terms
are not clearly explained. It is important to understand the different definitions of
deterrence that are found in the fields of criminology and international relations. The
term deterrence did not appear in the literature of international relations theory prior
to World War II, although it had been common among legal theorist since the late
nineteenth century to justify punishment as a means of deterring others from criminal
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behavior. 211 In U.S. foreign policy after World War II, deterrence referred to a
policy of massive military retaliation whether through the use of nuclear weapons or
conventional forces. In the U.S'., the doctrine of deterrence was developed in the late
1950s and early 1960's by American scholars212 who were examining international
relations issues concerning nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie was one of the first
scholars who argued that nuclear weapons would fundamentally change traditional
notions of balance of power between nation states.213
During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union used the threat of
nuclear weapons to deter attacks. In nuclear deterrence strategies each nation built
and maintained a large cache of strategic nuclear weapons for the purpose of
confronting a potential nuclear aggressor with the threat of having to receive an
unacceptable level of damage in a retaliatory strike even after having carried out a
surprise first strike against the deterrer. 214 Ultimately, nuclear deterrence ensured the
wholesale, mutual destruction of the Soviet Union in the event of a surprise nuclear
attack on the U.S.
Nuclear deterrence represents one meaning but others have defined
deterrence in broader terms. Paul Huth, for example, defined deterrence as "A policy
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that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the
cost of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits."215
In its most general form, deterrence is defined as the power to persuade one's
opponents that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take
outweigh its benefits. 216 Snyder stated, "One deters another party from doing
something by the implicit or explicit threat of applying some sanction if the
forbidden act is performed, or by promise of a reward if the act is not performed."217
Thus, an adversary can be deterred not only by the military use of force but also
other types of threats/rewards that can include economic or trade sanctions or the
promise of economic aid.
Though there are many definitions of deterrence, theories of deterrence have
shared a number of assumptions. First, deterrence is the threat of retaliation against
an adversary who attacks the United States. According to this argument, to be a
credible, the U.S. must not only maintain a stable deterrent posture by having a
readiness to use military force when needed but also to ensure its actions do not
provoke an attacker or to lead the attacker to fear an offensive strike by the U.S. 218
Second, deterrence assumes that the primary actors are rational and complete a cost
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benefit analysis to identify the risks and benefits of attacking the U.S. 219 Crenshaw
stressed that to deter terrorists they must be convinced that the price they will pay for
their actions will be high, and the punishment severe. 220 Terrorists, she noted, have
different values than their adversaries and assess risk factors differently. In addition,
cost-benefit considerations are influenced by a number of variables including history,
culture, and sociological and psychological aspects of the actors. 221
Finally, the effectiveness of a threat depends on a state's ability to convince
an adversary that it has both the will and power to punish an adversary severely. 222
Thus, for deterrence to be effective, the U.S. must not only communicate a credible
threat but also convince an opponent that one intends to fulfill the threat or promise.
Henry Kissinger wrote, "Deterrence fails when an attacker decides that the
defender's threat is not likely to be fulfilled." 223 Thus, the perception of the U.S.
deterrent against terrorism, in terms of capability and motivation, is affected by the
nation's ability and resolve to use power in similar situations in the past.
Many scholars have noted in the 1980's and 1990's U.S. foreign policy failed
to communicate to Al Qaeda that the U.S. was willing and able to inflict significant
damage on their organization in the event of an attack. 224 In fact prior to 9/11, the
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U.S. had consistently failed to retaliate in any meaningful manner against terrorist
attacks by Islamic radicals such as those against the marine barracks in Beirut in
1983, the World Trade Center in 1993, the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998,
and the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000.
This international relations perspective on homeland security has become
more important since the attacks on 9/11. Today, transnational terrorist organizations
are increasingly seen as an adversary that threatens the world system and must be
deterred. The problem with traditional ideas of deterrence from the field of
international relations is that these deterrent strategies were directed against nation
states and not individuals and organizations. It is clear, however, that to develop
effective counterterrorism strategies from an international relations perspective, it is
important to understand the motivation, goals, intentions, strategies and capabilities
of these adversaries. In order to explain the rise of transnational terrorist networks
one needs to look at the impact of globalization on terrorist behavior, strategy and
organization structure.

Impact of Globalization on Nation States and Transnational Terrorism

The term globalization has proliferated in our public discourse over the last
decade, though the term first appeared in the 1980s. For example, President
Clinton's National Security Strategy of 1997 identified globalization as the new

121
dynamic that was influencing world affairs and U.S. foreign policy. 225 In addition,
scholars have been turning out a growing number of journal articles and books about
globalization.226 Though there are a variety of definitions for the term globalization,
Kinsella has defined globalization as "a process whereby economic, political and
cultural transactions are less and less constrained by national boundaries and the
sovereign authority of national governments."227 Cronin defined globalization as "a
gradually expanding process of international interpenetration in the economic,
political, social, and security realms, uncontrolled by traditional notions of state
sovereignty. " 228
Globalization is a dynamic process that has involved the integration of
economic markets, nation-states, and technologies. 229 In addition, globalization has
been driven by advancements in technology that has made the transnational
movement of goods, people and ideas much easier to accomplish. As a result,
extensive webs of interdependence have been created that have had a significant
impact on the world system. While Friedman and a variety of scholars have
espoused the positive affects of globalization, others have discussed its negative
aspects including the anti-globalization backlash that has arisen in some regions of
225
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the world. 230 The increased threat of transnational terrorism in the post Cold War era
can be explained in part by organizations fighting against globalization and the
spread of American political, economic, and cultural influence. This antiglobalization thesis has been discussed in the works by Samuel Huntington in The

Clash of Civilizations, by Benjamin Barber in Jihad vs. Mc World, by Thomas
Barnett in The Pentagon's New Map, and by Joseph Stiglitz in Globalization and its

Discontents.
Samuel Huntington has put forth one of the most influential and controversial
arguments about the cause of religious terrorism in his book, The Clash of

Civilizations. First, Huntington argued that in the new era, groups of people would
define their identities in terms of culture, shaped by tribal ancestry, language,
religion, and social values. 231 The spread of western influence militarily,
economically, politically, socially and culturally has created intense resentment
among Muslims. 232 The result will be a future with struggle, conflict and large scale
culture clashes as globalization and interdependence draw the world closer together.
Second, Huntington's thesis argued that there was going to be growing and
fundamental cultural incompatibility between the Islamic world and the West, and
that the great contest after the Cold War will be global confrontation between the
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forces of militant Islam and the model of modernity presented by the West. 233
Third, Huntington argued that a great deal of frustration and anger would be directed
outward toward western cultures that are blamed by Islam for material secularism
and imperial exploitation of the Middle East. Out of this anger, he concluded, would
grow a future of radical Islamic fundamentalists, terrorism, and military clashes with
the United States. Finally, Huntington argued that western intervention in the affairs
of other civilizations, especially in the Islamic Middle East, is probably the single
most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict because such
interventions will likely backfire and inflame cultural hatreds.
While Huntington offered a radical new paradigm in the post Cold War era of
analyzing international conflicts, his assumptions engendered serious criticisms for
having a vague definition of culture, for misinterpreting the facts of history, for being
like the realist ideology of the Cold War, and having the potential of becoming a
self-fulfilling prophecy. 234 For example, in 1997 Huntington wrote, "The
fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam-- a
different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture
235
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The problem with this

statement according to Carey is that if enough people believe the thesis Huntington
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presents, then a clash becomes more likely not only with extremists but rather with
all Muslims.

236

Benjamin Barber argued that this struggle is not a clash of civilizations but
rather a struggle of Jihad versus McWorld. 237 Barber wrote, that the struggle is "a
dialectical expression of tensions built into a single global civilization as it emerges
against a backdrop of traditional ethnic and religious divisions, many of which are
created by McWorld and its infotainment industries and technological
innovations. " 238 From Barber's perspective, terrorism is a reaction to the
international forces of globalization because globalization threatens traditional
community structures based on kinship, religion, or ethnicity. Barber wrote, "This is
a struggle that expresses the ambivalence within each culture as it faces a global,
networked, material future and wonders whether cultural and national autonomy can
be retained. " 239 In addition, Barber stated that modernization with its bureaucratic
structures and secular, materialistic and individualistic ideology has displaced
community identity and group belonging.
Barnett supported the conclusion of Barber by arguing that groups, such as Al
Qaeda, reject the idea of their homeland being joined to a larger community of states
because they fear that joining a Western system of rules and governance will damage
and pervert their traditional society. Barnett wrote that globalization empowers
individuals at the expense of expense of the collective, thus making cultural change
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threatening for traditional societies.240 As a result, this creates a population of youths
"who are expelled from a larger context of society, of social integration, and of life
cycle expectations."241
In The Pentagon's New Map, Barnett looked at the impact of globalization in
a post Cold War environment and identifies key ordering principles that should guide
future U.S. national security policy and strategy. Barnett argued that globalization is
separating the world into those countries that are actively integrating their national
economies into the global economy, who he labeled the "Functioning Core."242 The
Core consists of the wealthy democracies such as the U.S., Western Europe, and
Japan with Russia, China and India striving to join. Those that are failing to
integrate into the larger economic community he labeled the ''Non-Integrating Gap."
These countries include the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean.
Barnett stated that national security threats to the U.S. will arise from failing or
disconnected states with thin the Functioning Gap. He wrote, "The real
asymmetrical challenge we will face will come from globalization's disenfranchised,
or the losers largely left behind in the states most disconnected from globalization's
advance. "243
According to economist Joseph Stiglitz, those that have been disconnected by
globalization have been those developing countries which have been made worse off
as a result of the policies of the major institutions of globalization, the International
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Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and World Bank.
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Stiglitz wrote, "The

West has driven the globalization agenda, ensuring that it garners a disproportionate
share of the benefits, at the expense of the developing world.
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In the Muslim

world, globalization has not only been seen as a force that is undermining traditional
values, but also, as a source of economic exploitation by the West, particularly the
U.S. According to the economic indicators of the United Nations and the World
Bank, the Arab countries lag behind the West and countries such as Korea, Taiwan
and Singapore in matters such as job creation, education, technology and
productivity. 246
For example, in the Arab Human Development Report of 2003, it stated that
economic and production growth were stumbling in Arab countries, and that
declining productivity was one of the major challenges facing Arab countries. 247 In
fact, the gross national product per worker in all Arab countries is less than half that
of South Korea and Argentina.248 Further from 1980-1997, productivity increased
annually by 15% in China, 8% in Korea and 6% in India, while the growth rate of
productivity in the best performing Arab country did not exceed 4% (it was 3-4% in
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Oman and Egypt, 2-3% in Tunisia, Mauritania and Morocco, 1-2% in Jordan and
Algeria and less than 1% in the UAE and Saudi Arabia). 249
While the theoretical debate has been raging on the impact of globalization,
Osama bin Laden has been successful in expanding his terror network because he has
been able to tap into this clear need of belonging and frustration among some
Muslim populations throughout the world. Jerrold Post has argued that some
individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of
violence because of this need to belong. Fighting provides some alienated
individuals with an identity, a group that functions as a community, a respected
leadership position, and a set of ideas providing a purpose to life. 250
While the U.S. has been focused on Islamic terrorists, we should not
automatically assume Islam is associated with terrorism. Islam is a religion and
culture that is diverse in its beliefs, customs and laws. It consists of Sunnis, Shia and
other groupings around the world with four different schools oflslamic law.251
Islam encompasses a religion with a billion worshipers and the vast majority whom
are not terrorists but rather ordinary people who simply want to live in peace.
However, to understand why individuals chose to join terrorist organizations is
important in developing counterterrorism strategies.
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According to macro theories of violent conflict, human conflict is a result of
socio economic discrepancies, the aggressive impulses from frustration, withdrawal
and alienation from existing social structures, and cognitive dissonance caused by
measuring the actual against the ideal. 252 The global flow of information from the
advancement of communications technology has expanded the physical capabilities
of people to interact with one another and to learn about other nations and cultures.
The spread of radio, television and personal computers allows people to be aware of
activities taking place elsewhere. Post argued that this aspect of globalization
contributes to dreams, fantasies and rising expectations, at the same time leading to
dashed hopes and unfulfilled achievements. 253 Terrorism breeds in the gap between
expectations and achievements; this is similar to strain theory in criminology.
Gurr argued that the disparity between aspirations and fulfillment can be
conceived as economic deprivation or as a combination of economic, psychological,
social and political deprivation. 254 Deprivation could include poverty, lack of
education, lack of civil rights, or lack of justice. O'Neill (2002) argued that
terrorism is driven by a sense of injustice and helplessness rather than just economic
poverty. O'Neill wrote, "The new international global system with its growing
institutions, trade, and technological capacities, can exacerbate real and perceived
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inequities, creating greater inequalities between and within states. Terrorists can
exploit these gaps, using modem communications and jet travel to preach their
ideologies, raise funds, recruit and hide. "255
Radical elements within these societies, such as Hamas or Al Qaeda, make
claims that wealthy nations, such as the U.S., are exploiting them to gain more power
and wealth at the expense of the poorer and weaker nation states and communities.
Revolutionary violence within a state is attributed, in part, to large scale frustration
and anger caused by the discrepancy between people's desires and their perceived
situation.256 This was clearly seen in the research conducted by Jessica Stem.
Jessica Stem found that the principal motive for individuals to join Hamas,
Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah was anger at being humiliated by their own poverty and by
perceived Israeli oppression, U.S. inspired globalization, secular materialist values,
corrupt western culture, and capitalist commercialism. 257 Bernard Lewis argued that
fundamentalist Islamists are unwilling to blame the Middle East's decline on its own
failure to modernize but rather to assign blame elsewhere, and the United States and
Israel are convenient targets. 258 Within part of the Muslim community of the
Middle East there is growing alienation, humiliation, and rage that stems from their
inability to cope with modernity and globalization. The theories discussed in this
section focus on factors that contribute to terrorist violence by individuals,
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organizational and nation states from an international relations perspective. In the
final section, the international relations lens looks at the role of national security
institutions in homeland security.

International Relations Lens of Homeland Security

The challenge terrorism poses for nation states is that terrorism represents a
type of warfare that may or may not involve other nation states. In this lens, .
homeland security is directly linked to national security and U.S. foreign policy
strategies and objectives. As a result, counterterrorism options are developed and
implemented by those U.S. government organizations responsible for national
security and U.S foreign policy-Department of Defense, national intelligence
agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency,
the State Department, and National Security Council. In the international relations
and political science literature there are studies on how foreign policy is developed,
yet there is little research on the national security apparatus in the U.S. as a whole.
Amy Zegart argued that studies of agencies such as the CIA, National Security
Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff are absent from the larger theoretical debates in the
fields of both international relations and American politics.259 Zegart further
explained that this may be due to the fact that realism has been the field's dominant
paradigm which has focused on the relations between states, not on what occurs
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inside them. 260 Though international relations theories focus on the relations
between nation states, a few scholars have examined U.S. foreign and national
security policy bureaucracy. 261
One of the seminal pieces on bureaucratic politics is Graham Allison's
writing on the Cuban missile crisis. Allison argued that foreign policy could not be
understood without looking at the organizational structure and process processes
within these institutions. Graham argued how international relations are perceived,
what information gets relayed to decision makers, how policies are implemented are
determined by a process of conflict and coalition building, by the "pulling and
hauling" between political players situated in different governmental
organizations.262 Graham recognized the influence of organizations on how foreign
policy and national security issues were perceived. He wrote, "The face of an issue
differs from seat to seat. Where you sit influences what you see as well as where you
stand on an issue. " 263 By analyzing the actors and organizations within the national
security bureaucracy, we can gain a better understanding of their decision making
processes and of their policy options and strategies for deterring and preventing
terrorism and responding to acts of terrorism when it does occur in the U.S. or
against its interests overseas.
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Most terrorism experts organize counterterrorist options into three
classifications that include: 1) diplomacy, financial controls, military force,
intelligence, and covert actions; (2) legal, repressive and conciliatory responses to
terrorism; and (3) targeted and untargeted prevention (i.e. target hardening). 264
Counterterrorism options cah vary from the use of military force and intelligence
operations to diplomacy and social reforms. Military forces are deployed in covert
operations using special operations forces, in suppression campaigns using military
strikes to destroy or disrupt terrorist personnel and infrastructure, and in preemptive
attacks to prevent terrorist attacks in the future. For example, the U.S. responded to
terrorist acts of aggression with military operations in Afghanistan in response to
9/11/01 as well as in Libya after the Berlin Disco bombing in 1986.
Nonmilitary, repressive options include nonviolent covert operations such as
disinformation campaigns and cyberwar, intelligence gathering and analysis,
economic sanctions, and enhanced physical security of possible targets or target
hardening. Conciliatory counterterrorism options do not involve the use of force or
other repressive methods and can include diplomacy to negotiate acceptable
resolutions to a conflict, and social reforms to address the root causes of terrorism. 265
Legal responses to terrorism include actions by international organizations such as
the United Nations and World Court.
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Each of these options has been used by various administrations to prevent,
deter and respond to terrorism, but some of these options can pose significant ethical
and legal dilemmas for policy makers. 266 Central to the development of these
responses in the international relations lens is the importance of deterrence in
preventing terrorist attacks by transnational terrorist organizations and nation
states.267
In the international relations lens, terrorism is seen as a form of asymmetrical
warfare that is a strategy used by nation states and organizations to achieve political
goals and objectives. In addition, the international relations lens is influenced by
theories of international relations which try to explain the behavior of nation states
and other actors operating in the world system. Different international relations
theories suggest different ways of addressing of the problem of terrorism, which in

tum, influences the type of policy solutions in homeland security. Finally, this lens
identifies homeland security as an international relations problem that is best
resolved by utilizing the institutions and processes of the U.S. national security
apparatus.
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LENS III: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
PROBLEMffERRORISM AS A NETWORK

In August, 2003, four Arab men who were operating a "sleeper operational
combat cell" from Chicago and Detroit were indicted for providing support to
terrorists ideologically linked to Al Qaeda. 268 According to the indictment, this cell
was ta1dng part in a global jihad against the United States and planning attacks,
recruiting members, seeking to obtain weapons, manufacturing fake identification
cards, and helping other members into the country. 269 One of the members, AbdelIlah Elmardoudi, was described by authorities as skilled in airport security
operations, telephone card fraud, and producing fake identification papers. 270 The
2006 Department of State Annual report on terrorism reported that radical jihadists
like those in the case above are becoming more widespread, diffuse, possibly more
deadly, and increasingly homegrown, often with a lack of apparent formal
operational connection with al Qaeda ideological leaders although perhaps inspired
by them or assisted through training. 271 This homegrown phenomenon of looser,
and more local networks was manifest in the 2004 attacks on Madrid's trains and the
July, 2005 terrorist attacks on London's transit system. This report further depicted
the emergence of micro-actors. That is, the operational component of the jihadist
movement will increasingly be assumed by small, autonomous cells and individuals
268
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that have diverse structures, motives and tactics. 272 These cells will be
technologically savvy and without regular communication with other groups or cells.
The challenge faced by the United States in homeland security is identifying ways to
combat these terrorist networks. Thus, one perspective on homeland security
envisions the situation as terrorist organizations pitted against organizations within
the U.S. government responsible for deterring, preventing and responding to
terrorism.
This section will describe the major characteristics of Lens (111)-Homeland
Security as an Organization Design Problem/Terrorism as a network. In this lens, the
terrorist threat is assumed to be a network of organizations, groups and individuals
that are in conflict with the network of U.S. government agencies that have been
tasked with fighting these groups and individuals. The information about the
organizational structures of terrorist groups is found in the terrorism literature and
U.S. government reports. The information on how U.S. agencies are organized is
found in the academic literature in the fields of public administration and
organization theory. In the first section, a summary of the key elements of the lens is
provided. Next, each of these elements is explained to form the framework that is
used to analyze the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing from this perspective.
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of this case from the Organization Design lens. As
with the other lenses, an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these elements
is discussed in Chapter 6.
272

Ibid.

136
Key Elements of homeland security as an organizational design
problem/terrorism as a network lens

In Lens III-Homeland Security as an Organizational Design
Problem/Terrorism as Network a number of characteristics are highlighted. First, this
lens focuses on the importance of the design of the government organizations tasked
with homeland security. It argues that rational, hierarchical, bureaucratic designs
and practices are likely to have limited success in deterring, preventing and
responding to terrorism attacks in the future because they are not well suited for
operating in complex, unstable environments. Second, terrorism is defined and
conceptualized largely by the lead agencies involved in homeland security,
particularly the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice,
Department of Defense, and the organizations associated with national intelligence
and national security. As a result, counterterrorism policies and programs will take
on the character of these organizations.
Third, each of the organizations involved in homeland security has unique
organizational structures, cultures, missions and strategies that impact the U.S.
government's ability to deter, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks within the
United States. Fourth, homeland security is characterized as a concerted effort thus
there is shared responsibility with Congress, state and local governments, the private
sector, non profit organizations and the American people. To effectively integrate
and coordinate these diverse stakeholders into our homeland security efforts,
network governance structures will need to be created and maintained at multiple
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levels. Fifth, threats to homeland security come from terrorist organizations or
movements often in the form of loosely linked networks of varied groups. These
groups can range from highly organized and trained operatives to groups of potential
actors who lack training or stable organizational structures. Finally, homeland
security organizations will have a difficult time identifying, tracking and
counteracting transnational terrorist networks like Al Qaeda. Terrorist networks are
different than past terrorist organizations in their design, technology, and tactics and
pose unique challenges. 273
This section is divided into a three parts that will describe each of the above
characteristics. First, there is a discussion on terrorist networks and why they pose
unique challenges for homeland security. This discussion is based on literature on
terrorism from a number of disciplines including criminal justice, international
relations, and sociology. Second, there is a discussion on the challenges of designing
a network of government agencies that is effective and efficient in implementing
homeland security policies and programs that is based on the literature from the field
of public administration.

Terrorism as a Network

Terrorism research often includes studies on how terrorist organizations are
structured and how these structures have changed and adapted to their environment.
273
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In the past, the tendency was to assume that, terrorists belonged to identifiable
organizations with relatively clear command and control structures (pyramid
organization) with a defined set of political, social and economic objectives. 274 A
pyramid or hierarchical terrorist organization in that view was thought to have
characteristics that are like those found in business or government. This form also
starts from the assumption that the terrorist organization operates as a hierarchical
organization with a clearly defined top to bottom communication chain, a strict
framework of division of labor and strict chain of command. 275 In the pyramid
structure the leaders are at the top of the pyramid and are responsible for
commanding the organization. Martha Crenshaw argued that a key function of
terrorist leaders is preventing defection or dissent by creating attractive incentive
structures that serve to develop intense loyalty to the organization.276
Lieutenants make up the middle-level, and rank and file are on the bottom of
the organization. The rank and file of the organization is composed of active cadre
who carry out terrorist operations, as well as, active supporters, those that gather
intelligence, and provide safe houses and other logistical support. 277 The Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (under Yassir Arafat), and the original Al Qaeda in 1989

274

White, Jonathan. (2006). Terrorism and Homeland Security. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Mishal, Shaul. (2005). Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology oflslamic Terrorist
Organizations. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 28_ 275-293.
276
Crenshaw, Martha. (2003). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches.
Inside Terrorist Organizations. Edited by David Rapaport. New York: Pearson.
277
White, Jonathan. ((2002). Terrorism: an Introduction. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

275

139
(fighting against the Soviets) are a few examples of hierarchical, traditional
command and control terrorist organization. 278
Terrorist organizations, like other types of organizations, adapt their
organizational structure to external conditions as well as to their designated goals.
Terrorist organizations face significant challenges in maintaining their operations
secret. Thus they must always consider external conditions such as access to
operatives and resources, danger of exposure or capture, ease of access to a target,
and time restrictions.
Terrorist organizational structures have evolved into more loosely linked
network structures to survive in a constantly changing threat environment. As law
enforcement, intelligence and military operations have successfully found and
captured operatives in terrorist organizations, these groups have had to find new
ways to evade authority, to become more adaptable and resilient, and to ensure their
organization would survive if the main leaders were captured or killed.
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Arquilla and Ronfeldt, in their study of terrorist organizations, define a
network as "a set of diverse, dispersed nodes that share a set of ideas and interests
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Ronfeldt argue that these networks have little or no hierarchy or official authority. 281
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Also decision making and operations are decentralized thus tactical operations can be
initiated and carried locally without central leadership. 282 In addition, in the
Information Age, networks employ new information, technologies and
administrative knowledge that enable organizations to adopt flexible modes of
structure. 283
The network organization often has a decentralized cell structure consisting
of a small group of people and a team leader. The leader is usually the person with
the most experience and he or she is responsible for ensuring the tasks of the cell are
carried out and for communicating and coordinating with other cells. (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Command and control linkages in a simplified terrorist cell. 284

Marc Sageman, who studied Al Qaeda as a social network, described hub
leaders are dynamic, outdoing personalities with extensive social reach.
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individuals are able to attract recruits and help guide them to the training necessary
to participate in jihad. In addition, the cell leader is the "ideological espouser" and
watchdog-ensuring that everyone maintains the ideological fervor necessary for the
success of the cell and its broader networked organization.286 This is a critical
responsibility because it ensures cell members retain similar goals, aims and beliefs
which is critical for their success absent the top-down authority of a hierarchical
organization.
In order to be effective in deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, it is
critical that government organizations responsible for homeland security understand
how terrorist networks are formed and structured so counterterrorism and
antiterrorism strategies can be developed and implemented. While the terrorist cell is
the building block of a terrorist network, there are a number of different types of
networks. Arquilla and Ronfeldt refer to three ideal types of networks: chains, hubs
and all-channel. (See Figure 3)
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In the chain structure, units are linked sequentially in a single line along

which information travels from one node 288 to the next. In this network, actors may
not know who is in command of the organization or what the final goal or action of
the network might be. In each node, actors take orders from the next and pass it on
to another without knowing the complete characteristics of the network. The chain
network is employed when a well structured sequential communication process is
employed, and when the chain of command and control are relinquished in order to
achieve a specific goal. 289 Such networks are often hard to detect because there is
little communication and activity to detect by law enforcement or intelligence
agencies. However, if one member of the chain is caught then the operation fails.
In the hub and spoke network there is a central node which links to all units
that radiate outward from it. All orders come from the center player and all
information passes through this single node. Thus, one player sees the whole picture,
while all other players only have a partial picture of the goals and operations of the
group. A terrorist organization operates as a hub network when the lines of
communication and the command and control chain are vertical and inflexible, and a
central command controls activity but does not create a formal division of labor. 290
This type of organizational structure has a major disadvantage in that it can
be easily broken by finding and neutralizing the central players. For example,
288
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following 9/11, America began an all out war against Al Qaeda which had this type
of structure, arresting, detaining, and killing many key leaders. 291 As a result, Al
Qaeda has been forced to decentralize their organizational structures even more thus
giving more autonomy and authority to cells and nodes within these networks.
Dishman stated that these mid level members "define the organization, its actions, its
direction and its goals."

292

Their actions are not constrained by a leader thus they can

pursue goals that may or may not support the broader organizational goals.
In the all channel network information does not flow through a central node
but rather flows freely in a fully collab9rative manner between actors in the network.
In this structure, no single leader has real command and control over others. Thus
this type of organization operates when communication flows freely and when
independent behavior is allowed by the various nodes within the system. In an all
channel network there are often looser relationships between nodes and less
centralized direction can lead to a reduction in the ability of an entire organization to
maintain tactical unity and, in some cases operational unity in its components
activities. 293
It is clear that transnational terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda pose a
significant security threat to the United States. In the National Strategy for
291
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Combating Terrorism, the terrorist threat is described as a transnational network
structure, "enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose
interconnectivity both within and between groups. In this environment, terrorists
work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, planning and
executing attacks."294 Terrorist networks can consist of groups that are state,
regional or global in reach. With modern technology, terrorist groups at each level
can coordinate their actions among dispersed cells while remaining undetected. In
addition, network structures are able to grow and adapt, taking the shape and
structure that is most resilient to the current environment. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has
made numerous transformations and has morphed into a multidimensional network
of networks. 295 The challenge in homeland security in designing government
organizations and networks that are effective and efficient at preventing attacks by
this type of transnational, multidimensional network of networks.

Organizational Design Challenges in Homeland Security

In response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, homeland security became
a major policy domain of the United States Government. This was clearly seen by
the broad stream of legislation and executive orders that were implemented in the
months following this event. One of the most significant events was the creation of
the Office of Homeland Security by the President of the United States through an
294
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executive order on October 8, 2001. The mission of this office was to develop and
coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the
United States from terrorist threats or attacks. 296 The functions of this office was to
coordinate the efforts of the executive branch to deter, prepare for, prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United
States. 297 The Homeland Security Council was established as part of this executive
order to coordinate homeland security activities of executive departments and to
develop and implement homeland security policies. This council consisted of the
President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretaries of Treasury, Health
and Human Services and Transportation, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and other officers as designated by the President.
To respond to the need for homeland security, the President, as the chief
executive, used an executive order to create a new agency instead of waiting for
Congress to pass legislation creating a Department of Homeland Security. As a
result, the Office of Homeland Security had no statutory power and was not
appropriated funds to carry out its mission. The president's actions helped him to
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immediately begin to coordinate a domestic response to security threats but also
forestalled any Congressional action that he opposed. 298
The issue of homeland security had been previously addressed by the U.S.
Commission on National Security in the 21 st Century, or the Hart-Rudman
Commission. 299 This commission had released its recommendations for the creation
of a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) which would be built around the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and included the Customs Service, the
Border Patrol and the Coast Guard. 300 In the aftermath of9/11, members of
Congress quickly began to consider the Hart-Rudman recommendations as well as
other variations of possible organizational designs. 301 The administration sought to
discourage these attempts by Congress because they feared that a new agency
created by Congress might limit the president's flexibility in responding. 302 By
creating OHS by executive order, the administration gained time to consider if they
favored a creation of a new agency or the existing structure. A year after the creation
of the Office of Homeland Security, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of
2002 which created the Department of Homeland Security. 303 The creation ofDHS
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was meant to centralize the resources and expertise of22 diverse federal agencies
into a supra bureaucracy in order to achieve greater coordination in homeland
security within federal agencies as well as to coordinate efforts with state and local
government and with the private sector.
The creation of OHS, and later DHS, shows how organizational design in the
public sector is unique from the private sector because it is the product of political
processes. Paul Appleby in Big Democracy argued that what made public
organizations distinct from private ones was their breadth of scope, impact, and
consideration; public accountability; and political character.

304

Terry Moe also

recognized the unique aspects of public organizations and wrote, "American public
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of politics,
and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who
exercise political power. " 305 By analyzing homeland security from an organizational
or agency design perspective we are able to gain insights into American politics and
the perspectives of Congress and the President on this issue, and to determine who
will create and implement public policy in homeland security.
The issue of homeland security is one of many complex problems that must
be addressed by our elected leaders and government organizations at the local, state
and federal level. The coordinated execution of agreed upon policies in homeland
security is fundamentally the responsibility, not only, for the Department of
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Homeland Security, but also, for a vast network of government agencies, non profit
organizations and private enterprise working in a concerted effort to prevent, deter
and respond to terrorist attacks within the U.S. In the field of public administration
there a number of theories and models which suggest variations in how governments
control conflicting interests and govern society. Governing society requires complex
structures of management and organization, but how this is to be accomplished is a
constant source of debate within the field.

The Hierarchical Model of Governance in Homeland Security

Over the course of American history, there have been a number of
fundamental intellectual and practical approaches to integrating and organizing the
function of public administration in the American system of governance. Among the
most enduring models of organizing is the hierarchical model of governance that was
developed during the Progressive era. Reformers in this era, such as Woodrow
Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Frederick Taylor, sought to promote effectiveness and
efficiency and eliminate waste and corruption in government organizations by
applying scientific methods to solve public problems and adapting a more business
like organizational structure. 306
In order to follow the model of business, Wilson advised that government
should establish executive authorities, controlling hierarchical organizations, and
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having the goal of achieving the most reliable and efficient operations possible. 307
The classical model of governance advocated by Wilson and later Luther Gulick
premised that administrative authority and power is delegated by elected officials to
agencies through constitutionally legitimate bodies and laws. 308 From this era, came
an organization and method of government that was the foundation of traditional
government bureaucracies.
Bureaucratic organizational structures have been the primary design for
government organizations and have a number of key characteristics as identified by
Max Weber and Luther Gulick. 309 First, there is a hierarchy in which there is
supervision of lower offices by the higher ones. That is, there is a clear chain of
command and authority. Those in the upper reaches of the hierarchy determine the
mission, give orders, and ensure orders and tasks are carried out as directed. Second,
the jurisdiction and authority of the organization is ordered by rules. Government
organizations gain legitimacy in our democratic system by being established and
controlled by the rule of law. Third, bureaucratic organizations preserve all written
documents and establish clear policies and rules. Fourth, there is a division of work.
Gulick stated, "Work division is the foundation of organization; indeed, the reason
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for organization."310 In fact, the scientific management approach to public
administration lays out a clear prescription: break down complex jobs into their
component parts; structure those parts so that they have the capacity to do difficult
tasks well and to do them well on a regular basis; and maintain the organization so
that doing the complex well becomes predictable. 311 Gulick concluded that
hierarchical organizations were most often the best choice because "purpose is
understandable by the entire personnel down to the last clerk and inspector."312 Thus
the major strength of a hierarchy is that it concentrates authority, provides direction,
and ensures coordination. It enforces accountability through direct and clear lines of
responsibility from top to bottom.
Goldsmith and Eggers argued there are certain factors favoring a hierarchical
model of govemance. 313 First, this model is best when there a need for a uniform,
rule driven response and stability is preferred. Responding to natural and man-made
disasters requires that organizations be flexible and have the ability to differentiate
responses based on the type of incident and capabilities of the responding agencies.
According to Mintzburg, organizations with unstable task environments, such as
those within the Department of Homeland Security, need to be more flexible so they
can adapt to rapidly changing environmental conditions. The constantly changing
threat environment, as well as, the chaotic nature of disasters, creates an unstable
310
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work environment for organizations tasked with preventing, deterring and
responding to terrorism.
If we assume that the agencies dedicated to homeland security are operating

in an environment that is dynamic, complex, hostile and uncertain, then a more
effective organization design would be one with an organic structure that is highly
decentralized, has many departments, and extensive planning and forecasting. 314 As
the environment becomes uncertain, organizations tend to become more organic,
which means decentralizing authority and responsibility to the lowest levels or
operating core, encouraging teamwork and taking a more informal approach to
assigning tasks and responsibilities. 315
Second, the hierarchical model should be chosen when government is the
predominant provider of the service and has the necessary capacity and experience.
In the realm of homeland security government at all levels, as well as businesses and
non profit organizations, have a role to play in counterterrorism, antiterrorism and
emergency response. For example during a major disaster, often there are many
organizations from the private and nonprofit sector that are engaged in everything
from monitoring environmental hazards, to providing disaster assistance to victims.
Coordinating the activities of all of these diverse groups is a complex and difficult
task.

314
315

Daft, Richard. (1992). Organization Theory and Design. New York: West Publishing.
Ibid.

152
Finally, the hierarchical model of governance should be selected when a
single level of government provides the service, and that service is not affected by
changing technology. 316 Organizational technology refers to the tools, techniques,
and actions used to transform organizational inputs into outputs and can include
machinery and work procedures. 317 In the area of homeland security, multiple
government agencies are involved in providing services and the organizational
technology of these agencies is constantly changing.
Though there are many ways of organizing government agencies, the
hierarchical model continues to draw support because it allows for a great deal of
command and control of people and resources, for a high level of accountability, and
for a means of effectively and efficiently providing direct services to clients in a
stable environment. After the 9/11 attacks, Congress argued that there was a need to
"connect the dots" among the government agencies that failed to coordinate their
information and operations. Thus, the Department of Homeland Security was
created in the form of the hierarchical model as a means to bring related agencies
under one bureaucratic umbrella.
The events of 9/11 highlighted the familiar problem in public administration
of coordinating large scale, complex work. A critical aspect of homeland security is
coordination of our national effort to deter, prevent and respond to terrorism; it is
about weaving together diverse organizations, experts and resources more effectively
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to prevent and mitigate natural and man made disasters. Seidman wrote, "If only we
can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable,
harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our
government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will
disagree."318 After large scale failures by government is such events as 9/11,
coordination is identified in after action reviews and commission reports as the
diagnosis of the homeland security problem and the reason for its failures. At the
broadest level, coordination for homeland security presents tremendous challenges
which are beyond the capacity for traditional, hierarchical bureaucratic
organizational structures to handle successfully. A network approach to homeland
security offers a viable alternative.

The Network Model of Governance in Homeland Security

In the 21 st century problems have become increasingly more complex and
span across cities, state, regions and nation-states. Bureaucratic systems that operate
with command and control procedures and inward looking cultures are ill-suited to
addressing problems that transcend organizational boundaries, such as homeland
security. 319 Agranoff and McGuire stated, "The classical mostly intraorganizational
inspired management perspective that has guided public management for more than a
century is simply inapplicable for multiorganizational, multigovernmental, and
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multisectoral forms of governing."32 For example, it was clear prior to 9/11 that
neither the FBI nor CIA could effectively prevent terrorism by working alone. The
FBI required the assistance of a law enforcement network (Joint Terrorism Task
Forces) that crossed agencies and levels of government in the investigation of the
1993 WTC bombing. While the hierarchical model of government will continue to
persist, it is being pushed away by the demand to create new structures.
These multigovernmental and multisectoral approaches are a response to
increasingly complex social and political problems that have been referred to as
'wicked problems.' 321 O'Tool and Meier observed that wicked public problems,
dense program environments, complexity, and multi-level issues are driving the
increase in network structures in the public arena. 322 The network literature argues
that network governance structures represent post-bureaucratic, non-hierarchical,
boundary spanning approaches to conducting the work of government. 323
Network models of organizations and governance are significantly different
than hierarchical models. 324 First, while hierarchies have a single authority structure
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created with the scalar and chain of command principle, networks have a divided
authority structure. Second, in a hierarchical structure activities are guided by clear
goals and well-defined problems, while in a network there are various and changing
definitions of problems and goals.
Third, the role of the manger in a hierarchical system is the management of
personnel and resources, while in a network the manager serves as a mediator,
process manager and network builder. Managers in networks are constantly
collaborating with partners across disciplines, boundaries and sectors. This is
significant because these management roles require different skill sets. Agranoff and
McGuire stated that the capacities required to operate successfully are different than
the capabilities needed to succeed at managing a single organization. 325 Today's
managers in public administration must, not only, have skills to plan, organize,
budget, staff and manage organizations, but also to activate, arrange, stabilize,
integrate and manage a network. 326
Fourth, the network is a highly, organic structure that is decentralized and
may integrate multiple levels of government and a variety of private and non profit
organizations in order to deliver a service or meet policy goals. Networks normally
function best in complex, unstable environments where innovation, flexibility, and
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adaptability are needed. 327 The greatest strength of the network is its ability to bring
together a group of experts and resources to solve problems in a rapidly changing
and shifting environment. This capability is critical in preventing, deterring and
responding to a broad range of terrorist threats. One of the challenges of network
management is aligning. outcome goals and mission purposes. Goldsmith and Eggers
stated that government networks "tend to form to deliver the type of service whose
outcomes are sometimes unclear, are difficult to measure, and may take years to
realize. To complicate matters, networks bring together actors whose goals
simultaneously overlap and differ."328

The Challenge ofMeshing Diverse Organizational Structures, Culture, Missions,
and Strategies in Coordinating Homeland Security

In homeland security, there are many government agencies involved in
coordinating and implementing homeland security policies and programs including
the Department of Homeland Security with its 22 agencies, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense, the organizations associated with national
intelligence and national security, local and state governments, private corporations
and non profit organizations. Each of these individual agencies has unique
organizational structures, cultures, purposes and strategies that impact our overall
efforts to deter, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Structure refers to a
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patterned arrangement of the relations among the persons and groups in the
administrative enterprise. 329
In the organization theory research there are a variety of ways for structuring
organizations. Henry Mintzberg, for example, proposed five organizational
structures including: entrepreneurial structure, machine bureaucracy, professional
bureaucracy, diversified form and adhocracy. Within a network of organizations
tasked with homeland security functions, all of these organizational structures could
be present. For example following 9/11, the city of Kenner, Louisiana formed a

collaborative partnership with the University of New Orleans and a private
information technology company to prepare for potential threats and emergencies. 330
Public sector partnerships and networks have been the norm over the past twenty
years and will be a key component in our homeland security efforts. 331
The starting point for defining organizational structures is strategy. Daft
defines strategy as the set of plans, decisions, and objectives that have been adopted
to achieve the organization's goals. 332 Chandler defines strategy as "the
determination of the basic goals and objectives of an enterprise, and adoption of the
courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these
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goals."333 In the public sector, an agency's strategy can be articulated by its enabling
legislation that defines its purpose, and by its strategic plans, mission statements,
policies and adopted goals. Strategy formulation typically begins with an assessment
of the opportunities and threats in the external environment and is an on going
process for many organizations.
Strategy formulation was clearly seen by Robert S. Mueller, Director of the
FBI, after the attacks of 9/11. Up until that point, the FBI had national security
responsibilities including deterring criminal conspiracy and investigating acts of
terrorism within the United States, but these were not the top priorities in the
organization. 334 After 9/11, Mueller announced that the FBI's number one priority
would be the prevention of terrorist attacks. 335 For many of the organizations that
would make up the Department of Homeland Security, terrorism prevention and

response would become one of the top priorities.
In addition, in the wake of 9/11, many states formed Offices of Homeland
Security and Task Forces consisting of state and local agencies to assess the state of
emergency preparedness and identify homeland security needs. 336 As a result of
these task forces, state and local governments have developed strategies to monitor
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and manage the risks associated with natural and man made disasters and to
coordinate and manage the technical and organizational infrastructure to support
rapid, effective emergency response when disasters do occur.
Organizational culture is a very important to most organizations and
culture change is a critical component of organization transformation.
Organizational culture is defined as "the set of values, guiding beliefs,
understandings and ways of thinking that is shared by members of an organization
and taught to new members as correct. " 337 Edgar Schein argued that "culture matters
because it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine
both our individual and collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns,
and values."338 In turn, cultural elements determine strategy, goals and modes of
operating. For example, law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation perceive terrorism as a crime thus their counterterrorism strategies
must be underpinned by the guiding principle of the rule of law and implemented
through the criminal justice approach.
Schein identifies three levels of culture that range from the very visible to the
very tacit and invisible, and include the following: (1) artifacts- the visible
organizational structures and processes; (2) espoused values- the strategies, goals,
and philosophies; and (3) basic underlying assumptions-the unconscious, taken for
granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings. 339 Understanding these levels is
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important when one is implementing transformational change because one must
identify the basic assumptions of an organization in order to plan interventions and
change strategies. Also understanding organizational cultures helps to explain some
of the inter-organizational and intra-organizational conflicts that occur in
implementing policies and programs. A conflict highlighted in the 9/11 Commission
Report was that between the FBI and CIA in sharing intelligence information on
suspected terrorists. This conflict can be explained in part by the drastically different
organizational cultures and strategies of these organizations.
The culture of intelligence driven organizations differs from those of pure
law enforcement organizations. 340 While (foreign) intelligence341 organizations are
interested in long-term infiltration, active and passive monitoring, and deterrence, the
law enforcement bias is to arrest and prosecute. Also, the primary goal of an
intelligence organization is to: (1) determine what intelligence should be collected to
advance national interests; (2) systematically collect that raw intelligence; (3) apply
analytical tools to the raw information in the development of informed judgments;
and (4) to share that finished intelligence with national level policymakers and other
officials with a demonstrated need to know. "Tradecraft" or the how, where and why
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intelligence gathering takes place, is of utmost importance. 342 Recruitment of sources
and penetration of groups operating in United States is highly valued by intelligence
organizations. Finally, there are fewer legal restrictions on overseas CIA operations
than FBI investigations at home or abroad.
By contrast, the primary goal of a law enforcement agency, such as the FBI,
is to respond to criminal activities, and to deter future crimes. In general, this goal is
achieved by rigorous investigation of criminal activities and close cooperation with
prosecutors. Discrete, individual criminal cases are the driving factor in a law
enforcement organizations, while broader trends and relationships among social
variables, such as political, economic, and military factors, drive intelligence
organizations. 343 When law enforcement entities operate within the United States,
civil liberties and the rights of U.S. citizens are of paramount concern. As a result,
the FBI is governed by a complex range of investigative guidelines and polices, and
statutes and constitutional limits when intelligence is being gathered in the United
States against foreign agents or U.S. citizens. 344 This was particularly the case pre
9/11.
In the organizational design lens, terrorism is seen as a network of
organizations, groups and individuals that are bound by a common ideology but may
have diverse structures, goals and tactics. In addition, this lens assumes that
342
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homeland security is a problem of developing, coordinating and managing networks
of government, private and non profit organizations which are in conflict with
terrorist networks. This lens is composed of theories from the field of terrorism
studies, as well as, public administration. From the field of public administration,
two models of governance are presented-hierarchical and network models. This lens
argues that rational, hierarchical bureaucratic design structures will most likely have
difficulty operating in complex, unstable environments. As a result, traditional
bureaucratic government structures will likely have limited success in deterring,
preventing and responding to evolving terrorist networks such as that represented by
Al Qaeda. An alternative way of structuring homeland security organizations is
through a network governance structure. This type of structure would allow multiple
agencies and organizations to build collaborative partnerships in order to improve
coordination across organizations and jurisdictions, to more effectively manage
resources and to enhance planning and communication capabilities. Finally, in this
lens, agencies involved in homeland security are assumed to have unique
organizational structures, cultures, missions and strategies. Thus, individual
organizations will perceive terrorism differently and will design and implement
counterterrorism polices that are congruent with their organization.
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Summary

The characteristics of each of these lenses are unique and developed from
different academic fields and practices. As a result, the stories about the 1993 World
Trade Center Bombing represented in Chapters three, four and five, are completely
different from one another. These stories represent how conceptual lenses can have
a significant impact in how we understand an event or phenomenon, as well as
having the affect of obscuring important details about a problem that if not addressed
can lead to catastrophic consequences.
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CHAPTER 3: 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING
FROM A CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE
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Introduction
To build a theoretical foundation for homeland security policy, three
conceptual lenses have been developed to analyze the 1993 World Trade Center
terrorist bombing. The focus of this chapter is to analyze the WTC bombing from a
criminal justice lens in order to begin the development of a homeland security
theory. This analysis will highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of this lens as
it relates to homeland security. Despite the successful investigation and prosecution
of the 1993 WTC conspirators, the United States was not able to prevent future
attacks against the homeland. This was due in part for failing to see the extent of the
new threat facing the United States at the time of the 1993 bombing. Terrorism in
the U.S. was seen primarily as a crime and homeland security was perceived as a
problem to be addressed by law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice
system. Lindsay Clutterbuck writes that "since the resurgence of terrorism in the late
1960s, it is this conception of "terror as crime" and not "terror as war" that has
primarily driven the response to terrorism of the liberal democratic nations." 1 For
example, throughout his administration, President Clinton often referred to
international terrorism as global crime.2 Carol Winkler wrote, "Before leaving office
the Clinton administration institutionalized terrorists as nonstate, criminal actors. " 3
This chapt~r presents the story of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
1
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from a criminal justice perspective, and each characteristic of this lens is used to
analyze this event from this conceptual perspective. The characteristics of Lens IHomeland Security as a Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism

as a Crime are listed in

table below and were described in Chapter 2.

Table 2: Characteristics of Lens I
FRAME
ANALYSIS

Criminal Justice

Definition of Terrorism:
Key characteristics

-Terrorism defined as a crime that is politically
motivated and is an illegal activity
-Act of violence whose purpose is to coerce or
intimidate a government or population
-many types of crimes can be committed in a terrorist
act

Key Theories explaining violent
behavior from the following levels:
• Individual
• Organization/group
• Nation state
• International/world
system

-Terrorists can be distinguished from ordinary criminals
-theories from criminology and criminal justice help to
explain terrorist behavior by groups and individuals and
include: deterrence, general strain, routine activity,
rational choice, and crime prevention theories

Primary Homeland Security Strategy
• Primary organizations
responsible
• Goal/purpose

-Law enforcement agencies, especially the FBI, and
those organizations that make up the criminal justice
system.
-Often reactive to crimes versus proactive
-Focus on investigating crimes, gathering evidence,
apprehending suspects, and successfully prosecuting
suspects for crimes.
-Homeland security efforts focus on crime prevention
strategies, intelligence gathering, enhancing law
enforcement powers, and increasing penalties for crimes
related to terrorism

The first section of this chapter will provide a chronology of the events that

led up to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, to the day of the bombing, and
finally to the investigation and prosecution of the defendants. This section will
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highlight the criminal justice process and organizations in this case. The second
section will highlight the crimes that were committed by the defendants and why
they were classified as terrorism. Section three will apply criminology theories of
rational choice, routine activities, and general strain in analyzing the motivation and
behavior of the six individuals involved in this case. Finally, section three will apply
the theories of deterrence and crime prevention in analyzing the 1993 WTC
bombing.

The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: The Crime

In the early morning hours of February 26, 1993, a convoy of three vehicles
left Jersey City headed for the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Four
conspirators, Mohammed Salameh, Mahmud Abouhalima, Eyad Ismoil and Ramzi
Yousef, had been plotting for months to build the most deadly improvised explosive
device ever constructed on U.S. soil.4 Among the vehicles in the convoy, was a
rented Ryder Ford Econoline van that was carrying the 1,500 pound urea-nitrate
bomb. 5
The mastermind and bomb maker of this plot, Ramzi Yousef, had purchased
1,000 pounds of technical grade urea and 105 gallons of nitric acid for the bomb's
main charge in the months before the attack. Yousef also purchased 60 gallons of
sulfuric acid in 15 gallon carboys to make nitroglycerin boosters. The conspirators
4
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had spent the previous three months mixing the chemicals for the explosives in their
apartment at 40 Pamprapo Avenue in Jersey City and storing the bomb components
and finished products at a rented storage shed at the Space Station Storage Company
in Jersey City. 6
The bomb that was loaded into the van consisted of four cardboard boxes
filled with a slurry of urea-nitrate and fuel oil, with waste paper as a binder. 7 These
boxes were surrounded by four tanks of compressed hydrogen that served to enhance
the destructive power of the bomb. 8 Twenty minute lengths of fuse were threaded
through surgical tubing to keep the smoke level down and were rigged to blasting
caps and boxes of gunpowder that were inserted into containers of homemade
nitroglycerine. 9 Typical high explosives have a velocity of three thousand feet per
second, but Yousef s bomb had a velocity five times that at fifteen thousand feet per
second. 10
Upon arrival at the World Trade Center complex, Ismoil and Yousef drove
the van filled with explosives into the red parking lot on the B-2 level, parked along
the load bearing south wall of the North tower, and lit the fuses. It was Yousefs
hope that, when the bomb detonated, the force would blow laterally, cracking the
supports at the skyscraper's base causing it to topple down and kill the tens of
6
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thousands within the building. 11 It was estimated that approximately 60,000
employees worked in the WTC complex and 90,000 additional visitors or commuters
to the World Trade Center each day, thus making it a prime target. 12
Yousef and Ismoil escaped in a car driven by Salameh. Yousef' s escape
continued that evening on a flight from New York City to Karachi, connecting to
Quetta in West Pakistan. 13 Ismoil would take a flight from Kennedy Airport to
Amman, Jordan on March 2, 1993. Following Yousef's and Isoil's lead, Abouhalima
would escape by flying from New York to Sudan via Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March

2, 1993. 14
At approximately 12:18 p.m., the bomb exploded, killing six people, injuring
more than a thousand, 15 and causing nearly $3 million in property damage. 16 The
massive blast created a cavernous crater 200 feet by 100 feet wide and seven stories
deep in the basement levels of the World Trade Center (See Figure 4). The
explosion not only caused extensive damage in several basement levels, which
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disabled fire protection, as well as, electrical, water and emergency communications
systems, but also ignited intense fires that quickly distributed black smoke to the
upper levels of the complex's seven buildings, requiring a massive evacuation. 17
Within minutes of the blast, first responders from the New York Police
Department (NYPD) and the New York Fire Department (FDNY) arrived at the
scene. For the New York City Fire Department it was the largest incident in its 128
year history (before 9/11); For FDNY it was equivalent to a 16 alarm fire involving
hundreds of fire fighters, representing nearly 45% of the on-duty staff. 18 While the
fire department focused on fighting fires, evacuating people, and rescuing those
trapped in the World Trade Center, the responding police units established a
perimeter around the crime scene, directed traffic, helped to rescue those trapped in
the building, and established a command post to coordinate the law enforcement
investigation to follow.
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Figure 4: Blast Damage from USFA Report on WTC Bombing

Blast Damage
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The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City, headed by Neil
Herman, assumed the lead role in this investigation which was labeled TRADEBOM
by the FBI. Neil Herman had a domestic terrorism unit comprised of about 50
agents and New York City police detectives. 20 These individuals, plus an additional
100 FBI agents, would join the investigation in New York City. 21 Also seven
hundred FBI agents nation wide were tasked to follow up on leads of
TRADEBOM. 22 To most of those involved in the investigation, this was a major
criminal matter to be solved by finding, arresting, prosecuting, and punishing the
perpetrators.

The Investigation of the WTC Bombing

For the FBI, the TRADEBOM investigation would be one of the largest
terrorism investigations in its history. In the days following the bomb explosion, a
team of thirty bomb technicians from the FBI, the NYPD and ATF worked in shifts
at the blast site looking for clues. Approximately 200 law enforcement officers from
at least eight different agencies assisted in the monumental task of collecting
evidence. For David Williams, the FBI's top bomb expert, this was the biggest "post
blast" scene he or any other team had ever processed in the U.S. 23 All items of
potential evidence were documented on the sites to preserve the chain of evidence
and chain of custody.
20
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In less than one month the crime scene investigations were completed and
approximately 3,000 pounds of debris were removed from the crime scene and
transported to the FBI laboratory in Washington D.C. 24 Among the most critical
pieces of evidence collected just two days after the explosion was a fragment of the
Ryder van. However, the FBI was only one of several criminal investigative
organizations collecting evidence at the crime scene.
On Sunday, February 28, 1993 teams of investigators from the NYPD bomb
squad, ATF Explosive's Team, and FBI's Explosive team were sent into the bomb
crater of the World Trade Center to search for clues. Joseph Hanlin, a senior
explosives enforcement officer from ATF was partnered with Donald Sadowy, a
detective from NYPD's bomb squad. Their team also included a chemist,
photographer, sketch artist and several technicians. As Hanlin's team searched the
edge of the crater near the bomb's center on the B-2 level, Hanlin spotted vehicle
parts that looked out of place. On closer inspection, Hanlin determined that these
were parts of the gear assembly that made up the differential assembly that were
ripped apart from the vehicle that had exploded. On one of the pieces was a series of
dots and digits that made up the vehicle identification number (VIN). This one piece
of evidence was the proverbial needle in the haystack, which of the 6,000 tons of
rubble that would be removed in the weeks ahead, led to the arrest of the first suspect
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in this case, Mohammed Salameh. 25
A VIN history check by the FBI revealed that the suspect parts were from an
E-350 yellow, Ford Econoline van with an Alabama license plate. This plate was
traced to the Ryder Truck Rental Company and then to the Ryder dealership at 1558

John F. Kennedy Boulevard in Jersey City.
When FBI agents interviewed the owner of the business, Paul Mascitelli, he
recounted that on Tuesday, February 23, 1993 man with dark hair and a trimmed
dark beard, who was identified as Salameh, had rented a yellow Ford Econoline
van. 26 Salameh had made it easy for the FBI to locate him because he had rented the
vehicle using his real name, his own driver's license, and an address to a local
Islamic Cultural Center. 27 The phone number on the rental agreement was traced to
his apartment at 34 Kensington Avenue. Also, a chemical analysis of the rental
agreement later showed traces of nitrates, a chemical associated with the explosives.
Mascitelli further reported that on Friday, February 26, 1993, about three
hours after the bombing, Salameh had returned to the dealership to report that the
van had been stolen the night before from the parking lot of a Shop Rite Supermarket
in Jersey City and to obtain his $400 rental deposit. 28 Salameh needed the money
from the deposit to upgrade his airplane ticket from an infant's ticket on Royal
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Jordanian Airlines to an adult fare to escape. 29

Mascitelli told Salameh that he'd

have to obtain a police report on the stolen van before the agency would accept his
account of the loss. 30 Salameh filed a police report on the stolen van with the Jersey
City Police on Tuesday, March 2, 1993 and returned to the Ryder agency for his
deposit, where the FBI was waiting to arrest him on Thursday, March 4th ·
Hours after Salameh's arrest, the FBI searched his apartment at 34
Kensington A venue and seized a great deal of evidence. Agents interviewed
Salameh's roommate, Abdul Yasin, who provided them a great deal of information,
including the location of the bomb factory at 40 Pamrapo A venue. Yasin was seen as
a cooperative witness by the FBI, thus he was not considered a suspect and released.
However, he fled the country on March 4, 1993 to Amman, Jordan. 31 Later, Yasin
was indicted as a conspirator for his role in the plot. Yasin helped to obtain and mix
the chemicals for the bomb and taught Salameh how to drive the rental van that had
carried the bomb to the World Trade Center parking garage. 32 He is still at large
today and the U.S. continues to offer a reward ofup to $5 million for information
leading directly to his apprehension or conviction through the Rewards for Justice
Program, U.S. Department of State. 33
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The ground floor apartment at 40 Pamrapo in Jersey City was used by the
conspirators to mix the chemicals they had obtained from City Chemical Corporation
and stored at a rented storage shed at the Space Station Storage Company in Jersey
City. Salameh had rented locker 4344, a 10 foot by 10 foot room at Space Station
Storage, on November 30, 1992 for $90 a month.

34

Yousef went to City Chemical

in December, 1992, where, he purchased 1,000 pounds of technical grade urea and
105 gallons of nitric acid to make urea nitrate for the bomb's main charge, as
prescribed in the bomb making manuals brought into the country by Ahmad Ajaj
and Ramzi Yousef on August 31, 1992.35
Ajaj had been arrested by agents of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) at Kennedy Airport on this date because he had a fraudulent Swedish
passport. 36 On inspection of Ajaj's luggage, INS agents found videos and bomb
books, and fake passports from Jordan. Yousef also raised the suspicion of INS
agents when he had no U.S. visa and presented an identification card with a name
that was different than what was on his passport. Yousef, too, was detained and
questioned by INS agents whereupon he asked for political asylum. 37 Yousef was
not detained like Ajaj because there was no room at the INS Varick Street detention
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facility. 38 Once in New York, Yousef put together the personnel (Salameh, Ayyad,
Abouhalima, Yasin and Ismoil) and supplies he would need to carry out his plan to
bomb the World Trade Center.
Among the key items that Ajaj brought into the country were two notebooks
with handwritten notes on explosives, six printed bomb making manuals, two
instructional videotapes on making explosives, and anti-American and anti-Israeli
materials. 39 Ajaj 's bomb making manuals were identical to those found in the
London apartment of Khalid al-Fawa, who was ultimately indicted in 1998 for the
U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. 40 Yousef
also purchased: 60 gallons of sulfuric acid, packaged in 15-gallon carboys, to make
nitroglycerin for boosters; one gallon of ethyl alcohol to stabilize nitroglycerin so
that it could later be transported; and a 25-pound bag of sodium carbonate to
neutralize acids during the mixing process.

41

Yousef paid $3,615 in cash for the

chemicals had had them delivered to the storage shed in Jersey City. 42
From January to February 1993, the conspirators mixed the chemicals they
had obtained from City Chemical in a manner consistent with the formulae and other
specifications in Ajaj's materials. In the course of the mixing process, the
conspirators spilled chemicals on the floors and walls of the apartment at 40
38
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Pamrapo, on their clothing, as well as on other items, thereby leaving telltale traces
of their illegal activities. 43 When mixing the urea nitrate, the conspirators first
dissolved the urea in water and then added the nitric acid. This process created harsh
chemical fumes, which required the conspirators to wear surgical masks during the
mixing process, caused some of the paint on the walls to change from white to blue,
and resulted in corrosion on the inside of the back bedroom's doorknob and doorhinges.44
Another explosive mixed in the 40 Pamrapo apartment was nitroglycerin,
which the conspirators used to make boosters for the World Trade Center bomb.
Nidal Ayyad, one of the convicted conspirators, was able to obtain "restricted"
chemicals to make these boosters because of his status as a chemical company
employee at Allied Signal. 45 During the mixing process, the conspirators spilled
nitroglycerin in the apartment and on their clothing, again leaving revealing traces of
46
the explosive. The evidence collected at this apartment, as well as, the one at
Kensington A venue Apartment would be would be presented during the trial of
World Trade Center bombing.
At Salameh's apartment on Kensington Avenue, the FBI found more
evidence of the World Trade Center conspiracy. Salameh's briefcase contained bank
records of accounts he had set up for Ramzi Yousef. Agents also found a telephone
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in which a phone record search led to more phone numbers and addresses of the
suspects and revealed their activities prior to the bombing. These telephone records
were a goldmine of information for the FBI because they were able to obtain other
possible contacts and suspects. Neil Herman described the telephone database that
was created during this investigation as so massive that it required four agents
working full time uploading numbers into computers, identifying who the calls went
to, and running their names through a criminal data base. 47
Ramzi Yousef spent thousands of dollars in phone calls while in the U.S.
calling terrorist contacts in Pakistan, the Middle East, and the Philippines.48 Among
those terrorist contacts Yousef was calling was his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
(KSM)-later the architect of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 49 On
November 3, 1992, KSM wired $600 from Qatar to the bank account ofSalameh. 50
KSM was inspired by Yousef s instant notoriety in 1993 and he, too, became
involved in planning attacks against the United States. In 1994, KSM and Yousef
went to the Philippines and began planning the Bojinka plot-the intended bombing of
12 U.S. commercial jets over the Pacific Ocean. 51 In September, 1996 Yousef and
two other defendants, Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah, were
convicted of crimes related to the Bojinka plot.

47

Reeve, Simon. (1999). The New Jackals. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 39.
Ibid. 39.
49
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission
Report. New York: W.W. Norton. 147.
50
Ibid. 147.
51
Ibid.
48

180
Another critical piece of information was a photo of Salameh standing next to
El Sayyid Nosair, the "lone deranged gunman" accused of assassinating Zionist
Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1991. 52 The Nosair case is important because many of the
individuals who were friends ofNosair, and known by the FBI as early as 1989, later
became the conspirators in the 1993 WTC bombing. As investigators developed
leads, evidence, and suspects, the investigation seemed increasingly to be just a
matter of good police work involving a variety of expert professionals from several
agencies. And, as sometimes happens in such investigations, the evidence and
suspects led the investigators to other cases with linkages that became clear as the
cases unfolded. The linkage of the 1993 WTC case with the assassination of Meir
Kahane is important in showing how long these conspirators were in the US planning
terrorist activities prior to the 1993 attack. These linkages went largely unnoticed
by law enforcement because each criminal event was perceived as an isolated
activity instead of linked to a broader criminal conspiracy.

Assassination of Meir Kahane-First Blow in Terrorist Campaign
On November 5, 1990, El Sayyid Nosair, a 34-year old immigrant from
Egypt, shot and killed Meir Kahane, the founder of the Jewish Defense League, after
Kahane had finished a fund raising speech at he New York Marriott East Side
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Motel. 53 In attempting to flee the murder scene, Nosair shot and wounded a
bystander, Irving Berlin. 54 Three blocks from the hotel, United States Postal Police
Officer, Carlos Acosta, was shot and wounded by Nosair. Upon being hit, Acosta
drew his own .357 magnum and fired once, hitting Nosair in the chin. 55 Nosair was
forced to flee on foot from the scene because his get away car, driven by Mahmud
Abouhalima, had parked in the wrong location.
When police arrived at the scene, they found a .357 Ruger in Nosair's hand
and in his pockets were bullets that fit the gun. Given the number of witnesses at the
scene of the crime and a clear murder weapon, this appeared to be an open and shut
case for the New York Police Department and the District Attorney. This appeared to
be a simple murder case, yet the evidence gathered at Nosair's home in Cliffside
Park, New Jersey by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (NY JTTF) clearly
showed that this was not the work of a lone gunman but rather of a larger terrorist
conspiracy but this was largely ignored by investigators at the time.
When detectives ofNYJTTF arrived at Nosair's home following the shooting
they found Mahmud Abouhalima and Mohammad Salameh, two of the WTC
bombers, and took them in for questioning. In addition, the detectives found
evidence that included formulas for bomb making. One of these formulas was for a
device constructed of fuel oil and urea nitrate, the same combination used by Ramzi
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Yousef 25 months later in the World Trade Center bomb. 56 Nosair' s home also
contained "literature relating to guns, weapons, and combat, including subjects such
as bomb making, hand grenades, security and listening devices, 'Arms in
Afghanistan,' 'Explosive Traps,' 'How to Teach Yourself to Shoot like an Expert,'
and a guide to buying guns and ammunition."57 Police also found 1,440 rounds of
7.62 millimeter bullets, the caliber commonly used in military rifles, pistol targets,
and several rounds of .22 and .3 8 caliber ammunition. 58
Among the most critical pieces of evidence collected at Nosair's home that
clearly showed a conspiracy was developing by a terrorist cell, were audio sermons
by Sheikh Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman, Nosair's notebooks containing parts of
Rahman' s speeches, and maps and drawings of New York City landmarks such as
the Statue of Liberty and World Trade Center Complex. 59 Rahman was one of the
spiritual leaders of the international terrorist organization, Egyptian al-Gama at alIslamiyya or Islamic Group (IG) from at least the early 1990's and was known
throughout the world by Islamic fundamentalists through his recorded sermons and
writings. Islamic Group (IG) was Egypt's largest militant group and was an
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. 60 IG's goals included overthrowing Egypt's
secular regime and the creation of an Islamic state, and waging jihad against
Americans. When Rahman entered the U.S. in 1990, he recruited persons to IG and
56
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solicited them to commit violent jihad actions through his sermons at the Farouq
Mosque in Brooklyn, New York. 61 Among the people who attended these sermons
were Nosair, Salameh and Abouhalima.
Rahman played a key role in defining the goals ofIG and provided guidance
to followers on whether particular jihad actions, including acts of terrorism, were
permissible under his extremist interpretations oflslamic Law. For example, written
in one ofNosair's notebooks was the future vision of jihad in the U.S. which
Rahman called for the "breaking and destruction of the enemies of Allah. And this
by means of destroying exploding, the structure of their civilized pillars such as
touristic infrastructure which they are proud and of their statues which they endear
and the buildings which gather their heads, their leaders, and without any
announcement for our responsibility of Muslims for what had been done." 62

In August, 1992, Rahman would begin planning for the destruction of the
"civilized pillars" by telephoning Ramzi Yousef in Pakistan, who would become the
bomb builder and mastermind of the WTC bombing. 63 Upon arrival in the U.S.,
Yousef called Mahmud Abouhalima who was the chauffeur and assistant to Rahman.
Yousef began gathering his cell members who were all followers of Rahman.
Yousef also kept in close contact with Rahman in the weeks leading up to the WTC
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bombing as evidenced by repeated phone calls to Rahman' s home. 64 In October,
1995, Sheikh Abdel Rahman was convicted of engaging in seditious conspiracy to
wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States, which included the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center and a plot to bomb New York landmarks,
including the United Nations, the FBI building in New York and the Lincoln and
Holland Tunnels. 65
At the time ofNosair's arrest, the FBI did not recognize the larger conspiracy
and link to Middle Eastern terrorist organizations because many of the materials in
Nosair's apartment were not tr~slated until after the 1993 WTC bombing. 66

The

primary task of the FBI was to gather the evidence needed to obtain a conviction for
the homicide committed by Nosair, thus, much of these materials were not needed in
the prosecution of this case. In addition, the FBI lacked Arabic translators to translate
and analyze Nosair's documents. Finally, the criminal justice lens from which the
FBI was operating limited their perception of the crime to one committed by a lone
perpetrator rather than a group of actors.
Chief of Detectives for NYPD, Joe Borelli, saw the Kahane murder as a clear
cut homicide committed by a "lone deranged gunman" with no ties to known
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terrorists or Middle East conspiracies. 67 The official stance of NYPD was that
Nosair acted alone. However, Lieutenant Eddie Norris, commander of the 1ih
Precinct Detective Squad who was assigned to this case, believed there was a group
or conspiracy involved. 68 Furthermore, according to FBI officials who were
interviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff on past terrorist attacks, the NYPD and the
District Attorney's office resisted attempts to label the Kahane assassination a
"conspiracy" despite the apparent links to a broader network of radicals. 69 Instead,
FBI officials further reported that these organizations wanted the appearance of
speedy justice and a quick resolution to a volatile situation. 70
When the Nosair case went to trial there was a great deal of media attention
because of the large number ofprotestors from the Kahane and Nosair camps that
picketed in front of the courthouse. Among the protestors were Mahmud
Abouhalima and Mohammad Salameh. The leader of the Brooklyn Mosque,
Mustafa Shalabi helped to raise funds for Nosair's legal fees. Some of these funds
came from the wealthy Saudi, Osama bin Laden. 71 It was during the Nosair case that
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the FBI's New York office first heard bin Laden's name. 72 Nosair was acquitted of
murder but received a 7 to 22 year sentence for a weapons charge.
Even while in prison, Nosair continued to plot attacks against the U.S. with
his friends Mahmud Abouhalima and Emad Salem, and his cousin, Ibrahim ElGabrowny. On May 6, 1992 when Abouhalima, Salem and El-Gabrowny visited
Nosair in prison, Nosair ordered them to build bombs, secure safehouses, and kill the
judge and prosecutor who had sent him to prison. 73 This information was given to
the FBI by their undercover informant, Emad Salem. 74 In late 1990, the FBI
recruited Salem to funnel information to them on the Muslim fundamentalists that
were at the courthouse during the Nosair trial. During the Nosair trial, Salem
befriended El-Gabrowny. In fact, Salem later infiltrated Rahman's inner circle and
provide key evidence to the FBI on future bombing plots planned by Nosair from
prison. 75 Salem had warned the FBI that Nosair and his friends were planning a
number of bombings and assassinations and that they should be following them in
the summer of 1992.76 The FBI was suspicious of Salem and did not trust the
information he was giving them, thus they did not follow up on his information and
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dropped him as an informant because he refused to wear a wire to record the
conversations of Rahman and his followers. 77

The Arrest, Prosecution and Conviction of the WTC Conspirators
After arresting Salameh on March 4, 1993 as he tried to secure his deposit for
the Ryder van that was used to carry the WTC bomb, FBI agents were able to obtain
and execute a series of search warrants for various locations linked to the
conspirators. As a result, they were able to uncover the identities of Salameh' s
· accomplices, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ibrahim El-Gabrowny and Nidal Ayyad. 78 The
day Salameh was arrested, the manager at the Space Station opened the locker rented
by Salameh because his employees had witnessed Salemeh and Yousef delivering
and storing suspicious looking containers at the shed. 79 He called the FBI and
reported his suspicions. The search of the storage locker at Space Station Storage
Company in Jersey City revealed evidence of cans of chemicals that were identified
as urea and sulfuric acid like that used in the bomb as well as bottles, beakers,
funnels, tubing and a fuse. 80 In addition, the identification that Salameh had used to
rent the van had his name but the address oflbrahim El-Gabrowny, cousin of
Nosair. 81
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While searching Salemeh's apartment on Kensington Avenue on March 4,
1993, agents found receipts for airplane tickets for Ahmad Ajaj, who had just been
released from prison for attempting to enter the U.S. on a fraudulent Swedish
passport. Agents found Ajaj on March 9, 1993 at an INS center and arrested him. 82
Nidal Ayyad, was arrested on March 10, 1993 at his New Jersey home. Phone
records showing calls from the Space Station Storage Company in Jersey City to the
business office of Ayyad, joint bank accounts with Salameh, and his inquiries into
buying explosives provided enough probable cause for the FBI to secure his arrest. 83
On Ayyad's computer FBI agents found the WTC bombing letter in which Yousefs
cell, named the Fifth Battalion in the Liberation Army , claimed credit for the
bombing and listed their grievances. 84 This letter was received by The New York

Times newspaper four days after the WTC attack and turned over to the FBI. 85
After Salameh's arrest, one of the first names that surfaced as a coconspirator was Mahmud Abouhalima. Within a week of the WTC bombing, FBI
traced Abouhalima's flight to Saudi Arabia and then to Egypt using ticket manifests
and information from their Egyptian informant, Emad Salem. 86
The FBI informed the Egyptian government and soon Abouhalima was taken
into custody by the Egyptian authorities and viciously tortured because of his
82
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connections to Islamic militants campaigning against the Egyptian government.

87

President Hosni Mubarek of Egypt later told the U.S. that Abouhalima had given
Egyptian authorities "a great deal of information about the bombing including how
the operation was carried out and who participated in it. " 88
Abouhalima was linked to the bombing through his close association with
Ayyad and Salameh. The FBI stated that Abouhalima was seen on the morning of
the WTC attack riding in the Ryder van with Salameh, and was also seen near the
Jersey City storage lockers where explosive materials similar to that at the bomb site
were found. 89
As FBI agents made arrests and interviewed witnesses, they became aware of
a mysterious young 'Iraqi' man called "Rashid" who appeared to be the mastermind
of the plot. 90 Rashid would be later identified as Ramzi Yousef. The NYJTTF
gathered enough evidence in the months following the bombing to charge him with
the bombing and circulated details of his aliases and crimes around the world. 91
Investigators stated that Yousef was not only spotted by witnesses at the 49 Pamrapo
apartment where the bomb was made, but also his fingerprints were found at this
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apartment as well as in the storage shed where the chemicals were kept, and on the
bomb manuals carried into the country by Ajaj. 92
On April 2, 1993 Yousef was listed as one of the FBI's Ten Most Wanted
Terrorists and a worldwide manhunt for him began. 93 And while the language of
international terrorism was employed, it came from a much more limited perspective
than how it has been employed from a post 9/11 vantage point. In this case, a half a
dozen agents would be assigned to Yousef's case with the task of building up the
evidence against Yousef, find him, capture him, arrange his extradition, and secure a
conviction in a U.S. court.94 The State Department offered a $2 million reward
through its Rewards for Justice Program for information that would lead to the arrest
of Yousef. 95
While a fugitive from justice, Yousef continued his militant activities.
Among the plots planned by Yousef, was an assassination of Prime Minister Bhutto
in September, 1994. This plot failed when the bomb detonated prematurely in his
Karachi apartment. Yousef then went to the Philippines to work on a plan to
detonate bombs on twelve jumbo jets headed to the U.S. which was expected to kill
approximately 4,000 passengers. This plan was code named "Project Bojinka."96
Yousef designed a pocket-size bomb, consisting of a timer made from a
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Casio watch, a nine volt-battery and liquid nitroglycerine in a contact lens case. 97
On December 11, 1994, while aboard a Tokyo-bound Philippines Airlines flight,
Yousef assembled a bomb which he placed under his own seat as part of a test run
for other similar bombings being planned. 98 After flying from Manila to Cebu, 350
miles to the south, Yousef got off the plane, leaving the bomb under seat 26-K.
Later, the bomb went off, killing Japanese businessman, Haruki Ikegami, who was
sitting there, and injuring ten others. The plane managed to make a safe emergency
landing in Okinawa. 99
On January 6, 1995, Yousef and his accomplice, Abdul Hakim Murad, were
mixing chemicals for a bomb in his apartment in Manila when a fire broke out,
forcing the conspirators to flee and fire and police to respond. When police arrived
at the apartment they found cartons of chemicals, Casio timers, wrist watches with
wires attached, and components for nitroglycerine. 100 The officers waited at the
apartment for Murad and Yousef to return, and within hours Murad was arrested as
he tried to retrieve Yousefs laptop computer from the apartment. 101 This laptop
contained a great deal of incriminating evidence against Yousef, such as information
relating to flight numbers and departure times of commercial airlines, including
civilian commercial aircraft to the U.S., and times for detonation of bombs aboard
97
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such airliners. It also contained a letter in which the "Fifth Battalion of the Liberation
Army under the leadership of Lt. General Abu Baker Almaki" threatened to attack
American targets "in response to the financial, political, and military assistance given
to the Jewish State in the occupied land of Palestine by the American
Government." 102 The use of airplanes as tools of terror to kill hundreds of civilians
was initially conceived by Yousef and fine tuned by Khalid Sheik Mohammad in the
attack on 9/11.
In early February 1995, the United States embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan
received a tip from Istiaque Parker who hoped to collect part of the $2 million
reward offered by the FBI for information leading to Yousef s capture. 103 Parker
stated that Yousef was at the Su Casa Guesthouse on the outskirts of Islamabad. On
February 7, 1995, Pakistani officials, together with a special agent from the U.S.
Department of State, arrested Yousef. The next day, agents from the FBI and Secret
Service arrived from the US to take Yousef into custody and transport him back to
the U.S.
According to U.S. Secret Service agent Brain Parr, who escorted Yousef
from Pakistan to the U.S., Yousef gave him a detailed account of his role in the
bomb plot, even bragging about it. 104 In fact, Yousef not only drew a rough sketch
of the crime scene and the path he had taken into the World Trade Center, but also
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provided an explanation for the methods and tactics he used. 105 For example, Yousef
told Agent Parr that he received money for the bombing from friends and family
members, and that had he had more money he would have made "a more efficient
bomb."106 Yousef also reported to Parr that he had hoped the explosion would cause
one tower to fall into the other and kill 250,000 civilians because if they suffered
those types of casualties Americans would realize they were at war. 107
Eyad Ismoil was the final conspirator to be arrested in the WTC bombing on
August 3, 1995. Ismoil had driven the van filled with explosives into the garage of
the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, and escaped on a plane to Amman,
Jordan on the night of the bombing. 108 Telephone records indicated that lsmoil was
in constant contact with other conspirators, including Yousef, in the Jersey City
apartment where the bomb was constructed in the months before the explosion. In
1995, FBI agents located lsmoil in Jordan and Jordanian police arrested him on July
30, 1995. 109 Ismoil told authorities after his arrest that he believed he was
transporting boxes of soap into the trade center garage as part of a business deal.
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While there was a global manhunt to apprehend and arrest some of the WTC
perpetrators, as the defendants went to trial it appeared to law enforcement officials
that the case was nearly over. From the criminal justice perspective the case is
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closed once a perpetrator is tried and convicted. As a result, there was no follow up
on the linkages of these perpetrators to other possible terror plots or suspects.

Defendants on Trial
In September 1993, Ayyad, Abouhalima, Ajaj, Salameh, Yousef, and Yasin
were indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York on a number of charges relating to their participation in the WTC bombing.
The trial of Ayyad, Abouhalima, Ajaj and Salameh lasted from September 1993 to
March 1994. During the trial the prosecution called 207 witnesses and presented
1,003 exhibits in an effort to present an avalanche of circumstantial evidence with
which to bury the four defendants. 111 Since there were no witnesses who actually
saw the defendants at or near the trade center on the day of the blast, the government
had to build its case on myriad small details such as the telephone records showing
that the men were in constant touch with each other, computer files, DNA tests,
fingerprint analyses, reports on chemical traces found on articles of clothing, rental
contracts, and bomb-making manuals. 112
On March 4, 1994 the jury found Ayyad, Abouhalima, Ajaj and Salameh
guilty of all charges which included conspiracy to damage building by use of an
explosive device, damaging or destroying WTC complex by explosive, causing ·
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injury or death, explosive destruction of property, explosive destruction of

.
. of exp1os1ves.
.
113
government property, and mterstate
transportation
Mahmoud Abouhalima was convicted on nine counts and sentenced to 240
years imprisonment. Mohammad Salameh was convicted of 10 counts and
sentenced to 117 years imprisonment. Nidal Ayyad was convicted of nine counts
and sentenced to 117 years in prison. Ahmad Ajaj was convicted of nine counts and
sentenced to 115 years. All four of these conspirators were also fined $250,000 and
ordered to pay $250 million in restitution. 114
On May 29, 1996, Yousef went to trial in U.S. Federal Court in Manhattan
for the Bojinka plot. In September 1996, Yousef was convicted of conspiracy to
damage or destroy aircraft by planning to bomb eleven U.S. jumbo jets over the
Pacific Ocean. A year later in August, 1997 Yousef and Ismoil went on trial for
their participation in the 1993 WTC bombing. Like the first WTC trial, a great deal
of forensic evidence and expert testimony was presented on chemicals, fingerprints
and explosive residue. 115 The most compelling evidence against Yousef was his own
admissions on his role, motivations, and goals to Secret Service Agent Brian Parr. 116
Ismoil and Yousef were found guilty of all charges which included
conspiracy to destroy by explosives buildings, vehicles and property, damaging or
113
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destroying the World Trade Center complex by means of an explosive, causing
injury or death, and transporting explosive materials in interstate commerce with the
intent to destroy buildings or vehicles. 117 Yousef received a sentence of 240 years in
prison without the possibility of parole, fined $4.5 million and ordered to pay $250
million in restitution.
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Eyad Ismoil was convicted of 10 counts, sentenced to 240

years imprisonment and fined $250,000.
In sentencing the terrorists convicted in this trial, the judge computed the
actuarial life spans of the six victims and added them together to arrive at a sentence
of240 years.
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It is particularly interesting to note that at the time of the 1993

bombing, there was no crime in the federal statutes specifically addressing terrorism.
Rather, the practice was to charge defendants with a broad range of criminal statutes,
which in this case, included conspiracy to damage building by use of an explosive
device, explosive destruction of property, and interstate transportation of explosives
to name a few. 120 All of the defendants were charged with conspiracy, defmed in the
federal statutes as follows: "If two or more people conspired to either commit any
crime against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose." 121 The conspiracy charge was based on
the letter sent in to the New York Times four days after the bombing by Nidal
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Ayyad. The letter claimed responsibility for the bombing on behalf of the Liberation
Army Fifth Battalion and listed certain political demands and threatened future acts
of terrorism. 122 In this case the FBI was the lead agency tasked with investigating
and managing this terrorist incident because terrorism was seen largely as a crime
and counterterrorism policy at the time focused on criminal justice solutions.

The 1993 WTC Case: Terrorism as Crime
The counterterrorism policy of the United States from 1985 to 200 I was
largely influenced by a set of principles laid down in 1985 by a commission chaired
by Vice President George Bush. In the Public Report of the Vice President's Task

Force on Combating Terrorism, one of the key principles was that "the U.S.
government will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic
freedoms or endangering democratic principles."

123

This report goes on to state that

"violent terrorist acts are crimes. Accordingly, the United States will make every
effort to investigate, apprehend and prosecute terrorists as criminals." 124 By
prosecuting terrorists within the U.S. criminal justice system, defendants are
understood and treated in the same manner as any other criminal under U.S. law.
The principles highlighted in the 1986 report became the national policy as
outlined in National Security Decision Directive #207 called the National Program
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for Combating Terrorism. In NSDD 207, terrorists were described as undertaking
"criminal acts that involve the use of threat of violence against innocent persons.
These acts were premeditated, intended to achieve a political objective through
coercion or intimidation of an audience beyond the immediate victims." 125 This
conceptualization of terrorists was similar to the FBI' s definition of terrorism at the
time of the 1993 attacks. The FBI defined domestic terrorism as ''the unlawful use
of force or violence, committed by a group(s) or two or more individuals, against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." 126 Using this
definition of terrorism, the FBI classified the 1993 WTC bombing as a terrorist
incident and became the lead agency in managing the incident.
Since 1982, the Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, has been
responsible for responding to terrorist incidents that occur domestically. 127
Specifically, the FBI was designated the lead agency responsible for combating
terrorism in the U.S. in April, 1982 by President Reagan's national security decision
directive #30. 128 This role was later reaffirmed, even after the WTC attack, by
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President Clinton in Presidential Decision Directive 39 signed in June, 1995.

129

The

Department of Justice and the FBI, not only, were to resolve and manage a crisis
caused by a terrorist incident, but also, were to conduct the criminal investigation
and pursue, arrest, and prosecute the terrorists. An incident may involve U.S. citizens
or foreign individuals or groups engaging in terrorist acts or threats on U.S. soil. 130
In 1986, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act expanded
the FBI' s jurisdiction to include investigating acts of terrorism directed against
Americans overseas. 131 As a result, the FBI expanded its international role by
developing partnerships with law enforcement agencies in nations around the world.
In the 1993 case, the FBI received assistance from police agencies in Egypt, Jordan,
and Pakistan in capturing and extraditing some of the conspirators in this case.
Extradition is the formal process with which a nation state surrenders a criminal
suspect to another state for prosecution or punishment. 132 Generally, agents of one
nation state may not enter another nation state to apprehend a criminal suspect
without the host State's permission.
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not arrested by Jordanian authorities until 1995 was because the U.S. did not have an
extradition treaty with Jordan until May, 1995. 134 International terrorism has long
been recognized as a political crime by the United Nations as well as nation states.
What distinguishes terrorism from common domestic crime is that the conduct is
motivated by political, military, ideological and religious ends. In the next section,
the behavior of the perpetrators in the WTC attack will be examined using theories
from the field of criminology.

Explaining the WTC Bombing as a Terrorist Act using Theories of Criminology

If terrorists are perceived as criminals then theories of criminology should
explain the motivation and behavior of the perpetrators in this case. In this section,
the WTC attack will be analyzed as a political crime and criminology theories of
rational choice, routine activities, and general strain will be used to analyze the
behavior of the conspirators in this case.

Terrorism as a Political Crime
The 1993 WTC bombing clearly highlights some of the differences between
terrorists who commit political crimes and ordinary criminals. A number of scholars
have identified clear differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals. 135 First,
according to Bodrero, criminals are characterized in general as opportunistic,
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impulsive, self-centered and undisciplined. 136 Thus, most street criminals do not
plan their crimes and they react to easy opportunities on the spur of the moment. For
most criminals, crime is a way for obtaining goods and violence is employed as a
means to obtain money or material goods for the criminal's own self-interest.
Gottfredson and Hirschi described criminal behavior "as acts that involve simple and
immediate gratification but few long term benefits, and are exciting and risky but
require little skill or planning." 137 Terrorists, by contrast, normally plan their
operations and their violent acts are intended to have consequences (political or
social), most often to create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself. 138
In the WTC case, the conspirators planned their attack many months in
advance by acquiring bomb making materials including 1,000 pounds of technical
grade urea 105 gallons of nitric acid, 60 gallons of sulfuric acid, mixing the
chemicals in a rented apartment to form a 1500 pound bomb, and conducting
surveillance of the WTC to determine the best location to place the bomb and
identify weaknesses in security systems.
Second, criminals try to avoid committing their crimes in public and are not
concerned about influencing public opinion. Terrorists, however, use political
violence as "theatre" or a way to make a symbolic statement about a political
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cause. 139 The primary advantage of terrorism to those who sponsor and perpetuate it
is that it has an extremely useful agenda-setting function. That is, terrorist violence,
if its purported cause is skillfully articulated, can put the issue of political change on
the public agenda. In addition, terrorism can be used to create revolutionary
conditions or inspire resistance by the population by example. 140
The 1993 WTC bombing conspirators were clearly motivated by political
goals as seen by the letter that arrived at The New York Times four days after the
bombing. In this letter the Fifth Battalion of the Liberation Army declared
responsibility for the explosion at the World Trade Center in response "for American
political, economical, and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the
rest of the dictator countries in the region." 141 The attack was intended to cause large
scale fear and to coerce the American government in changing its foreign policy as it
related to Israel and Middle Eastern regimes. The letter by the Liberation Army also
justified the attacks on American civilians because "the American people are
responsible for the actions of their government and they must question all of the
crimes that their government is committing against other people or they, Americans,
will be the targets of our operations." 142 The victims in this case were not selected
by the conspirators, but were chosen arbitrarily. Because terrorism is essentially
139
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arbitrary and unpredictable no one can be certain that they will not be the next
victim. 143 As a result, this type of violence instills fear in the community or nation as
a whole.
Finally, criminals are generally undisciplined, untrained and oriented toward
escape, while terrorists are the opposite. 144 Terrorists prepare for their missions, are
willing to take risks, and are attack-oriented. 145 In the WTC bombing, the
conspirators used an Econoline van containing a 1,500 pound urea-nitrate bomb as
their weapon. The blast resulted in six murdered civilians and over a thousand other
victims who suffered various injuries. Though terrorists have some differences from
ordinary criminals, they, in fact, participate in a broad range of criminal behavior in
planning and carrying out their acts of violence. As such, theories from the field of
criminology can help explain the motivation and behavior of the perpetrators in the
WTC attack.

Applying Strain Theory
One of the most widespread sociological theories on the causes of terrorism
is that terrorists come from groups that experience marginalization, poverty,
unemployment, and social alienation. People with such social disadvantages are
thought to be at a higher risk for getting generally involved in acts of violence, and
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by inference in terrorism. This path to terrorism violence is explained by strain
theory.
General strain theory as developed by Robert Agnew argued people engage
in crime because they experience strains or stressors. 146 Strains refer to events or
conditions that are disliked by individuals. Strains can occur when individuals lose
something they value such as money, a job, property, a loved one, as well as, when
individuals are treated in a negative manner such as if they are oppressed, physically
abused, humiliated or disrespected. 147 Another type of strain results when individuals
are not able to achieve their goals such as having a better job, more status, or greater
autonomy. As a result of these strains, individuals experience a range of emotions
including anger, frustration and depression which some cope with through crime. 148
Agnew wrote, "Crime may be a way of reducing or escaping from strains; obtaining
revenge against those believed responsible for the strains or other, more vulnerable
targets; and/or alleviating the negative emotions associated with strains." 149
Others have also suggested that some people engage in terrorism as a result
of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives, e.g. regarding
education or social mobility. 150 There is little doubt that some young people with
little education, such as Palestinian youths in the Middle East, or second generation
146
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immigrants in the under privileged areas of big European cities, feel frustrated at
being excluded from the higher status majority groups that surround them, from the
realization that they do not share the same opportunities, and from lack of hope of
ever improving their living conditions. It is not hard to imagine such humiliated
young men believing that powerful, violent acts of terrorism are a means to avenge
themselves, their families or their community, regain control of their lives, and
express the rage that comes from humiliating experiences.
Charismatic religious leaders, such as Abdul Rahman, understand the sense
of humiliation of their followers and seduce them into committing horrific acts of
violence. Rahman clearly had a great capacity to inspire young Muslim men to
engage in violent jihad against the U.S. as seen with the assassination of Rabbi
Kahane by El Sayyid Norsair in 1990, the bombing of the World Trade Center by
Yousef and company in 1993, and the planned bombing spree by Siddiq Ali and his
eight Sudanese recruits against New York City landmarks in June, 1993.
Strain theory assumes that there are environmental conditions such as poverty,
lack of education and political disenfranchisement, which may cause individuals to
tum to violent criminal behavior, including terrorism. General strain theory would
suggest that the WTC conspirators committed the violent crime of bombing the
World Trade Center, as a result of their anger and frustration at the perceived
inequality, injustice and humiliation they felt as Muslim men. Jessica Stem reported
that in her interviews of terrorists from around the world, the most frequent variable
that arose as a reason why these individuals chose a life of holy war was not poverty
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or human rights abuses, but perceived humiliation. 151 Stem wrote, "Part of the
mission of jihad is to restore Muslims' pride in the face of humiliation. Violence, in
other words, restores the dignity of humiliated youth." 152 A reaction to strain,
according to Merton (1938), is "rebellion" in which one rejects the system altogether
and tries to replace it with a new one. 153 Rebellion can include politically motivated
terrorism which is motivated by individuals with a deeply held sense of grievance
over some form of political, social or economic injustice. Given the background of
some of the WTC conspirators this sense of humiliation and injustice may well have
been a key reason for their involvement in this terrorist attack. 154
Among the WTC conspirators, Muhammad Salameh exemplified several
aspects of marginality. Salameh was born to Palestinian parents in the West Bank
and his family was forced to relocate to Amman, Jordan in 1968. 155 Salameh's
family was one of thousands who left the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 1967
Arab Israeli War. Salameh came from abject poverty and was a man with few skills,
and few hopes of developing a professional career. 156 Salameh was neither smart nor
ambitious as a result he was often unemployed in Amman. 157 In order to earn a
living, Salameh moved to Jersey City in 1988 where he was only able to find menial
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odd jobs. In America, Salameh's first contact was with Nosair at his Jersey City
Mosque. Salameh would become a loyal disciple ofNosair and Rahman and
embrace their radical ideologies. Salameh faced a series of small humiliations
throughout his life that may have added up to feeling of intense frustration, and a
willingness to commit acts of terrorism against the U.S., his perceived oppressor, as
a means of restoring his sense of dignity. 158
Ahmad Ajaj, like Salameh, came from a family of Palestinian refugees.
According to Ajaj, he came to the U.S. in 1991 seeking political asylum because he
had been tortured by the Israeli Army. 159 In the U.S., Ajaj also worked in a low
paying, menial job as a pizza delivery man in Houston. 160 In June 1992, Ajaj would
travel to Pakistan, like many other Muslim men, to attend the terrorist training camp
at Camp Khaldan. 161 It was here that Ajaj learned how to use weapons and build
bombs from Ramzi Yousef. Ajaj was arrested in September, 1992 when he
attempted to enter the U.S. illegally (at the same time as Yousef). Ajaj was linked to
the 1993 WTC bombing because he was found carrying the manuals that were used
in making the bomb and in providing instructions on how to set up a terrorist cell. In
one of the manuals the ideology of the group was highlighted in that it instructed
individuals that "the ultimate goal is getting rid of people who stand in the way of
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the Islamic Call and establishing an Islamic state." 162 To accomplish this, the
strategies that were listed included assassinating personnel and foreign tourists, and
blowing up, destroying, and sabotaging places of entertainment. 163
Mahmud Abouhalima, like Salameh and Ajaj, grew up in conditions of abject
poverty and desperation. Abouhalima was born in 1959 in a ramshackle suburb 15
miles south of Alexandria, Egypt. According to Abouhalima's friends, he developed
a deep hatred for Egypt because he felt his country offered little hope for his
generation's future. 164 As a teen, Abouhalima began to associate with members of
the outlawed, Islamic Group, led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Abouhalima fled
Egypt to Germany in 1981 to escape prosecution by the government of Anwar Sadat
which was arresting Islamic intellectuals and fundamentalists who opposed him. 165
In Germany, Abouhalima worked at menial jobs such as a dishwasher and clerk in a
grocery store and associated with the orthodox Muslims within the Egyptian
immigrant community. Abouhalima fled Germany for America in 1986 when his
residency permit expired.
In the U.S., Abouhalima was given amnesty in 1986 and became a permanent
resident in 1990. He was able to obtain a chauffeur's license and proceeded to drive
taxicabs in New York from 1986-1991. In his free time, Abouhalima helped raise
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money for the Afghan Mujahideen and recruited Muslims for the Afghan-Soviet War
out of the at the Alkifah Afghan Refugee Center in Al Farooq Mosque in
Brooklyn. 166 This Brooklyn office of MAK was a center for fundraising and training
in the U.S. for the Afghan Arabs and later Al Qaeda, and was said to have been
funded by Osama bin Laden. 167 In fact, Abouhalima took several trips to Pakistan
from 1988 to 1990 to train in the terrorist training camps and fight in the AfghanSoviet War. 168
By 1990, Abouhalima had been transformed into a radical jihadist who was
further inspired by Sheik Rahman. One Egyptian who attended the mosque where
Rahman preached recalled that many listeners were Egyptian expatriates, like
Abouhalima, who had undergone college training for a profession but were forced to
take menial jobs in America. 169 Some of these individuals felt demeaned while
others felt alienated and lonely in America. 170 Abouhalima became closely
associated with Rahman by serving as his driver and bodyguard, and attending his
sermons at mosques in Brooklyn and Jersey City. Abouhalima was involved in the
attack on the World Trade Centers because he said that he regarded America as a
world wide enemy. 171 The reason, he stated, is not only because the United States
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supported the secular Egyptian government that he and his colleagues found
oppressive, but also because of its history of terrorist acts, such as the bombing of
Hiroshima. 172 While Ajaj, Abouhalima and Salameh came from backgrounds
highlighted by poverty and oppression, Nidal Ayyad was a stereotypical American
success story.
Like Ajaj and Salameh, Nidal Ayyad was born after the Arab Israeli War in
1968 to Palestinian parents who had been forced to move to Kuwait from the West
Bank:. 173 Ayyad's father was a clothing salesman who strongly supported law and
order in America. 174 Ayyad emigrated to the United States in October, 1985 and
began studying chemical engineering at Rutgers University. Ayyad graduated in
1991 and was employed as a research engineer for Allied Signal in Morristown, New
Jersey, which made aerospace and automotive products. Ayyad primarily worked
with chemical used in pharmaceuticals and paints. Ayyad was from a middle class
family who was succeeding in America yet he chose a path of terrorist violence as a
form ofrebellion against U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the deep
humiliation he felt as a Palestinian over the loss of the Palestinian homeland to the
Israelis.
Ayyad was involved in the conspiracy from the beginning in that he opened
up a series of bank accounts with Salameh that transferred money from Muslim
Brotherhood supporters in Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Europe and other countries to
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the New York cell. Ayyad also went on scouting and surveillance missions at the
World Trade Center with Salameh, helped Salameh rent the yellow Ryder van that
carried the bomb, and ordered tanks of compressed hydrogen gas from his company.
In searching the homes of the other conspirators, law enforcement officials often
found the sermons of Rahman and manuals on how to build bombs in the homes of
the other conspirators. With Ayyad, the only items they found that indicated Ayyad's
support ofRahman's radical ideology were a picture that was found in his home in
which the Palestinian flag is draped over his shoulder and one hand is gripping a
hand grenade, and later the letter found on his work computer in.which the Fifth
Battalion claims responsibility for the WTC bombing. 175
Ramzi Yousef, like his fellow conspirators, was born after the Israeli-Arab
war in 1968 in Fuhayil, Kuwait to a family of mixed Pakistani and Palestinian
heritage. 176 Yousef s father, Karim, became involved with an extreme fundamentalist
group that called itself the Salafis, a group that believed that Sunni Muslims were the
true believers and that Shiites were an abhorrence. 177 Karim also supported the
cause of Baluchi nationalism in Pakistan because· Baluchistan was his homeland. 178
In 1984, Yousef s family moved to Baluchistan because, like many foreign workers
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in Kuwait at the time, they were tired of being treated like second class citizens and
serfs. 179
The influences ofYousefs father, as well as, his family's treatment in
Kuwait were factors that motivated Yousefs commitment to terrorism. Later,
Yousef would blame the United States and Israel for the Palestinians' plight. 180
Before his trial for the WTC bombing, Yousef stated he believed the State of Israel
had no legal right to be established in Palestine and accused the Israeli government
of"systematic murder, torture, imprisonment and deportation" of Palestinians. 181
Further, Yousef stated Palestinians have the right to attack US targets because the
U.S. gave considerable military and financial aid to Israel. 182
Unlike other terrorists, Yousef did not start his bombing campaign due to his
religious zealotry. In fact, law enforcement investigators concluded that Yousef was
a new breed of terrorist in which his motivation was not wholly religious or wholly
political but a combination of these two. 183 It was Yousef s anger at the on going
suffering of the Palestinian people that drove him to terrorism. In contrast, Ayyad,
Abouhalima and Ajaj all expressed religious sentiments during their statements at
sentencing but did not admit any .connection to the WTC bombing. 184 It appears that
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Yousef was a secular terrorist who mobilized others by playing on their religious
zeal for jihad.
Strain theories are useful in helping to understand the motivations of the
WTC conspirators, but theories from environmental criminology such as routine
activity and rational choice theory also help to explain criminal behavior.

Applying Routine Activity and Rational Choice Theories
According to routine activity theory as developed by Larry Cohen and
Marcus Felson three elements must be present for a predatory crime to occur-a
motivated offender, a suitable target and an absence of a capable guardian. 185 The
actions of the offenders in the WTC case show they were highly motivated to kill
and injure as many Americans as possible. First, the conspirators were willing to take
great personal risks in planning and carrying out their crime. In mixing the
chemicals and acids to form the bomb, Abouhalima, Yasin, Salameh and Yousef had
to wear lab masks over their mouths and noses to protect them from the toxic
chemical fumes. The conspirators also had to mix a balance of sulfuric and nitric
acids with glycerine to produce the nitroglycerine detonators. Nitroglycerine is
highly explosive and is so unstable that the slightest jolt, impact or friction can cause
it to spontaneously detonate, thus the conspirators froze the nitroglycerine to make it
easier to transport. 186 The fact that the conspirators were willing to risk their lives
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making the bomb clearly shows a high degree of motivation and dedication to
achieving their objectives.
Second, the conspirators were not deterred by the presence of guardians,
persons that by their mere presence would deter potential offenders from perpetrating
a criminal act. Guardians can include police patrols, security guards, neighbors,
vigilant staff, and other enforcement officials. In the WTC case the presence of
guardians did not deter the conspirators and, in many cases, guardians had
opportunities to prevent the bombing from occurring.
In fact, a number of the WTC conspirators were detained and questioned by
law enforcement and security personnel prior to their attack. For example, on
September 1, 1992 when Ajaj and Yousef entered the US at JFK International
Airport, both were detained and questioned for attempting to enter the country
illegally. Ajaj presented the INS inspector with a Swedish passport in which the
picture had been altered and contained no visa. When Ajaj's possessions were
searched INS inspectors found a ''terrorist kit" with fake passports, military guides
on carrying out successful terrorist operations, assembly instructions for rocket
launchers, training videos on bomb making, and a bomb making manual with the
chemical formulas for making bombs capable of destroying large building. On the
manual's cover were Arabic words that were mistranslated initially as "The Basic
Rule" and were later retranslated as "Al-Qaeda, The Base." 187 It is believed Ajaj's
role was to distract INS inspectors thereby maximizing Youser s chances of getting
187
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through customs. 188 It is also possible that Yousef and Ajaj were aware that it was
easy to get into the U.S. at JFK by claiming asylum. Muaffar Chishti of the National
Immigration Forum reported that in 1991 immigrants began shopping for airports"
and that JFK was seen as particularly porous because of the number of people
seeking asylum at this point of entry. 189
Although Yousef also committed several acts of immigration fraud by using
three different identities and lying to INS officials, he was released because the INS
detention center was full. The 1993 WTC bombing could have been prevented if
INS officials had upheld the letter of the law and detained both Yousef and Ajaj, and
if the FBI had translated the materials in Ajaj's "terrorist kit." Stephen Emmerson, a
terrorism expert, concluded that ..had the government correctly translated the
material it might have understood the men who blew up the World Trade Center
were linked directly to Osama bin Laden's terror network." 190
In the WTC case, all three elements identified in routine activity theory were
present-motivated offenders, the absence of a capable guardian, and a suitable
target. The perpetrators intentionally chose the World Trade Center because it, not
only, was a soft target, but also, symbolized American capitalism and power.
Criminologists, Ronald Clarke and Graeme Newman identified target features that
invite terrorist attacks that include the following elements: exposed, vital, iconic,
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legitimate, destructible, occupied, near and easy. 191 Using these elements, the World
Trade Center would get a high rating as a target for terrorists at the time of this event
because it was highly exposed or it was a highly visible target on the New York City
skyline. In addition, the WTC buildings were vital because it had a critical
commercial and economic role in New York City. Due to this role, the WTC towers
were iconic because they were seen as a symbol of capitalism. The conspirators
hoped to kill up to 250,000 people in these attacks thus they saw this attack as
legitimate as highlighted in their letter of responsibility. The WTC was also chosen
because it was believed that serious damage and destruction would result if a large
enough bomb was detonated in the basement it would cause one tower to fall into the
other, thus killing and injuring tens of thousands of people. Also, the WTC complex
was near where the conspirators lived and worked and it was an easy target because
of the lack of security in the parking garages. Though the conspirators failed to
topple the towers in the first attack, they were committed to carrying out further
terrorist attacks against the U.S. Finally, the WTC towers were chosen because there
was a lack of security and guardians to prevent the conspirators from carrying out
their attack.
Another way to understand the events of this case through the criminal justice
lens, is to apply rational choice theory. The WTC bombing was not merely a series
of criminal acts, but rather part of a larger terrorist conspiracy carried out by rational
191
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actors. Rational choice theory assumes that criminals make rational decisions to
commit crimes and that they consider the opportunities, costs and benefits as part of
their decision making processes. 192 Martha Crenshaw also looks at terrorism from a
rational choice perspective, but focuses on the collective rationality of the
individuals within a terrorist organization. 193 From Crenshaw's perspective, an
organization rationally chooses to use violence for political and strategic reasons
rather than as an unintended outcome of psychological and social factors. 194 For
terrorist organizations the benefits of an attack may include creating a climate of
fear, killing as many people as possible, disrupting economic systems and
commerce, destabilizing government regimes, forcing a government to overreact,
creating an image of a significant terrorist threat so a small group may appear
stronger than it really is, recruiting or testing new supporters, and/or to eliminate an
opponent or weaken an enemy. 195 The costs of terrorism can be high and can include
punitive government reaction, loss of popular support, and possible death or injury to
individual participants. The costs for the WTC bombers included the threat of
incarceration if they were convicted, loss of family and community support, and the
threat of torture at the hands of foreign governments.
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Rational choice theory views offending behavior as involving decision
making which is constrained by time, cognitive ability, and information resulting in a
limited or bounded rationality for the offender. This theory assumes that offenders
do not always succeed in obtaining the benefits they seek because they rarely have
all the information they need or enough time for planning thus mistakes are made.
For example, Yousef and members of the law enforcement community thought the
operation was a failure because the truck bomb was not powerful enough to bring
down the twin towers. 196 The premise is that the decisions and factors that affect
offender decision making vary greatly at both the different stages of the offense and
among the different offenses, as a result, rational choice theorists focus on the
prevention of individual crime types instead of a general approach to preventing
crime such as deterrence. 197
Cornish and Clarke, therefore, stressed the need to be crime specific when
analyzing offender decision making and choice selection (of targets and tools).
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their attacks and these are often specific to the type of attack that is being planned.
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In general, they argued that most terrorist attacks require the following tools: cell
phones or other means of communication and control, cars or trucks to transport
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terrorists and/or weapons, money, false documents (driver's license, passports), and
maps, plans, photos and other information about the target.
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In looking at

terrorists, Newman and Clarke stated that "ifwe are to thwart terrorist attacks, we
must understand the choices they make at each step of the way-preparation, target
selection, commission of the act, escape and aftermath. They further wrote that we
must "think like a terrorist" because doing so allows us ''to better understand how to
increase the costs of mounting the attack and reducing the benefits to them."201
This idea of thinking like a terrorists is similar to what rational choice
theorist, Derik Comish described as thinking like a thief. 202 Comish argued in any
particular category of crime there is a standard set of actions to be performed in a
particular order that he labels a "crime script."203 By studying the sequence of events
or crime script, possible points of intervention and prevention may be revealed.
Comish and Clarke stated that it is critical to understand how criminals and/or
terrorists make decisions and go about their tasks of planning and carrying out their
crimes because in that way we can identify weaknesses and devise preventive
strategies. 204
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Deterring and Preventing Terrorism with Crime Prevention Strategies
From a criminal justice perspective, crime prevention strategies play a key
role in preventing a broad range of crimes associated with terrorism. Michael Tonry
and David Farrington identified four major crime prevention strategies that can be
applied to preventing terrorism: law enforcement, developmental, community and
situational prevention. Law enforcement prevention is founded on the expectation
that the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws deter potential offenders by fear
of punishment and incarceration. 205 This form of crime prevention is based on
theories of deterrence in classical criminology whereby individuals refrain from
committing a crime because they fear the certainty, swiftness and severity oflegal
punishment. Also, the concept of general deterrence assumes that crime is prevented
and deterred by the efficacy of legal sanctions administered by the state. Thus, a
common policy solution to acts of terrorism is to increase penalties related to acts of
terrorism, as well as to enhance the authority and power of law enforcement agencies
responsible for investigating terrorist crimes.
After the WTC bombing in 1993, a number of anti terrorism laws were
introduced and later passed by Congress. For example, two weeks after the WTC
attack, Representative Charles Schumer ofNew York introduced legislation that
made domestic terrorism an offense potentially punishable by death, and made
providing support for terrorist activities a crime that could result in a 10-year prison
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sentence. 206 In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act which provided broad new Federal jurisdiction to
prosecute anyone who committed a terrorist act in the United States or who used the
United States as a planning ground for attacks overseas. This act also increased the
penalties for a number of terrorist associated crimes. 207 For example, the penalty for
damaging federal property by fire or explosives that resulted in substantial risk of
injury to another, went from a penalty of imprisonment for not more than 20 years to
imprisonment for not less than seven years nor more than 40 years. 208 This law also
authorized the Secretary of State to designate foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).
As such, individuals or groups providing funds or materials for the designated FTOs
are committing a criminal offense. 209

Weaknesses of Deterrence Theory
Part of the difficulty in the area of deterrence is the ongoing clash among
criminal justice scholars and policy makers as to the effectiveness of new criminal
laws as deterrents to crime. Despite the increases in penalties and resources
provided to federal and state law enforcement agencies in the 1990's, terrorists
associated with Al Qaeda would strike the World Trade Centers again in 2001 and
succeed in bringing the towers down. This leaves doubt that criminal justice
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deterrent strategies will succeed in preventing future terrorist attacks by terrorist
organizations with a jihadist ideology. Clarke and Newman argued that the idea that
"taking out" the terrorists by arresting offenders is not the same as preventing
crime. 210 In addition, they stated, "Decades of criminological research have failed to
establish a relationship between severe punishment and reduced crime."211
While deterrence theory may explain why some criminal behavior is
prevented it has numerous weaknesses when applied to terrorists. First, deterrence
research often searches for a negative association between crime rates and sanction
levels that can be interpreted as a deterrent effect. This may be feasible when
looking at crimes that are common place such as burglary, drunk driving or drug
dealing but is not realistic when dealing with crimes associated with acts of terrorism
which are rare. Second, it is difficult to gather large amounts of evidence on the
long term effects of policies on deterring traditional crimes let alone those related to
terrorism. 212 Third, the perceived risks and rewards are usually different for
criminals and terrorists because there are fundamental differences in the
psychological make up and motivation between the two groups of actors. 213 Paul
Davis and Brian Jenkins argued that it is difficult to deter terrorists because often
they feel they have nothing to lose (especially suicide terrorists), they are motivated
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by religion or other ideologies, and their acts of terror provide positive reinforcement
from their community-notably status, power and psychological rewards. 214
Fourth, Dugan pointed out traditional deterrence-rational choice models in
criminology have been aimed at understanding the behavior of individual criminal
offenders, and that a rational calculus at a group or organizational level for terrorists
may look very different. 215 Finally, Jenkins and Davis wrote that no simple theory of
deterrence can apply to the broad spectrum of terrorist organizations that include
right wing militias and eco-terrorists to religious terrorists and anti-U.S. martyrs. 216
Jenkins and Davis recommended a system approach instead of a focus on groups and
individuals in deterring terrorism. 217 Within this terrorist system are multiple actors
including top leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers, recruiters, supportive segments of
the population, and external suppliers and facilitators. 218 Jenkins and Davis stated
that it is critical to look at these different actors to identify strategies of deterrence.
For example, Osama bin Laden may only be deterred by incarceration or death while
others such as those providing financial support may be deterred by threat of
apprehension and incarceration.
While the threat of punishment may not deter many types of terrorists, they
may be influenced by the actions of law enforcement. Because terrorists are
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predominantly rational actors that make cost/benefit calculations to identify whether
the risks are worth the rewards, we can assume that increasing their risk of being
caught or unsuccessful in achieving their objectives may deter them from attempting
a specific attack. Thus the criminal justice system must employ a broad range of
strategies to prevent and deter terrorism.

Applying Crime Prevention Strategies to the WTC Case

Two crime prevention strategies introduced by Tonry and Farrington include
community prevention and situational prevention. Community prevention strategies
are designed to change the social conditions that influence offending in residential
communities. Strategies can include altering building and neighborhood designs to
increasing natural surveillance, as well as, organizing citizens in Business and
Neighborhood Watch programs. It is not known if any Neighborhood Watch
programs were established in the area that the conspirators lived, but their
suspicious activity was observed by those who lived in and around the apartment
where the bomb was constructed, and by those who worked at the Space Station
Storage Company in Jersey City where the chemicals for the bomb were delivered
and stored.
For community crime prevention strategies to be effective, community
members must report suspicious activity to the police. In this case, the activities of
the WTC conspirators went unreported to police until after the bombing. For
example, Yousef, Abouhalima, Yasin and Salameh were often seen going in and out
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of the storage locker at the Space Station in Jersey City by security guards and
employees. In fact, one week before the bombing Yousef and Salameh were stopped
by the site guard from storing three hydrogen tanks that had been delivered to Space
Station.219 Though this did raise the suspicions of the site manager, the storage
container was not accessed until after the WTC bombing whereby the bomb making
chemicals were found and the FBI contacted.
One strategy that was effective in finding the perpetrators after the attack was
the Rewards for Information program administered by the State Department's
Diplomatic Security Service. This program offered rewards of up to 5 million
dollars to individuals leading to the prevention of terrorist acts or the arrest and
conviction of terrorist criminals.220 By 1994, Yousef was on the cover of Newsweek
and labeled "America's Most Wanted" terrorist. To market this program, Brad
Smith of the Diplomatic Security Service printed posters of Yousef and distributed
them throughout the Middle East and Asia, set up an international tip line, and
produced television spots in many languages. 221 The most ingenious of Smith's
marketing plans was to put Yousefs wanted picture on the covers of37,000
matchbook covers that were then air dropped throughout Pakistan and
Baluchistan. 222 Yousef was apprehended in Islamabad, Pakistan by federal officials
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after he was identified by Istaique Parker, a friend ofYousef's sister in law, who had
seen a matchbook with Yousef' s wanted picture. 223
Situational crime prevention strategies are often recommended policy
solutions to crime advocated by routine activity theorists. Situational crime
prevention is defined by Ronald Clarke as "opportunity-reducing measures that are
directed at highly specific forms of crime; they involve the management, design or
manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as
possible so as to increase the effort and risks of crime and reduce the rewards as
perceived by a wide range of offenders."224 Clarke and Newman stated that
increasing the efforts refers to those strategies that make it more difficult for
terrorists to reach their targets, obtain logistical support, and maintain their
organizations. 225 These strategies may include target hardening with barriers or
locks, controlling access to facilities, screening exits, and controlling access to
weapons or tools. Increasing the risk refers to strategies that make it more likely that
offenders will be captured or caught. 226 These strategies include improving
installing alarms and surveillance systems, using taggants on explosive materials,
improving lighting, hiring security guards, and using smart cards and national
identification cards. Situation crime prevention strategies were recommended as
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early as 1984 by officials within the Port Authority but these were largely ignored
until after the 1993 attack.
The Port Authority, which was responsible for operating and overseeing the
buildings within the World Trade Center complex, was aware of the growing threat
of terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the WTC as early as 1984. In 1984, Peter
Goldmark, executive director of the Port Authority, ordered a report on the
vulnerability of the WTC to terrorism. 227 To accomplish this task, the Office of
Special Planning (OSP), an anti terrorism unit, was formed. OSP formed a task force
which consisted of police and civilian experts including veterans of the FBI, whose
mission was to identify terror threats, and possible Port Authority targets, and to
assess the vulnerability of Port Authority facilities to terrorist acts. 228 OSP spent six
months studying the issues and consulted with the FBI, CIA, NSA and other security
specialists. OSP even considered possible attack scenarios including a "bomb-laden
truck attack."229 The 1984 report by OSP warned that domestic terrorism was rising
and that the WTC was highly vulnerable to attack. OSP also found that the
underground parking garage was highly vulnerable, easily accessible, and if attacked
could critically affect the WTC's structure.230 A 1984 report also stated the WTC
was highly susceptible to car bombings because the parking garage was not secure
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and open to the general public.231 The OSP report further recommended the
elimination of public parking, the installatfon of video cameras and battery powered
lighting in emergency stairwells, and the random inspection of vehicles entering the
garage. 232 These recommendations were not implemented, in part, because
Goldmark had left the Port Authority for another position. In 1985, OSP issued
another counterterrorism report that again recognized the WTC as an attractive
terrorist target, and recommended the same target hardening measures as before.
The report also recommended additional police patrols with explosives detection
dogs.233
In response to the 1985 OSP report, Director ofWTC, Guy Tozzoli argued
that he had to balance ease of access to the building by customers with security
concerns. For example,on the issue of public parking, Tozzoli stated that public
parking could not be eliminated because it would cause to great of an inconvenience
to tenants and their clients. 234 He also did not support having security guards or
parking attendants controlling access because it was too expensive and would not
deter terrorists. 235 Finally, Tozzoli argued random inspections could not be done on
vehicles without probable cause that a crime was going to be committed. 236 .
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In 1991, the Port Authority commissioned another security report from the
private security company, Burns and Roe Securacom. This report found that the
major risk to the WTC was from a package or hand-held bomb, and that the
shopping and pedestrian areas, not the parking garage, would be the most likely
targets. 237 Some security measures were taken after the 1991 report was completed
including installing video cameras in the tourist visiting areas on the top floors (but
not in the garages), increasing police patrols, and removing public wastebaskets on
the concourse level where a bomb might be hidden. When asked why more stringent
measures were not taken such as eliminating public parking, Charles Maikish,
Director of the WTC, stated, "The idea was to try to maintain normalcy rather than
an armed camp. The questions always come down to balancing the sense of personal
freedom and of being free from fear with ringing the place with the National
Guard. "
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Despite the warnings by these reports, the recommendations were not
completely implemented by the Port Authority resulting in tragic consequences on
February 26, 1993. The lack of additional security in the parking garages allowed a
van loaded with explosives to enter and park in a no parking area undetected. The
lack of emergency lighting and proper ventilation systems made the evacuation of
thousands of people a difficult and horrifying experience. After the 1993 bombing
some safety improvements were made including the installation of battery operated
237
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emergency lighting and luminescent paint in the stairwells, and the installation of
emergency command centers in each building. 239

Summary

In this chapter, the 1993 WTC bombing was analyzed using the
characteristics of Lens (!)-Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice
Problem/Terrorism as a Crime. The 1993 terrorist attack was perceived by policy
makers and the public as a crime and, as such, criminal justice agencies were
responsible for investigating the crime, gathering evidence, apprehending suspects,
and successfully prosecuting the perpetrators. In this case, the WTC bombing was
seen as a singular criminal incident and not as part of a larger terrorist conspiracy
that needed to be addressed through new counterterrorism programs and policies.
The FBI' s success in this case highlighted the effectiveness of the criminal justice
system in coping with the threat of terrorism in the US at that time. Despite the
successful investigation and prosecution of the 1993 WTC conspirators, the United
States was not able to prevent future attacks against the homeland because of the
inherent weaknesses in the criminal justice lens in deterring and preventing religious
terrorists as represented in this case.
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CHAPTER 4: 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING
FROM AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE
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Introduction
At the time of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the U.S. was
undergoing large scale changes in its national security and foreign policies that were
precipitated by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989.
Thus, the theories in use in international relations, as well as, foreign policy
strategies and objectives, were in transition during this time period and
fundamentally altered the international relations lens that was used in viewing the
problem of terrorism. The Cold War dominated international relations scholarship
and U.S. national security policy in the second half of the twentieth century. For
more than a generation, the Cold War struggle between communism and
anticommunism was the first premise of the foreign policies of nation states
throughout the world. Since the end of WWII, international politics was dominated
by the ideological, political and military confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, both nation states built up vast quantities of
weapons, conventional and nuclear, in an extended arms race that had a profound
affect on both nations and the world system.
To overcome the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the U.S. prescribed to
realist theories and adopted the strategy of containment and deterrence that included
large standing nuclear and conventional forces, various peacetime alliances such as
NATO, and active intervention in the affairs of other nations, such as Afghanistan
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and the Middle East. 1 Through arms aid, covert intelligence activities and the
bolstering of what was perceived as corrupt and autocratic regimes, both the U.S.
and USSR fostered proxy wars using insurgents and/or terrorists in Africa, Latin
America and Asia. The foreign policy of the U.S., particularly in the Middle East,
with our support of Israel and autocratic regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran
was highly criticized by Islamic fundamentalist movements that formed during the
Cold War. These grievances continue to be voiced by terrorist organizations such as
the Islamic Group and Al Qaeda. In addition, during the Cold War, terrorism was a
third tier issue that was often thought of in terms of the East-West conflict, or as a
form of asymmetrical warfare by state sponsors of terrorism.
The end of the Cold War brought tremendous changes to U.S. national
security policy, including how terrorism was perceived as a threat. The end of the
Cold War, not only appeared to have brought an end to the East-West conflict, but
also, to have elevated the stature of the United States and the political ideologies of
liberalism and democracy. From the American perspective, the world seemed on the
verge of a new era of peace and prosperity. In this new era, a search began for a new
grand strategy that would guide U.S. foreign policy. The first post Cold War
President, George H. W. Bush talked about creating a "new world order." In 1993,
President George H. W. Bush stated, "Our objective must be "to work toward
transforming this new world into a new world order, one of governments that are
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democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home."2 For George H. W. Bush the
dominant security challenge was still the Soviet Union that was undergoing
transformational change. Brent Scowcroft stated that "Things not related to the
USSR were not given much attention," thus, the counterterrorism struggle was not
one of his foreign policy priorities.3 In fact, during the presidency of George H.W.
Bush there would be no structural changes to U.S. foreign and domestic
counterterrorism and anti terrorism systems despite the gaps that were identified by
the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism.4
With the disappearance of the global threat of the USSR, increasingly the
focus was on the importance of international economic issues and trade. Thus, when
President Clinton was sworn in as President in January, 1993, he, and his national
security team, faced a dramatically changed world that would need a new agenda in
f~reign policy on America's role as the world's lone superpower. 5 Under the Clinton
administration, globalization theories of international relations would take center
stage and economic issues would be at the forefront of U.S. domestic and foreign
policies.
The growth of transnational terrorism would not be at the forefront of U.S.
national security policy until the mid 1990's and later, after the U.S. had faced
2
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terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Though the threat posed by the Soviet Union
was greatly diminished by 1993, the post Cold War era posed a new set of risks and
challenges in the form of global warming and other environmental concerns,
proliferation of nuclear weapons, regional ethic and religious conflicts, global
criminal syndicates and drug trafficking, and the rise of transnational terrorism.
However, the threat of transnational terrorism was obscured in 1993, not only,
because the dominant lens at the time was the criminal justice perspective as
highlighted in chapter 3, but also, because the international relations lens, itself, was
in transition.
The characteristics of this lens in the Cold War and Post Cold War era are
seen in Table 3. The characteristics were described in Chapter two, however, this
table divided this lens into two sections, one which looks at terrorism in the Cold ·
War era and the other in a post Cold War era. While, many of the basic
characteristics stay the same there are some differences. First, state sponsorship of
terrorism during the Cold War era was seen largely in terms of the East-West
conflict. The behavior of nation states during the Cold War era was explained in part
by theories of realism and deterrence. In the post Cold War era, there continues to
be state sponsorship of terrorism, as well as, the rise of transnational terrorist
networks with no state sponsorship. Among the international relations theories that
explain the rise of these non state actors in the world system are globalization
theories.
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Table 3: Characteristics of Lens II
ANALYSIS
Definition of Terrorism:
Key Characteristics

Key Theories explaining
violent behavior.

Primary Homeland Security
Strategy

•

GoaVPurpose

•

Organizations

INTERNATIONL RELATIONS

INTERNATIONL RELATIONS

FRAME

FRAME

Cold War
-Used as proxies in the east-west
conflict to achieve foreign policy
objectives
-Dominance of state sponsors of
terrorism
-terrorism is a strategy of
asymmetrical warfare that is
directed at civilians or
noncombatants in violation of
the laws of war
-Is a rational strategy whose
purpose is to coerce or
intimidate a government or
population in order to obtain
political, social or religious goals
-Is a form of psychological
warfare as a means of instilling
fear in a population
-Terrorists can be distinguished
from insurgents though there is
overlap between the two
-Theories from international
relations help to explain terrorist
behavior by nation states and
include: Realism, deterrence,
and containment

Post Cold War
-Rise of transnational actors with
no state sponsors
-Increase in sectarian terrorist
groups
-terrorism is a strategy of
asymmetrical warfare that is
directed at civilians or
noncombatants mviolation of the
laws of war
-Is a rational strategy whose
purpose is to coerce or intimidate a
government or population in order
to obtain political, social or
religious goals
-Is a form of psychological
warfare as a means of instilling
fear in a population
-Terrorists can be distinguished
from insurgents though there is
overlap between the two
-Theories from international
relations help to explain terrorist
behavior by non state actors
include: globalization theories

-Linked to US National Security
Strategy and foreign policy
- -Focus is on creating and
implementing long term grand
strategies related to the EastWest conflict
-Serves to promote US national
interests at home and abroad.
-Homeland security is linked to
counterterrorism efforts that
include diplomacy, military
force, intelligence gathering and
analysis, covert actions, targeted
and untargeted prevention,
financial controls and economic
sanctions

-Overlap between US National
Security Strategy and homeland
security Str.
- Focus is on creating and
implementing long term grand
strategies related to GWOT
- Serves to promote US national
interests at home and abroad.
-Homeland security is linked to
counterterrorism efforts that
include diplomacy, military force,
intelligence gathering and
analysis, covert actions, targeted
and untargeted prevention,
:financial controls and economic
sanctions

DoD, State, NSC, Intelligence,

DoD, State, NSC, Intelligence,
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Second, during the Cold War, national security policy was largely aligned
with U.S. foreign policy. U.S. national security policy during the Cold War was
dedicated to deterring and containing the threat from the Soviet Union. Today,
however, U.S. national security policy must be aligned with both our foreign policy
and homeland security policy. U.S. national security policy in a post Cold War era
was initially concerned with global political economy under Clinton, and later after
9/11, with the Global War on Terrorism.
Finally, the policy tools used in counterterrorism were largely the same in the
Cold War and post Cold War, in that the tools included law enforcement, diplomacy,
military force, intelligence gathering and analysis, covert actions, and economic
sanctions to name a few. However, during the Cold War, our foreign policy options
had to be assessed in light of how such actions would be perceived by the USSR and
what actions they would take in response. It is clear that at the time of the 1993
World Trade Center bombing, the international relations lens was in transition and as
a result this lens missed a great deal about the nature of the new and emerging threat.
This chapter will analyze the 1993 World Trade Center bombing from an
international relations lens from a Cold War and Post Cold War perspective because
events that formed the Islamic Group, the terrorist group involved, largely occurred
during the Cold War. Among the events in international relations that had a major
impact on the formation of this terrorist group and its affiliated transnational network
were the Afghan-Soviet War, the rise of Al Qaeda, and the transition of the world
system in an era of globalization after the Cold War. The first section, will detail the

238
characteristics of the international relations lens in the Cold War and Post Cold War
era and how the perception of terrorism changed. The second part of this chapter,
looks at terrorism as a form of asymmetrical warfare and details the one-sided war
that was being waged by global Islamic terrorists. This section will describe the

ideological foundations for Islamic Group and its link to both, the Fifth Battalion
Liberation and Al Qaeda. It was during the Cold War that the terrorist organization,
the Islamic Group, was formed in this case. Thus, understanding the dynamics of the
world system both, during and after, the Cold War and the enabling environment that
helped breed terrorism and its supporters is critical in analyzing this case.
The third section, will discuss how U.S. counterterrorism policy slowly
adapted to the new threat in the post Cold War era while the international relations
lens was in transition. As a result, U.S. agencies dedicated to national security were
not aware of the growing threat of that we faced by Al Qaeda until the mid 1990's as
evidenced in our counterterrorism policies. The story that follows is sensitive to the
lens in place but in transition at the time of the case. This story also discusses
critical dynamics present in that setting that led to the 1993 WTC bombing but that
were not recognized by the old lens or emerging one.

International Relations Lens from a Cold War Perspective

The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 appeared to be planned
and conducted by a·small group of Islamic extremists who were followers of the
radical Egyptian cleric, Sheik Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman, but were not tied to a
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state sponsor of terrorism or recognized Middle Eastern terrorist organization. The
Clinton administration maintained that the 1993 bombing was a new terrorist
phenomenon carried out by highly motivated individuals rather than a nation state. 6
Such independent action was unusual because during the second half of the twentieth
century state-sponsored terrorism was understood to be the norm. 7 One of the
characteristics of this lens is the recognition that terrorism can be perpetrated by
individuals, as well as, domestic, international and transnational groups and nation
states. In addition, this lens recognizes that terrorism can be used as a tool of foreign
policy by nation states as a means of balancing power in the world system, of
destabilizing hostile regimes, and of avoiding direct military confrontation with a
more powerful nation state. In fact, during the Cold War, one of the primary state
sponsors of terrorism directed against the U.S. was the Soviet Union as a strategy of
balancing power in the East-West conflict.

The Cold War and State Sponsorship of Terrorism
Terrorism has often been used by national leaders as an instrument of foreign
policy to promote state interests in the international domain, to spread its ideology,
and to achieve strategic ends without resorting to conventional warfare. 8 At the level
of superpower confrontation, the massive destructive power of both nuclear and
6
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conventional weapons limited the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union
based on their mutual recognition that unless alternatives to direct military
confrontation could be found, the ultimate result would be mutual assured
destruction by nuclear weapons. Thus, the superpowers sought to limit their use of
military force at a lower level in order to avoid direct confrontation.
The Soviet Union, in particular, supported client states, which in tum, trained
and equipped various groups to use terrorism as a form of indirect aggression that
could challenge the strategic position of the U.S. To the USSR during the Cold War,
terrorism was not simply a form of violence, rather it was employed as a strategic
weapon that was placed within a broad spectrum of political warfare and armed
conflict that included overt and covert propaganda, and paramilitary operations
composed of a wide variety of Soviet activities in support of terrorist groups and
insurgent movements. 9 Former Director of the CIA, Ray Cline, stated that "the
Soviet Union and the KGB provided the infrastructure for terror-the money, the
guns, the training, the background information, the communications, and the
propaganda which inspired the individual terrorist groups." 10
Former Romanian General, Ion Mihai Pacepa, reported the extent of Soviet
support of terrorism throughout the world. For example, he stated that between 1968
and 1978, Romanian security forces sent two cargo planes of military weapons each
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week to Palestinian terrorists in Lebanon. 11 In addition, Pacepa reported that in the
1960s' and 70's the KGB was deeply involved in mass terrorism against the Israelis
which were carried out by various Palestinian client organizations. The Soviet
Union was also involved in operations to destabilize Western Europe that was
carried out by KGB sponsored Marxist terror organizations such as Baader-Meinhof
and the Red Army Faction. 12 In 1992, Boris Yeltsin announced that thousands of
Communist party documents were discovered which detailed the Kremlin's
financing ofintemational terrorism from the 1970's to the end of the Cold War that
amounted to $20 million per year to a broad range of terrorist organizations, such as
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The purpose was "to carry out
operations against American and Israeli personnel in third countries" and to carry out
acts of sabotage and terrorism."

13

While the Soviet Union employed terrorism as a

way of avoiding the technological nightmare of nuclear war, other nation states have
used it to compensate for the preponderance of power held by the United States.
Nation states, such as Libya, Iraq and Iran, have long been recognized as
state sponsors of terrorism for providing financial assistance, ideological support,
and military and operational assistance to terrorist organizations. 14 Brian Jenkins
argued that terrorists are employed by nation states to "provoke international
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incidents, create alarm in an adversary's country, compel it to divert valuable
resources to protect itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific forms of
sabotage." 15 Increasingly during the late twentieth century, terrorism was used as an
instrument of foreign policy by a number of nation states because of its low costs
politically and financially. Compared to conventional warfare, terrorism is an
inexpensive way in which to wage war. In addition, if state sponsorship can be
hidden, the violence against one's enemies can be safe and unaccountable. 16 That is,
states that assist terrorist organizations can distance themselves from culpability,
cover up their involvement, and disclaim responsibility, and thereby escape possible
reprisals and punishment. The nation that is a target of the terrorism cannot respond,
as it might to direct attack, unless it can develop evidence of its enemies' objectives.
The use of terrorist organizations as proxies by the Soviet Union and other state
sponsors of terrorism to achieve foreign policies objectives can be explained, in part,
by realist theories of international relations.
In the U.S., realist theory assumptions were the dominant way in which
policy makers viewed international relations because it fit almost perfectly in the
East-West rivalry during the Cold War. Some realist theorists assume that the world
system is anarchic thus the first priority of nation states is their own survival. 17 As a
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result, realists see world politics as a fundamental struggle for power in which the
primary aim of foreign policy is to accumulate and reinforce the power assets at the
state's disposal, and to protect vital national security interests. 18 State sponsored
terrorism can be explained in part by Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism
which assumes that the goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power,
and that they are·always looking for opportunities to take advantage of other states
through economic, q.iplomatic and military means. 19 Thus, state sponsored terrorism
is not meant to gain greater power but to return to a more balanced system of power.
Walt's theory of defensive realism assumes that states do not try to maximize
their power but rather take actions to maintain their positions in the world system. 20

It is evident that no single state can challenge the U.S. militarily (and perhaps
economically), thus they may resort to "surrogate warfare" as a means to prevent the
further expansion of power by the U.S.
In the Cold War, realism supported strategies of deterrence that were focused
on state actors who threatened or attacked the U.S. Traditionally, the U.S. has
attempted to deter nation states by sending a clear message that states that provide
either direct or indirect sponsorship of terrorism will be punished based on
reasonable evidence of state linkage. The U.S. has sought to deter state sponsorship
of terrorism through a variety of counterterrorism strategies including the use of
military force in suppression campaigns, pre-emptive strikes and covert operations,
18
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and the use of economic sanctions. States that are designated by the State
Department as state sponsors of terrorism are subject to trade restrictions and
controls that are imposed to pressure sanctioned governments to moderate their
behavior. For example, in 1999, President Clinton imposed financial and
commercial sanctions against Afghanistan and its Taliban rulers for harboring
Osama bin Laden, who was responsible for the two U.S. embassy bombings in East
Africa in 1998.21
. However, the inherent problem in using economic sanctions as a
counterterrorism strategy against state sponsors is that for sanctions to be effective,
they must be imposed in an environment whereby other nations besides the U.S. are
committed to long term sanctions. For the U.S. to take action, credible intelligence
has to be found by the CIA or other intelligence agencies which links a nation state
to an act of terrorism. In the case of the 1993 WTC bombing, the CIA investigated
possible links between the WTC conspirators and Iraq, which had threatened to use
terrorism against the U.S. during the Gulf War in 1990.
The Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence

Assessment ofIraq stated that the CIA reviewed the possible involvement by Iraq in
the 1993 WTC bombing. 22 The CIA looked at three possible connections to Iraq that
surfaced during the investigation of the WTC conspirators. "First, Ramzi Yousef, the
leader of the attack, entered the U.S. on an illegitimate Iraqi passport and fled the
21
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U.S. with Kuwaiti documentation that Iraq may have been able to provide following
its 1990-91 occupation of that country. The CIA found that stolen Iraqi passports
were common at this time, however, and there was no indication that Iraq had used
Kuwaiti documentation in any other intelligence operation. "23 Second, there was a
belief that Abdul Yasin was an Iraqi agent because he was oflraqi descent and after
the 1993 attacks he fled the US with Iraqi assistance. Iraq held Yasin in custody
since that time, explaining that it feared the U.S. would misrepresent Yasin's role in
the attack to implicate Iraq. Third, convicted bomber Mohammed Salameh, had a
maternal uncle who held a post in Palestinian Authority leader Yassir Arafat's Fatah
organization while it had offices in Iraq. Iraq allowed Salameh's Palestinian uncle to
emigrate to the West Bank in 1995, however, something the U.S. counterterrorism
center's analysts judged the regime would not have been expected to do if he had
been involved in the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. 24 The CIA's report confirmed
the FBI' s final report on the 1993 bombing that stated they had found no evidence
that a foreign government was responsible for the attack. 25
From the criminal justice lens, the WTC attacks were perceived as criminal
acts committed by a small group of individuals, while from the international relations
lens during the Cold War, terrorism was often perceived as part of a larger strategy
conducted by nation states. As a result, both lenses failed to see how this group was
a new breed of terrorism that was part of a larger transnational movement fueled by a
23
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common ideology and that was formed in part out of the crucible of the East-West
conflict played out in Afghanistan from 1979-1989.
At the time of the 1993 WTC bombing the criminal justice lens and
international relations lens largely failed to _see the dramatic political and historical
developments occurring that served to shape the nature and character of the new
transnational terrorist threat first seen with this attack. As the discussion to follow
indicates, these were not just general trends, as they had specific impacts on those
who planned and carried out the 1993 attack.

Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism During the Cold War
The rise of this new terrorist threat did not happen overnight but rather
developed over a period of time as part of a worldwide jihadist movement that was
fueled in part by the Cold War, the Afghan-Soviet War, the on going IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the transition of the U.S. as the lone superpower after the
collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, and the rise of the Western-led forces of
globalization. To explain some of the factors that led to the attacks on the World
Trade Center in 1993, one needs to look at the rise of the worldwide jihadist
movement over the past 20 years, as well as, how some aspects of U.S. foreign
policy has engendered frustration and rage by terrorists and their sympathizers.
Audrey Cronin wrote, "Terrorism is a by-product of broader historical shifts in the
international distribution of power in all its forms-political, economic, military,
ideological, and cultural."
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By looking at homeland security from an international.relations perspective
we are able to gain a broader view of how dramatic international change within the
world system can increase or decrease the enabling environment that breeds
terrorism and its supporters. One of the key breeding grounds for the rise of the
worldwide jihadist movement was the Soviet-Afghan War, the last of the Cold War
struggles between the U.S. and USSR.

The Cold War Rivalry and Its Impact on the Third World

The Cold War had a profound impact on U.S. foreign policy, as well as, the
balance of power in the world system which affected every nation state, particularly
those in the Third World. Both the U.S. and USSR resorted to surrogate warfare as a
means of containing the power and influence of the other, particularly in the third
world. The Cold War was a geopolitical competition in which a zero sum game was
played pitting East against West, capitalism against communism. The Cold War
focused primarily on confrontation between the industrialized countries of the West
against the communist countries of the Warsaw Pact. Interest in Third World
countries by the U.S. and USSR stemmed from the Cold War competition whereby
communists and non-communists competed for influence, particularly in regions of a
military or strategic value, such as the Middle East. 26 Among the most critical
strategic alliances the U.S. has maintained in the Middle East is with the state of
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Israel. However, this relationship has been an on-going grievance oflslamic
fundamentalists for over sixty years.

Impact of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on the Jihadist Movement
Radical Islamist movements, from the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Islamic
Group, to Al Qaeda, have traditionally blamed the West, especially the U.S., for its
support ofun-Islamic or unjust regimes in the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Saudi
Arabia) and for its biased support for Israel in the face of Palestinian displacement.27
The U.S. support for Israel began with its support of the 1947 United Nations
Resolution that divided Palestine into a Jewish and Arab nation state. Israel has been
the largest total recipient of direct U.S. economic and military assistance since World
War II. 28 Total direct U.S. aid to Israel amounts to well over $140 billion in 2003
dollars. 29 Also, U.S. aid to Israel combined with the partition of Palestine has led to
an ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. In this conflict the Israelis have, not only, been
fighting against Arab nation states such as Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, but also,
against terrorist organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood. These groups have been seeking
the creation of a Palestinian state and the removal of the Israelis from historically
Muslim lands.
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According to the doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic
Group, part of the process in bringing about the ideal pan-Islamic state included the
spiritual phenomenon of an "Islamic awakening" throughout the entire Muslim
world. Only subsequent to the "Islamic reawakening" and the establishment of
Islamic power as the caliphate could the destruction of the Jewish state begin as a
divinely sanctioned war between Islamic forces and those of Israel. 30 Rahman and
the Muslim Brotherhood have long promoted the long-term strategy of creating the
foundations of a Muslim state that would eventually become powerful enough to
destroy Israel.31 Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood's antagonism toward the West was
predicated on the West's support oflsrael. In most of the Muslim Brotherhood
literature during the Cold War era, they alleged that the Jews were behind both
Western imperialism and international communism, and there could never be a
peaceful coexistence between Egypt and a Jewish state. 32
The Muslim Brotherhood, like Al Qaeda, has rejected the idea of any nonArab or non Muslim state on what they have considered an Arab or Muslim land. 33
Walid Phares argued that the jihadi position on Israel is not about the "fairness of
removing Palestinian populations and replacing them with Jewish ones; it is about an
intangible doctrinal principle: land that was once ruled by the laws of Allah cannot
30
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be ruled by other laws afterward. " 34 Thus, the solution for "Palestinian problem"
from the jihadist perspective is the eradication of the state of Israel, the removal of
the Jewish population, and the reunification of the province of Palestine into a reestablished caliphate. 35 The anger directed toward Israel is due, in part, to a sense of
injustice for having lost Muslim lands, but also, to a feeling of humiliation as a result
of being defeated by the Israeli military throughout the Cold War.
Among the most significant defeats for Arab nations and Islamists was that of
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In this conflict, Israel proved to be a strategic asset in the
Cold War by serving as America's proxy in which Israel helped contain Soviet
expansion in the region and inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet clients like Egypt
and Syria. 36 The Egyptian defeat by the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967
caused widespread humiliation and anger, not only, among the citizens of Egypt, but
throughout the Middle East that would last for generations. Among those greatly
affected by this war would be the families of many of the 1993 WTC conspirators.

37

On June 5, 1967, the Arab-Israeli War began. Lasting six days, the war was
an unqualified victory for Israel and a complete defeat for the armies of Egypt, Syria
and Jordan. This event was critical in the development of the state of Israel and of
the terrorist movements arising out of the Middle East. John Esposito wrote, "The
1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War symbolized the depth of Arab and Muslim
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impotence and the failure of modern states in the Muslim world."38 Israel caused
further humiliation because it seized major pieces of territory including: the Gaza
strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and from Jordan, the West Bank and
holy city of Jerusalem which contained the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa
Mosque.39
Israel's victory also gave rise to another exodus of Palestinians, with more
than 250,000 people fleeing to the eastern bank of the Jordan River. However,
roughly 600,000 Palestinians remained in the West Bank and 300,000 in Gaza. Thus,
the 3,000,000 Israeli Jews came to rule some 1,200,000 Arabs (including the 300,000
already living in the State oflsrael).40 The forced removal of the Palestinians from
their homeland caused a great deal of anger and frustration among the Palestinians
and led to the creation of a number of terrorist organizations and their supporters
dedicated to reclaiming this lost territory through acts of terrorism.
Most of the 1993 WTC conspirators were directly affected by the 1967 ArabIsraeli War because their families were among those forced to flee from their
homeland to live in refugee camps or as outsiders in neighboring Arab states.
Muhammad Salameh's family was forced to move from the West Bank in 1969 to
Amman, Jordan where they lived as refugees in abject poverty. In addition, as a non
citizens in Jordan, Salameh faced restrictions on access to higher education and jobs,
38
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thus he mostly found work as a low paying, unskilled laborer. In addition, Ahmad
Ajaj, Ramzi Yousef, and Nidal Ayyad were from families who were Palestinian
refugees after the Six-day War. Due to their degrading and humiliating experiences
as Palestinian refugees, Ajaj, Ayyad, Yousef and Salameh were easily recruited into
Islamic fundamentalist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and susceptible
to the influence of charismatic leaders such as Rahman.
For radical Islamists, the 1967 defeat was blamed on the U.S. and its proIsraeli policies, as well as, on the moral decline of Muslim society, which had,
according to terrorist leaders, turned away from God's true path. 41 Marc Sageman
wrote, "Qutb's writings filled the ideological vacuum created when the catastrophic
1967 Arab defeat discredited imitation and pan-Arabism as strategies for countries as
the West. " 42 In countries as diverse as Egypt, Iran and Algeria, strong extremist
movements emerged in opposition to the secular state to espouse a more traditional
set of religious values as these extremists saw them. This is clearly seen in the
writings and speeches of Rahman, who called for the establishment of an Islamic
government and the cultural and moral re-Islamization of Egyptian society, even if it
required the use of violent resistance and revolution. 43
Rahman schooled his followers that the United States and Israel were the
primary enemies of Islam. He preached, "Every conspiracy against Islam, every
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scheming against Islam and the Muslims-its source is America. America is the
power behind Israel and behind Muslims' having to live in a state of humiliation and
surrender."44 In the literature and speeches of these terrorist organizations, the
killing of Jews and Americans is encouraged and the alliance between Israel and the
United States is generally depicted as "the crusader-Zionist conspiracy," the Western
demon bent on the eradication oflslam.45 Further, they assumed that Islam and the
West are locked in an ongoing battle dating from the time of the Crusades and
European colonialism. This ideology was espoused by both Sheikh Omar Abdel
Rahman and Ramzi Yousef.
In his interview with Raghida Derghan while in prison, Ramzi Yousef talked
at length about his beliefs and motivations for terror. Yousef saw himself as a
warrior fighting for the liberation of Palestine from the illegitimate state of Israel. 46
He argued that because of their suffering the Palestinians have the right to attack
Israeli targets and any other organization or country that interfered in support of
Israel. 47 According to his logic, Americans and Israelis are equally responsible for
crimes committed in Palestine. Yousef stated, "Am~rica finances these crimes (in
Israel) and supports Israel with weapons. These funds are taken from the taxes
which Americans pay, so this makes the American people, logically and legally
responsible for all the killing crimes and the settlements and the torture and the
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imprisonment which the Palestinian people are exposed to."

48

Thus, for Yousef and

his co-conspirators, the WTC was bombed "in response for American political,
economical and military support to Israel. " 49 To prevent future terrorist attacks, the
Liberation Army demanded that the U.S. stop all aid to Israel and diplomatic
relations with Israel. 50
Rahman exhorted his followers to kills Jews even while imprisoned for his
role in the New York landmarks plot in 1993. In October, 2000 Rahman released a
statement stating, '"'Jihad (Holy War) is now a duty for the entire (Islamic) nation
until Palestine and the Aqsa mosque are liberated and Jews are either pushed into
their graves or back where they came from." 51 Rahm.an's words, even from prison,
served to inspire his worldwide followers. What is clear, is that the Arab-Israeli
conflict continues to a source of humiliation and anger for Palestinians and their
supporters throughout the world.
Cold War rivalries, not only, were a source of conflict in the Middle East but
also in Asia, Africa and South America. The two superpowers were attracted to
conflicts in developing countries because such friction could either bring to power a
government regime one superpower liked and the other disliked, and to ensure that
the other side did not gain undue influence in any one country or region. 52 For
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example, the Soviet Union promoted this competition in the Third World by actively
supporting Marxist insurgencies or "wars of national liberation" in Asia, Africa and
Latin America during the Cold War. 53 To thwart the spread of communism,
especially in the Third World, the U.S. adopted the doctrine of containment.
The primary focus of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was containing
the Soviet Union. The doctrine of containment was developed by George Kennan in
1946 and its primary strategy was that the U.S. would counter any attempt by the
Soviets to expand their sphere of influence into other nation states or to spread
communism beyond their own borders. 54 The U.S. would contain Soviet expansion
by intervening to save a friendly regime from being attacked by the Soviet Union or
one of its satellites. 55 Presidential administrations during the Cold War were
committed to containment, however, President Reagan's sought to reverse or
rollback Soviet gains during the 1970s in places such as Ethiopia, Yemen and
Afghanistan. One of the last places that the East-West rivalry was played out was in
Afghanistan. However, the end of the Afghan War in 1989 would herald in the fall
of the USSR and the rise of a worldwide jihadist movement that facilitated the first
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.
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The Crucible of the Afghan-Soviet War

The official policy throughout most of the Cold War was a defensive posture,
in that, the U.S. never sought to unseat Soviet supported regimes until the Reagan
Doctrine. In December, 1979, 85,000 Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan to
support the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan that had taken power
in a coup in 1978. The Soviets feared that the Islamic fundamentalism sweeping
Iran and Pakistan at that time might engulf Afghanistan, creating an insecure
situation on the southern border of the USSR where approximately fifty million
Soviet Muslims lived. 56
At the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. feared that the
USSR would gain a stronghold in Afghanistan and from there invade Iran. 57 Such a
maneuver would have given the USSR a strategic position in the Persian Gulf and
threaten the Saudi oil fields. 58 This would shift the balance of power in this region
decisively in favor of the USSR which would not have been in the national security
interests of the U.S. President Reagan responded with the Reagan Doctrine which
was an offensive policy of indirect confrontation with the USSR that aimed to
reverse Soviet gains in counties in which they had established fledgling Marxist
regimes, such as in Afghanistan. The U.S. undertook the largest covert operation in
56
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CIA history in Afghanistan in an effort to make the costs so high politically and
militarily that the Soviets would withdraw in defeat.
America's covert activities during the Afghan-Soviet War consisted of three
significant measures: providing the mujahidin with money and weapons through the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, training Islamists in Pakistan and
Afghanistan in guerilla warfare, and recruiting radical Islamists from around the
world. The CIA and ISi intentionally allied themselves with internationalist,
militantly anti-Communist Islamist ideologues and militants rather than mainstream
traditionalist/nationalist Muslim organizations in order to defeat the USSR in
Afghanistan and secure U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region. 59 Thus,
members of terrorist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic
Jihad from Egypt were actively recruited for this effort. Mahmood Mamdani wrote,
"The CIA was key to the forging of the link between Islam and terror in central Asia
and to giving radical Islamists international reach and ambition. The groups it
trained and sponsored shared a triple embrace: of terror tactics, of holy war as a
political ideology, and of a transnational recruitment of fighters." 60 The AfghanSoviet war, in effect, became the crucible in which the worldwide jihadist movement
would become organized, trained and empowered.
At the same time the U.S., along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were
supporting the Afghan rebels through funds, training and weapons, Islamist militants
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from around the world volunteered en masse to fight a historic jihad against the
Soviet infidel. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reverberated throughout the
Muslim world, summoning thousands of volunteers to fight jihad. Pakistani
journalist, Ahmed Rashid estimated that 35,000 Muslim radicals from forty three
Islamic countries fought for the mujahidin between 1982 and 1992.61 Among these
fighters were two of the 1993 WTC conspirators, Mahmud Abouhalima and Ramzi
Yousef.
From 1988 to 1990, Mahmud Abouhalima made several trips to Pakistan
where he was trained in Peshawar in the use of explosives and modem weapons. 62
Abouhalima admitted to going to Afghanistan in a non-military "civil" capacity
during this period. 63 However, according to other accounts, Abouhalima was
involved in the fighting and had volunteered for the suicidal task of mine sweeping. 64
When Abouhalima returned to the U.S. from his service in Afghanistan, he became
more actively involved in Muslim political causes and helped to arrange for the
Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman to become established in New York City. 65
During the Soviet-Afghan War, Ramzi Yousef was a student at Swansea
University in Wales studying electrical engineering. As a student, Yousef became a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood cell that was operating out of Swansea
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University. 66 Yousef viewed the war as a struggle against oppression, thus in 1988,
he joined the thousands of other young Muslims in their fight against the Soviet
Union. Yousef did not fight in Afghanistan, but spent several months in Peshawar
training camps funded by Osama bin Laden learning bomb making skills and
teaching electronics. 67 It was in the training camps in Peshawar that Yousef met and
befriended Mahmud Abouhalima. 68 The Afghan-Soviet War became the training
ground for future terrorists.
Training camps were established as early as 1984 by Osama bin Laden to
provide military training and lectures in Islamic theology and history to Afghans and
non-Afghan volunteers. These terror training camps would continue to operate after
the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. In 1993, the Bureau oflntelligence and Research of
the U.S. Department of State reported in a classified newsletter:
"The mujahidin excelled at guerrilla warfare. Volunteers trained
with small arms, explosives, and other weapons, learning techniques
well suited to terrorist operations. Many still have access to the false
passports, visas, and identity papers they used during the war,
facilitating their free flow throughout the region. Their knowledge
of communications equipment and experience in logistics planning
will enhance the organizational and offensive capabilities of the
militant groups to which they are returning. " 69

This report also stated that the veterans of this war possessed a wide range of
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them to share propaganda ideas and strategies with Islamic opposition groups world
wide. 70
Some of this training was conducted by CIA specialists and U.S. military
officers who provided training to Pakistani instructors and Afghan soldiers in
camps in Pakistan on psychological warfare, demolitions and explosives,
assassination techniques, surveillance and counter surveillance, light and heavy
weapons, sabotage, communications technology, mine laying, anti tank attacks, and
guerrilla warfare. 11
The training provided to the mujahidin was similar to that provided to
security forces personnel and included providing field manuals reserved for U.S.
Special Forces units. Within the training camps, bin Laden recruited ex-military
officers, such as Ali Mohamed, to provide military training to Muslim volunteers
both in Afghanistan and the U.S. 72 Ali Mohamed provided training to his friend, El
Sayyid Nosair, 73 as well as the 1993 WTC conspirators.
Ali Mohamed was a former Egyptian Army Captain and member of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad in the 1980's that was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. 74 Zawahiri is
currently the deputy chief of Al Qaeda and one the FBI' s most wanted terrorists
today. Mohamed became a CIA informant during the Afghan-Soviet War and was
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the primary trainer for jihadists. 75 He provided instruction in guerrilla tactics,
espionage, surveillance, explosives and bomb making and various firearms. 76
Mohamed entered the U.S. military in 1986 and was assigned to the Special Warfare
Center, home of the Green Berets. While assigned at Fort Bragg, Mohamed gained
access to top secret training manuals, U.S. troop strength levels, and military
readiness documents and exercises. 77 Using special force's training manuals,
Mohamed wrote the Al Qaeda training manual. 78 A copy of this manual was, not
only, found among the items Ajaj was carrying in his luggage when he entered the
U.S. in 1993 with Yousef, but also in 2000, from a safe house in Manchester,
England during a terrorist take down. 79
While serving as an advisor to the Green Berets, Mohamed trained Nosair, as
well as, the 1993 WTC bombing conspirators, Mahmud Abouhalima, Mahamed
Salameh and Nidal Ayyad in small arms, guerrilla warfare and bomb making. 80 The
FBI's New York Joint Terrorism Task Force was aware of the firearms training
which was being conducted as early as 1989 because in July, 1989 the FBl's Special
Operation Group from the New York Office was assigned to follow and do
surveillance on Mohamed and friends as a result of a terrorism assignment. 81 These
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surveillance sessions took place over four successive Sundays at the Calverton
Shooting Range in Brookhaven, New York where Mohamed was observed providing
small arms training to Nosair, Abouhalima, Ayyad, and Salameh. 82
In 1990, Ali Mohamed left the military and travelled to Pakistan and
Afghanistan where he befriended Osama bin Laden. Mohamed became one of bin
Laden's top aides and helped to establish al Qaeda's terrorist bases and training
camps in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1990's, Ali Mohamed continued to be a
major operative for Al Qaeda. Mohamed helped Osama bin Laden move to Sudan in
1991, trained Al Qaeda members at camps in Afghanistan on explosives, cell
structures, and surveillance techniques in 1992 and 1994, conducted surveillance of
American, French and British targets in Nairobi in 1993, and helped Osama bin
Laden move from Sudan back to Afghanistan in 1996. 83 Later, Mohammed was
charged with conspiring to kill Americans in October, 2000 as one of four men
charged in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August
7, 1998. Evidence seized from Nosair's house proved, as early as 1991, a direct
connection between Ali Mohamed, the 1993 WTC conspirators, Al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden. It is clear that these training camps were critical in providing
critical skills to future terrorists such as those involved in the 1993 attack.
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To maintain the mujahidin support network, recruiting centers were
established throughout the world to raise funds and motivate young Muslim men to
join the jihad against the Soviet Union. At the same time that Abouhalima and
Yousef were in Peshawar training, the Egyptian cleric, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman
was also there recruiting young Egyptians and serving as a spiritual leader for the
jihadists. 84 By 1980, Rahman was a well know cleric within the Islamic
fundamentalist movement, particularly in Egypt where he was the leader of the
Islamic Group, a more radical sect of the Muslim Brotherhood. He rose to further
prominence in the 1980s when he became the spiritual leader of the Afghan Arabs. 85
Over the course of the Afghan-Soviet War a close working relationship developed
between the warlord and later Afghan Prime Minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and
Rahman and bin Laden. 86 Bin Laden was among the many private donors whose
funds helped provide training and logistical support to the mujahidin through the
Bureau of Services, also called Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK). The Bureau of Services
was established as a support network that funnelled money, supplies and manpower
to support the Afghan mujahidin.
Dr. Abdullah Azzaro, the intellectual architect of the jihad against the 19791989 Soviet occupation, with his deputy Osama bin Laden, founded a "Bureau of
Services" called Mak.tab al-Khidamat (MAK) in 1984 which channeled (mostly
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Arab) recruits into Afghanistan. 87 MAK played a decisive role in the anti-Soviet
resistance because it recruited, indoctrinated and trained tens of thousands of Arab
and Muslim youths from around the world, as well as, distributed $200 million of
Middle Eastern and Western aid destined for the Afghanjihad.

88

MAK became a

worldwide financial and recruiting network that had offices in 35 countries and 30
U.S. cities in the 1980's.89 This network was also called Al Khifah and is considered
by many experts to be the organizational forerunner of Al Qaeda.90
During the Afghan-Soviet War, the Brooklyn office of MAK arranged
training for recruits in the use of rifles, assault weapons and handguns and also
helped them get visas, plane tickets and contacts in the MAK office in Peshawar. In
addition, it became the center for counterfeiting tens of thousands of dollars, for
shipping explosives to Hamas in the Middle East, for falsifying and altering
passports to enable Muslims to enter the U.S., and for planning terrorist conspiracies
against the U.S.91 One of the key MAK offices in the U.S. was the The Al Farooq
Mosque in Brooklyn that became the home of Rahman following the Afghan-Soviet
War.
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Post Cold War Era and Rise of the Transnational Jihadist Movement
April, 1988 brought victory to the Afghan jihad as the Soviet Union declared
it would begin pulling out its military forces from Afghanistan within the next nine
months. As the Soviets began to withdraw, the jihad's leaders, Osama bin Laden and
Dr. Abdullah Azzam agreed that the organization they created to fight in Afghanistan
should not be dissolved, but rather used to create a base or foundation (al Qaeda) as a
potential headquarters for future jihad. 92 At the conclusion of the Afghan-Soviet War
in 1989, tens of thousands of jihadi fighters, trained in the Afghan War, scattered
around the world to continue the worldwide radical Islamists jihad, largely without
interference by the U.S.
For the CIA, the Afghan-Soviet War was huge success in the East-West
conflict, however, the blowback from this operation would be felt for decades to
come with the rise of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Tom Twetten, the number two man
in the CIA' s clandestine services in 1988, reported that the CIA had no plan on how
to deal with the Afghan rebels and militant jihadists after the Russian Army left. In
fact, after the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, the CIA kept
providing weapons to the Afghan rebels, chief among them was Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, who was a close friend and ally of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Within a
year of the Soviet withdrawal a new force was taking hold in Afghanistan called Al
Qaeda. This growing threat was largely ignored because 1989 also brought an end to
the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Thus, U.S. foreign policy was largely
92
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focused on Russia and Eastern European nations, and the conflict in Iraq in the early
1990's and not on the growing terrorist organization emerging from Afghanistan.
The Afghans' victorious jihad against one of the world's superpowers, the
Soviet Union, was an historical moment in the Muslim world for it provided a sense
of pride and showed that even great powers can be defeated. Sheik Omar Abdul
Rahman said his strongest emotion about the Afghan jihad was pride. 93 He stated, "I
felt so proud of my religion, so proud of the power that Muslims had. And I knew
that Allah would aid these people and that Islam would be victorious in the end. " 94
This victory brought pride to the Arab world because for decades they had been
humiliated by military defeats by the Israelis and by perceived oppression at the
hands of corrupt leaders. Professor Anthony Hyman noted that "to many Arabs the
Afghan cause appeared to be the only successful example of an Islamic struggle
against communism and atheism in a world where failure and disappointment was, to
the Arabs, all too common."95
The Afghan-Soviet War served as a melting pot by giving militant Islamists
ideological and logistical ties with fighters from around the world. The victory over
the USSR inspired these militants to continue their jihad against other infidels,
including the U.S., Israel, and more secular Middle East regimes. 96 Bin Laden was
emboldened by this victory and was quoted as saying in interviews, "Having borne
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arms against the Russians in Afghanistan, we think our battle with America will be
easy by comparison. We are more determined to carry on until we see the face of
God."97 With the demise of the Soviet Union and an end to the Cold War, the only
global power left was the U.S. in which to wage global jihad. Among those that
would wage jihad against the U.S. was Sheik Rahman from his new home in New
York City.
After the Soviet-Afghan War, Rahman returned to Egypt and was forced to
leave under threat of arrest. In May, 1990 a CIA official at the U.S. embassy in
Khartoum signed the visa request that allowed him to enter the U.S. despite the fact
that he had been on a State Department terrorist watch list since 1987 for his role in
the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. 98 In this case, the CIA officer
did not recognize the Egyptian cleric for his ties to terrorism because he was not able
to check the lookout list since the computers were broken at the time of the
application.99
When Rahman came to the U.S. in 1990, he assumed control of the recruiting
and fundraising efforts for the global jihad at the Al Farooq Mosque in Brooklyn,
which was one of the many Bureau of Services (MAK) offices established during the
Soviet-Afghan war. Later, the Al-Farooq Mosque became the spiritual home of
those involved in the 1993 WTC bombing including: Mahmud Abouhalima, Ramzi
Yousef, Abdul Yasin, Nidal Ayyad, and Mohammed Salameh.
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After Rahman arrived in America in 1990, he quickly attracted a following at
storefront mosques in Brooklyn and Jersey City. Rahman became the emir or leader
of the Islamic Group (IG) in the United States and played a key role in defining the
goals of IG and providing guidance to followers regarding whether particular jihad
actions, including acts of terrorism, were permissible under his extremist
interpretation oflslamic law. 100
Rahman called on his followers to engage in armed, violent struggle against
the enemies oflslam, especially the U.S. and told them: "Jihad means do jihad with
the sword, the cannon, with grenades, and with missiles. Jihad against God's
enemies for God's enemies and for God's cause." 101 He schooled his followers to
believe that the United States was the primary enemy of Islam and the one
responsible for the unhappy condition of much of the Muslim world. He stated,
"Every conspiracy against Islam, every scheming against Islam and the Muslims-its
source is America. America is the power behind Israel, behind Egypt's President
Husni Mubarak, and behind Muslims' having to live in a state of humiliation and
surrender." 102 Rahman attempted to arouse his listeners with sermons directed
against Americans whom he said were "descendants of apes and pigs who have been
feeding from the dining tables of the Zionists, Communists and Colonialists." 103
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Rahman was effective in persuading Muslim men to wage offensive jihad
against the U.S. First, a devoted follower of Rahman, El Sayyid Nosair, assassinated
Jewish Defense League leader Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1990 in New York City. 104
Among the item's found in Nosair's apartment by the FBI were audio sermons and
speeches of Sheik Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman.
Second, five of the conspirators in the 1993 WTC bombing, Mohammed
Salameh, Mahmud Abouhalima, Eyad Ismoil, Ramzi Yousef and Nidal Ayyad, were
followers and/or associates of Rahman. 105 In fact, Yousef had become a member of
the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980's while he was in college at Swansea University
in Wales and was quite familiar with the teachings ofRahman. 106 It was here that
Yousef was recruited to join the mujahidin and influenced by the jihadist ideology.
Third, Rahman was convicted in October, 1995 of engaging in seditious
conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism for his role in the Day of Terror plot, in
which a group of nine Islamist terrorists planned to blow up the United Nations
Building, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels and the Manhattan office of the FBI. 107
The Kahane assassination, the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, and the Day of
Terror Plot were all conducted by individuals who were close associates or followers
of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. The Al-Farooq Mosque served as a fundraising and
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training center for Al Qaeda even after the arrest and conviction of the WTC
conspirators and Rahman.
In March 2003, for example, Sheik Muhammad Ali Hassan al-Mouyad told
an F.B.I. informant that he was a spiritual advisor to Osama bin Laden and he had
worked for years funneling up to $20 million to Al Qaeda through the Al Farooq
Mosque in Brooklyn. 108 What is clear is that support for the worldwide jihadist
movement did not end with the end of the Soviet-Afghan War or the Cold War, but
rather gathered strength and power over the 1990's with the rise of Al Qaeda.
While Rahman moved to the U.S. to coordinate terrorist attacks, Bin Laden
moved to Sudan in 1991 to set up a global terrorist enterprise which coordinated
terrorist attacks around the world, as well as, provided equipment, training and funds
to extremist groups in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, and the
U.S. 109 After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, thousands oflslamic
fundamentalists engaging in clandestine, violent campaigns to overthrow
governments in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and other Muslim states used
Afghanistan as a base for training and planning operations. This was shown by a
team of Los Angeles Times reporters who carried out an investigation into the
aftermath of the Afghan War and found that over four continents key leaders of
every major terrorist attack between 1989 and 1996, from New York in 1993 to
France in 1995 to Saudi Arabia in 1996, inevitably turned out to have been veterans
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of the Afghan War. 110 Among the terrorists that arose from the Afghan-Soviet War
and the post war training camps were members of the terrorist cell responsible for
the 1993 WTC bombing. Critical events during the Cold War, such as the 1967
Arab-Israeli War and the Afghan-Soviet War, had a significant impact on those
involved in the 1993 WTC attack.
These events, combined with the radical ideology espoused by radical Islamic
fundamentalist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Group
radicalized thousands of Arab men to wage an on going holy war or jihad against the
U.S. m Jihad has many meanings but the term most commonly understood in the
media was that which entailed warfare. To understand the motivation of the terror
cell in this case, who called themselves the Fifth Battalion Liberation Army it is
important to understand the jihadist ideology of the Islamic Group, and its sister
organization the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Brotherhood's leaders-Sayyid Qutb
and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.

The One-Sided War of the Fifth Battalion Liberation Army

In the international relations lens, terrorism is conceptualized as a strategy of
asymmetrical warfare used by rational actors that is directed at people, particularly
110
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civilians and noncombatants, in order to coerce or intimidate a government or
population to obtain primarily political goals. In this section, the story will discuss
the ideology and beliefs of the WTC conspirators which were heavily influenced by
the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman who advocated
asymmetrical warfare against the West and Israel. In addition, the story highlights
the new breed of terrorism that Ramzi Yousef and his co-conspirators represented at
the time. Finally, this section will discuss why this was largely a one-sided war
being conducted by the terrorists because the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
agencies did not perceive that the first WTC attack in 1993 was an act of war being
carried out be a transnational terrorist organization, but rather a as a crime carried out
be a small, autonomous cell.

The Ideology of Qutb, Rahman and the Muslim Brotherhood
The Islamic fundamentalist movement did not begin with the attack on the
World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, but rather evolved over the 20th century.
The origins and nature of this movement were heavily influenced by the ideology
and organizational example of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Group. The
ideology of Sayyid Qutb, of the Muslim Brotherhood, had an incalculable impact on
the development of radical Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the world.
Examples of Qutb' s influence can be found in the speeches and writing of Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman in the 1970's to 1990's, as well as, in that of Osama bin Laden
in the late 1990s to present. This ideology has inspired thousands of predominantly
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young Muslim men around the world to wage an offensive jihad against the U.S, its
Western allies, and secular Arab regimes.
Sayyid Qutb is regarded as the founding father and leading theoretician of the
contemporary jihadist movement. 112 Sayyid Qutb's (1906-1966) was an Egyptian
teacher and journalist who had initially been an admirer of the West upon graduating
from college. In the 1940's Qutb's visit to the U.S. transformed him into a severe
critic of the West. Qutb was appalled by the moral decadence that he saw, including
materialism, sexual permissiveness and promiscuity, free use and abuse of alcohol,
and racism. 113 Qutb wrote about his views on America in his influential tract,
Milestones: "Look at this behavior, like animals, which you call "free mixing of the

sexes"; at this vulgarity which you call "emancipation of women"; at this evil and
fanatic racial discrimination." 114 Qutb's hatred for America was cemented by U.S.
support for the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.
Sayyid Qutb returned home to Egypt in 1950 and became a leading
intellectual of the Muslini Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in
1928 by Hassan al-Banna and has been an Islamic movement in Egypt since then.
The Muslim Brotherhood movement has always been oriented toward a total change
of society from secular to an Islamic regime and a renewal of the Islamic
caliphate. 115 That is, the Brotherhood believed in deposing secular Muslim rulers
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and uniting all Muslims under an Islamic state ruled by a caliph, or successor of
Prophet Mohammad. The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, like that of Qutb,
rejected Western values and Communism and called for the establishment of a panIslamic state founded on the basis of shari'a, or Islamic law. Qutb believed that
Western civilization had led humanity "to corruption and irreligion from which only
Islam can save it." 116 Qutb's goal was to completely reshape society by imposing his
view of Islamic values on all aspects of life which would be accomplished only
through a strict imposition of Sharia law as his followers and he interpreted it. For
a~cording to Qutb, "Islam means returning God's authority to Him, rejecting the
usurpers who rule over human communities according to man made laws. " 117 This
was necessary, Qutb argued, because the entire world, including Muslims, was in a
state of jahiliyah, or ignorance where man's way had replaced God's way. 118
For Qutb, society was divided into two camps, the party of God to which
he belonged, and the party of Satan which consisted of those opposed to his God or
his form of Islam, such as Westerners and Jews. According to Qutb, since jahiliya
and Islam cannot exist, offensive jihad was necessary to destroy jahiliyah society and
bring the entire world to Islam. He wrote that violent jihad was necessary to
"abolish injustice from the earth, to bring people to the worship God alone, and to
bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of the Lord." 119 More

116

Anonymous. (2002). Through Our Enemies Eyes. Washington D.C: Brassey's. 84-85.
Qutb, Sayyid. The right to judge. In Jihad in Modern Islamic Thought a Collection. At:
http://www.thewahhabimyth.com/gutb.htm [accessed 24 January 2008].
118
lbid.
119
Qutb, Sayyed. Milestones. Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation. n.d. 56.
117

275
importantly, Qutb recognized the importance of using strategies of asymmetrical
warfare in waging jihad against a superior enemy.
Recognizing Western civilization's military supremacy, Qutb encouraged
Islamists to use unconventional warfare to defeat the enemy: "The Islamic Jihad has
no relationship to modem warfare, either in its causes or in the way in which it is
conducted" 120 To achieve victory, he said, the Islamist movement cannot fight

Jahiliyyah face-to-face on the battlefield. Qutb argued that unconventional warfare
would give the weaker lslamist movement the element of surprise, which would help
to even the odds of the war.

121

This use of asymmetrical strategies is encouraged in many of the writings
and speeches of those in the jihadist movement. For example, Sheik Rahman
extolled his followers at his mosque in New York City to destroy the enemies of
Allah by "means of destroying exploding, the structure of their civilized pillars such
as touristic infrastructure which they are proud of their statues which they endear
and the buildings which gather their heads, their leaders, and without announcement
for our responsibility of Muslims for what had been done." 122 In fact on January 16,
1993, Rahman gave a speech in Brooklyn forecasting the carnage that was soon to
follow with the WTC attack. Rahman told his followers, America is the foremost
enemy of Islam, and "we must be terrorists and we must terrorize the enemies of
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Islam and frighten them and disturb them and shake the earth under their feet." 123
Just over a month later, a group of Rahman's followers bombed the World Trade
Center.
This theme of attacking infidel Western governments and apostate Muslim
regimes via asymmetrical strategies was also found in the opening paragraphs of the
Al Qaeda manual found in the bomb making kit of Ajaj and Yousef when they were
entering the U.S. in 1992. This manual stated: "The confrontation that we are calling
for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates ... Platonic ideals ... nor
Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of
assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and
machine gun." 124
Finally, this strategy was articulated in the threats made by the Liberation
Army in 1993, when its leaders threatened continued attacks against civilian and
military targets, including nuclear targets, and the use of 150 suicidal soldiers. These
were not idle threats as plans for attacking a U.S. nuclear station were discussed by
Yousef with one ofthe conspirators in the Bojinka Plot in 1994, Hashim Murad. 125
In addition, on Yousefs captured Toshiba computer, Philippine National Police
found his plans for a suicide mission against the CIA headquarters using a chartered
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commercial aircraft. 126 This plot was intended to demonstrate to the whole world
that a Muslim martyr was ready and determined to die for the glorification of this
interpretation of Islam. The strategy of suicide bombers was a tactic encouraged by
Sayydi Qutb and his followers.
Qutb encouraged martyrdom as a viable method of achieving the groups goal
claiming that the men who die in the midst of fighting the Islamist jihad are honored
by God: "It is God's choosing and honoring a group of people who share death with
the rest of mankind but who are singled out from other people for the honor - honor
among the noblest angels, nay, even among all of mankind." 127 Qutb's embraced
martyrdom which he described as an "heroic death in which the martyr not only
gains heavenly rewards, but his name will become legendary on earth, and the entire
ummah will honor him." 128 For Islamic scholars, the Muslim world constitutes an
ummah - a universal community based on shared faith and implementation of its
law. 129 These views were endorsed in the plans and interviews of Ramzi Yousef,
and the writings of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and his followers who subscribed to
Qutbism. 130
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The main tenet ofQutbist ideology, which was adopted by the Islamic
Group, as well as al Qaeda and others, was the assertion that the Muslim community
has been extinct for centuries having reverted to Godless ignorance (Jahiliyya) and
must be re-conquered for Islam. This was to be achieved through a two-prong attack
of preaching and education to promote conversion to Islam, and of waging offensive
jihad as part of a global strategy to eliminate infidels and apostate Muslim regimes.
Jihad, in this case, was understood as the use of violence in the form of asymmetrical
warfare to effect a gradual takeover, beginning with Muslim countries or the near
enemy, and the establishment of an ideal state to be ruled by a Caliph. 131 The
ultimate goal of bin Laden is the rebuilding of the umma. the community of
believers throughout the world. 132
Religious terrorists, such as Rahman and bin Laden, believe jihad is
necessary to prevent the onslaught of Western cultural and political influence into
the Muslim community; that is "it is a means of last resort to prevent the extinction
of the distinctive identity of the Islamic community against the forces of secularism
and modernism. " 133 This onslaught was felt more profoundly in traditional societies
with the rise of globalization in the 1990's.
A number of scholars have explained the increasing threat posed by
transnational terrorism ·in the Post Cold War era is a result of the negative impact of
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globalization. 134 Sheik Rahman and Osama bin Laden espoused an anti-modem,
anti-western ideology and doctrines which promoted jihad against the destructive
effects of "McWorld" on group identity and belonging, culture, religious beliefs and
values, and traditional societies. 135 Ranstorp explained that the threat of
secularization and foreign interference provokes a self defensive and hostile attitude
toward Western nations and organizations. 136 This reaction against foreign
interference was clearly seen with the rise of the mujahidin in the Soviet-Afghan
War, and in the letter sent by the 1993 WTC conspirators which specifically
demanded that the U.S. "not to interfere with any Middle East countries interior
affairs." 137 To achieve this objective the 1993 WTC conspirators were committed to
kill non-Muslims and Muslims alike as espoused by Qutb.
Qutb, broke with mainstream Islam, by advocating that all true Muslims have
a personal obligation to wage offensive jihad against non-Muslims. To get around
the prohibition of killing another Muslim, Qutb used the concept of takfir, or
excommunication of apostates, to justify assassinations and attacks against secular
rulers, officials or organizations, or any Muslims that opposed the Islamist agenda. 138
The takfir concept, along with offensive jihad, became a means for any Islamic
extremist to justify attacks against virtually any target. According to Fawaz Gerges,
134
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Qutb's theory of unrestricted jihad " ... against every obstacle that comes into the way
of worshipping God and the implementation of the divine authority on earth ... " was
the intellectual basis behind the exhortations of Abdullah Azzam, Sheikh Omar
Abdel al-Rahman, and Ayman al-Zawahiri and ultimately the establishment of
Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. 139
The Qutbism ideology provided the justification to the WTC conspirators for
the large scale terrorist attack against the U.S. that killed six people and injured over
one thousand in 1993. This new breed of terrorism, as represented by Yousef and the
Liberation Army, were motivated by both sectarian and political objectives in their
attack on the World Trade Center.

New Terrorism and the Liberation Army
The 1993 WTC conspirators represented a new face of terror. The 1993 plots
to blow up the World Trade Center and to bomb New York landmarks featured
characteristics previously absent from terrorist schemes including: the deliberate
intent to target and kill thousands of civilians, by a group or organization composed
of different nationalities without a state sponsor, in order to achieve both political
and religious goals and objectives. New terrorism was different than terrorism of the
past, it is argued, because these terrorist organizations are religiously (rather than
politically) motivated and that they are intent on inflicting harm on a massive
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scale. 14 For the U.S., our ability to identify the new terrorism threat we were facing
was heavily influenced by our perceptions at the time of the 1993 attack. In this
case, this event was largely seen as a crime by the FBI though they did recognize this
new type of terrorism.
The FBI identified this phenomenon as a new type of terrorism which they
labeled International Radical Fundamentalism in its 1993 annual report. 141 The FBI
report identified unique characteristics of the new terrorism to include that these
terrorists justified their violent acts through a radical interpretation of their religious
beliefs and that they sought to convert mankind to their faith system through
violence or jihad. 142 In addition, the FBI report identified this new type of terrorism
as a transnational phenomenon in which radical fundamentalist sects were comprised
of individuals of various nationalities who have "put cultural and religious
differences to the wayside, concentrating instead on a shared goal-the spread of
their religious beliefs through armed struggle." 143 Thus, one of the unique
characteristics of new terrorism as represented by Ramzi Yousef, was the religious
motivation of the actors.
Although religion and terrorism share a long history, in the twentieth century
international terrorism was dominated by ethno-nationalist/separatist and
ideologically motivated terrorism. In fact in a study done as late as 1968, none of the
140
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eleven identifiable active international terrorist groups could be classified as
religious. 144 Sectarian terrorists are "classified as having aims and motivations
reflecting a predominant religious character or influence."

145

By 1992 the number

had grown to eleven groups; and by 1995, 26 of 56 known, active international
terrorist groups were classified as religious. 146
Hoffman argued that the religious terrorists are driven by value systems and
worldviews that are radically different than secular terrorists. The most critical point
of departure between these two groups he said is that religious terrorists are not
constrained by political or moral considerations because they believe they are acting
on behalf of their God. 147 As a result, religious terrorists are more likely than their
secular counterparts to kill wantonly and indiscriminately and to use weapons of
mass destruction. 148
This new breed of terrorism with its advocacy of large scale indiscriminate
killing was clearly represented with the 1993 WTC conspirators. This characteristic
was demonstrated in the letter sent by the perpetrators of the WTC attack to the New

York Times, four days after the attack. This letter by the Liberation Army Fifth
Battalion stated, "If our demands are not met, all our functional groups in the army
will continue to execute our missions against military and civilian targets in and out
of the United States. This will also include some potential nuclear targets." 149 (see

144

Hoffman, Bruce. (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Chapter 4.
Ibid.
146
Ibid.
141 Ibid.
148
Ibid.
14s

283
Figure 5). In addition, Yousef intentionally targeted civilians in order to inflict the
maximum amount of pain and suffering on his enemies, specifically the U.S. for its
political arrogance and support for Israel. 150
Further, this letter justified the killing of Americans by claiming, "The
American people are responsible for the actions of their government and they must
question all of the crimes that their government is committing against other people.
Or they-Americans will be the target of our operations that could diminish them." 151
The Liberation Army clearly represented the new breed of terrorism that
combined both religious and political motivations and objectives. This letter by the
Liberation Army highlighted specific grievances against U.S. foreign policy which
included military, economical and political aid to Israel and what they perceived as
U.S. interference in the interior affairs of Middle East countries.
In fact, the grievances presented by the Liberation Army are similar to those
presented by Osama bin Laden in his 1998 fatwa against the US. The 1998 ''fatwa"
of al-Qaeda and its allies, the "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
against the Jews and the Crusaders," described the U.S. presence (in Saudi Arabia)
as a catastrophe that had humiliating and debilitating effects on the Muslim
people. 152
This sense of feeling inferior and being humiliated is a reason why militants
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kill according to Jessica Stem in Terror in the Name of God. Stem's book explores
five kinds of grievances that give rise to terrorism in the name of God-alienation,
humiliation, demographic shifts, historical wrongs and claims over territory.
153
Figure 5: Letter from the Liberation Army

The following letter from the Liberation Army regarding the operation conducted
against the WTC.
We are, the fifth battalion in the Liberation Army, declare our responsibility or the
explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the
American political, economical, and military support to Israel the state of terrorism
and to the rest of the dictator countries ofthe region.

OUR DEMANDS ARE:
Stop all military, economical, and political aids to Israel.
1.
All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.
2.
Not to interfere with any Middle East countries interior affairs.
3.
If our demands are not met, all our functional groups in the army will continue to
execute our missions against military and civilian targets in and out ofthe United
States. This will also include some potential nuclear targets. For your own
information, our army has more than hundred and fifty suicidal soldiers ready to go
ahead The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported by America) must be
faced with a similar one. The dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by
America) that some countries are practicing against their own people must also be
faced with terrorism.
The American people must know, that their civilians who got killed are not better
than those who are getting killed by the American weapons and support. The
American people are responsible for the actions of their government and they must
question all ofthe crimes that their government is committing against other people.
Or they-Americans-will be the targets of our operations that could diminish them.
We invite all ofthe peoples.from all countries and all ofthe revolutionaries in the
world to participate in this action with us to accomplish our just goals.
" .. .IF THEN NYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHIBIITON AGAINST YOU
TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE AGAINST HIM... "
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Stern argued that it is the failure of modern societies that has alienated and
humiliated people throughout the world. Stern wrote, "The failures of modern
society are like a disease, like Aids: people go back to tradition and to religion.
Identity today is based in general on religion and culture, not nation states."

154

This

sense of humiliation in the 1990' s came from a number of sources including the
continual losses for the Muslims in the Arab-Israeli conflict, America's military
presence in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the impoverishment of the
Islamic people.

Impact of the Post Cold War on the U.S.
The international relations lens identifies many possible causes of terrorism
including poverty, lack of economic development, deprivation, oppression, loss of
territory, and political disenfranchisement, to name a few. These environmental
conditions may result in feelings of intense anger and frustration among a
population, and in turn, lead to terrorist violence. These environmental conditions
and their impact are constantly changing within the world system as seen in the
differences between the Cold War and Post Cold War era. This section highlights
the negative impact of the end of the Cold War on the Third World and the
subsequent rise of weak and failing states which have become sanctuaries for
terrorist organizations. Next, this section highlights the transition of U.S. foreign
policy from one dominated by the East-West rivalry to one focused on globalization
and trade and economic issues. As a result of this transition and the new focus on
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globalization issues, the international relations lens in the post Cold War
environment also initially failed to see the new and emerging threat against the U.S.
that was first seen in the 1993 attack. Finally, this section analyzes U.S.
counterterrorism policy at the time of the 1993 attack and looks at how those U.S.
agencies focused on national security responded to this event.

Impact of the Post Cold War in the Third World
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989 had a
profound affect on the international system and U.S. foreign policy. The immediate
consequences of the end of the Cold War was the fall of communism in Eastern
Europe in which all six states allied with the Soviet Union overturned their
communist regimes and made their first attempts at establishing a political
democracy and market economy. In tum, the revolutions of 1989 provided
momentum to the events that shaped the post Cold War era. This led to an end to the
East-West military competition, particularly in the Third World, and greater
cooperation between Russia and the U.S.
The end of superpower competition for influence in the Third World is
another long term affect of the end of the Cold War .
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positive affect of this is that the artificial overlay of the East-West conflict into Third
World problems was removed, leaving the possibility that real problems of economic
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and political development could be addressed directly and without distortion. 156 In
addition, the end of the Cold War removed the superpower patronage system that
held many weaker states together. The negative affect was that the U.S. and Russia
were less motivated to provide resources as a means of currying influence, and less
committed to restrain conflicts within and between Third World countries. 157
Since the end of the Cold War to 1999, the U.S. reduced foreign aid by about
50% in inflation -adjusted terms to Third World countries. 158 As a result, poverty,
instability, conflict, and violence in the Third World has led to weak or failing states
that have become sanctuaries and breeding grounds for a broad range of terrorist
organizations, including al Qaeda. 159 Countries become vulnerable and subject to
terrorist subversion when there are high rates of unemployment, particularly among
males aged 15 to 35. 160 Within these sanctuaries, terrorist organizations are able to
recruit, train and plan operations for enemies throughout the world. The reduction in
foreign aid combined with the negative impact of globalization, served to help create
an environment within these regions that provided a fertile ground to breed terrorist
violence against the U.S. and its interests.
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Globalization and its Impact on Terrorism
In the Post Cold War era, the new world order was being transformed not
only by the end of the East-West rivalry but also by the rise of globalization. The
Clinton administration embraced globalization because it marked the triumph of
capitalism and its market economy. Defenders of globalization, such as President
Clinton and author Thomas Friedman, presented the beneficial aspects of
globalization in that it would generate wealth and increase economic opportunities,
spread political democratization and cultural diversity, and empower and connect
individuals throughout the world in an interdependent network. 161
However, critics of globalization argued that this phenomenon would bring
global fragmentation or "the clash of civilizations," as well as, domination and
control by wealthier nation states over the poorer underdeveloped ones, thus
increasing the gap between the haves and have nots within the world system. 162
Stiglitz argued that growing impoverishment in the Third was due in part to the
forces of globalization that dominated the 1990's and into the 21 st century. Stiglitz
wrote, "The West has driven the globalization agenda, ensuring that it garners a
disproportionate share of the benefits, at the expense of the developing world." 163
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This in turn has bred frustration and anger that, in some cases has lead to acts of
terrorism directed against the U.S.
This concept that the Third World will continue to be a breeding ground for
terrorism is supported by Thomas Barnett who divided the post Cold War world
between a functioning economic core and an excluded, non integrating gap that is
not included in the global economy. 164 Barnett argued that terrorism comes from the
non integrating gap because true believers within the gap understand the threat that
economic development means to their narrow way of life.

165

That is, Islamist

terrorists will do whatever it takes to prevent their societies from being assimilated
into a "sacrilegious global economic empire." 166 This has been seen in Afghanistan
through the 1990's. In fact, in 1993 Afghanistan was in the bottom three countries in
the developing world in human development and in GNP rankings. 167
While the U.S. was celebrating the end of the Cold War in the 1990's,
Afghanistan was wracked by civil war and then by the rule of the oppressive regime
of the Taliban. It was in this environment that Al Qaeda was able to recruit and train
lslamist terrorists for its future operations largely out of mind and sight of U.S.
national security organizations which were no longer focused on Afghanistan, but
rather on a new post Cold War agenda that largely ignored the threat of transnational
terrorism until the late 1990' s.
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At the time of the 1993 WTC bombing, the negative impacts of globalization
on the world system were not clear because globalization was a relatively new
phenomenon. In addition, it is not a clear that those involved in the 1993 WTC
attack were motivated by issues related to globalization. The grievances highlighted
in the letter of the Fifth Battalion of the Liberation Army are related to U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East from the end of WWII to 1993. In addition, though most
of the WTC conspirators were followers of Sheik Rahman who espoused the anti Western ideology of Qutb, there was no direct evidence that could be found that
specifically linked the motivation of these individuals to the negative impact of
globalization. Globalization would be more closely linked to international terrorism
in the twenty-first century, thus at the time of the WTC attack, it was difficult to
apply theories of globalization to understand the new terrorism threat represented in
this case. What is evident is that the end of the Cold War, not only had a significant
impact on the Third World, but also, on U.S. foreign policy. In the post Cold War
era the international relations lens would be transformed and focused on issues
relating to globalization instead of the East-West conflict.

Post Cold War Foreign Policy and its Focus on the Global Economy
By the end of the Cold War, Americans had been war weary from the

decades of conflict between the U.S. and USSR and its resulting military
engagements overseas. The American public simply had no desire for the U.S. to
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serve as the world's policeman. 168 Americans believed the post Cold War era would
bring a peace dividend whereby there would be a reduction in defense spending 169
and deployment of U.S. military forces overseas, and more attention would be
focused on U.S. domestic issues, especially the economy. 170
The end of the Cold War, not only, brought an end to the East-West conflict,
but also, elevated the stature of the United States and the political ideologies of
liberalism and democracy. From the American perspective, the world seemed on the
verge of a new era or peace and prosperity. In this new era, a search began for a new
grand strategy that would guide U.S. foreign policy. The dominant focus of the
international relations lens would shift dramatically over time, but at the time of the
1993 WTC attack, the lens was dominated by a post Cold War globalization
perspective.
For some in the international relations community, the most critical forces
that would characterize the post Cold War era were democracy and free market
capitalism. 171 To adherents of this view, the expansion of democracy would enhance
global stability because as a rule democracies do not go to war with each other 172 and
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a market based world economy would tie nations together in a cooperative search for
prosperity. Clinton ran on the platform of"lt's the economy stupid," and swept into
office with a focus on promoting democracy abroad and bolstering America's
economic revitalization.
From the onset of his presidency, U.S. economic interests were central to
Clinton's foreign policy. President Clinton's top three foreign policy priorities upon
being sworn in as President in 1993 were to update and restructure American
military and security capabilities, to elevate the role of economics in international
affairs and to promote democracy abroad. 173 This agenda was supported, by and
large, by the public who stated the most critical foreign policy issue in 1993 was
strengthening the domestic economy to improve America's international position. 174
In 1995, after the 1993 attack but while legal actions were still pending against the
WTC conspirators, the Clinton administration formally articulated its national
security strategy in the new world order in A National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement. It stated: "our national security strategy is based on

enlarging the community of market democracies and containing a range of threats to
our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political
economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of
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geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our
people are likely to prosper." 175
This policy reflected Clinton's reluctance to engage in minor conflicts around
the world, and to use military force in conflicts outside our strategic area of
interest. 176 It is clear that the Clinton administration's priority upon entering office
was domestic issues, yet in the post Cold War era a new set of risks and challenges
faced the U.S. in the form of regional ethnic and religious conflicts, the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, and the rise of militant nationalism and the threat of
transnational terrorism. With these new challenges and non state threats, realism
deterrence as a guiding theory was largely replaced by theories of globalization in
the 1990's.
While realism would continue to be an important school of thought in
understanding the behavior of states and global events in the 21 st century, its state
centric focus offered a vision of world actors that was too narrow. The idea that
states are the sole, or even overwhelmingly powerful, actors in international relations
was challenged in two ways. First, there has been an emergence of numerous,
influential nonstate actors such as terrorist organizations and networks, worldwide
criminal syndicates, and non-governmental organizations that have had a profound
influence on nation states. Second, globalization has integrated markets, financial
systems, and technologies which have enabled individuals, nation states and
175
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corporations to reach around the world farther, faster and deeper than ever before. 177
Thomas Friedman argued that globalization has given more power to individuals to
influence both markets and nation states and some of these individuals act on the
world stage directly as "Super-empowered" individuals. 178 The Liberation Army of
the WTC bombing was part of a larger jihadist network linked to Osama bin Laden,
a person that Friedman would label a super-empowered individual.
In a globalized world, a smaller force using asymmetrical strategies can
undermine the political, economic and military power of a great power as was later
seen on 9/11. In 1993, the national security apparatus and the Clinton administration
did not see perceive that a non state actor could have this kind of power. It was not
until the terrorist attacks in New York City in 1993, in Tokyo in 1995, and in
Oklahoma City in 1995, that the Clinton administration took substantive action
against this growing problem and appointed a number of commissions to examine
this threat and America's readiness for this new type of catastrophic terrorism
demonstrated in the above attacks. 179 However, at the time of the 1993 attack, the
Clinton administration did not perceive international terrorism as a tier one national
security issue because of the changing nature of the international relations lens and
the dominance of the criminal justice lens in the early 1990' s as discussed in Chapter
three.
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Clinton Counterterrorism Policy
At the time of the WTC attack in February, 1993, terrorism was, not only, not
on the national security agenda, but also, not a major focus of U.S. foreign policy
until the late 1990's when the U.S. had been the victim of additional domestic and
international terrorist attacks. As Richard Clarke wrote, "In 1993, the Clinton
administration came to office with an agenda to deal with the post Cold War era, and
terrorism was not on it." 180 In the grand scheme of U.S. foreign policy, terrorism was
a second or even third level concern until after 9/11. For most presidents, terrorism
was a nuisance to be attended to, not a strategic threat because terrorists had never
seriously threatened American power or the safety of large number of American
citizens. 181
Thus at the time of the 1993 WTC attack, the U.S. national security
organizations did not perceive terrorism as a current or future threat to the U.S.
Daniel Benjamin wrote, "In the first two years of the Clinton administration, the
intelligence community was slow to examine the growing threat of Sunni extremism
to America." 182 While the national security organization~ had concerns about the
growth oflslamist violence following the WTC attack, much of our focus in foreign
policy in 1993 was on other countries such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Further,
on forecasting future threats, few of the experts in foreign affairs and security in a
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Times Mirror survey saw international terrorism in the U.S. as certain or probable
despite the 1993 WTC event. 183
These predictions were confirmed by the decrease in terrorism in the first five
years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, the trends in international
and domestic terrorism in 1994 indicated that terrorism in the United States was on
the decline by domestic terrorist groups and that attacks by international terrorist
groups in the U.S. was rare. 184 Given the fact that domestic and international
terrorism was declining and the chance of an attack occurring in the U.S. by a
foreign terrorist organization was not likely in 1993, it is no surprise that terrorism
was not-a major issue of concern for the U.S. national security apparatus at the time
of the 1993 WTC attack.
Like past Presidents, Clinton primarily saw terrorism as a crime that was best
handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in concert with other criminal justice
agencies. As a result, in the 1993 WTC case, the CIA, State Department, and other
national security organizations played a minimal role or no role in preventing the
attack or in capturing the conspirators involved. These roles, however, would
change during the course of the Clinton presidency as the U.S. was targeted
increasingly overseas and at home by terrorists.
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The international relations lens assumes that terrorism is an international
relations problem that is best handled by national intelligence agencies, the
Department of State, the Department of Defense and other organizations that make
up the U.S. national security apparatus. Each of these organizations had a
counterterrorism mission at the time of the 1993 attack and was concerned with
preventing, deterring and responding to international terrorism through a broad range
of offensive and defensive strategies. However, most of these agencies did not
respond to the 1993 attack, but were utilized after other terrorist attacks against the
U.S. in the late 1990's as the threat of catastrophic terrorism became a growing
concern and priority.
During the Clinton presidency, the U.S. was a victim to a number of high
profile domestic and international terrorist incidents including: the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 which killed 168
people, the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar,es Salaam,
Tanzania in 1998 which killed 312 people (12 Americans), and the suicide bombing
of the USS Cole in 2000 which killed 17 U.S. sailors. Like past administrations,
President Clinton employed a range of policy options to combat international
terrorism, from diplomacy and international cooperation and constructive
engagement, to economic sanctions, military strikes and protective security
measures.

In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton signed
presidential decision directive 39 (PDD~39), U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, on
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June 25, 1995. This plan laid out the national policy and assigned specific missions
to designated Federal Departments and agencies. First, the PDD stated, "It is the
policy of the U.S. to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on
our territory and against our citizens ... The U.S. regards all such terrorism as a
potential threat to national secwity as well as a criminal act. " 185 Thus, terrorism was
perceived in this policy as both a criminal justice and international relations problem.
Second, PDD-39 reaffirmed that the FBI would be the lead agency for terrorist
attacks within the U.S., while the State Department would be the lead agency for
terrorist attacks on c.ivilians outside the U.S. Third, PDD 39 ordered the Attorney
General, the Director of the FBI, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the
secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, and Treasury, to enact measures to
reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism. Specific measures these agencies were directed to
do included reviewing the vulnerability of government facilities and critical
infrastructure, expanding their counterterrorism programs, excluding persons who
pose a terrorist threat, and gathering and analyzing intelligence related to terrorist
organizations. Also this directive, only part of which has been declassified,
addressed deterrence of terrorism. It called for the return of indicted terrorists to the
United States for prosecution, and presented measures for dealing with states that ·
support terrorism.
For President Clinton the terrorist threat did not conform to old stereotypes,
but rather, represented a more deadly and modem threat. Clinton argued in his
185
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national security strategy and in numerous speeches that terrorists were planning to
use weapons of mass destruction. 186 This concern about the use of chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons by terrorists led to the passage of The Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997). 187
This law advocated the training of first-responders to deal with a WMD terrorist
incident. In 1997, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program began
training first-responders--firefighters, police, and emergency medical technicians--in
120 cities across in the country. 188
The other major legislation signed by President Clinton was the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 which contained a number or provisions
affecting foreign assistance. 189 First, this legislation recognized the threat of terrorist
organizations by authorizing the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a
foreign terrorist organization if the organization engages in terrorist activity that
threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the U.S. 190 As a
result of this designation, it made it illegal for anyone in the U.S. to provide material
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support, such as money, lodging, training, false documents, safe houses, weapons,
communications equipment, personnel or other physical assets, for specific acts of
terrorism. 191 Second, this law prohibited U.S. foreign assistance to governments that
provide assistance or lethal military equipment to foreign terrorist organizations. 192
Third, it authorized the exclusion of aliens who are members or representatives of
foreign terrorist organizations. 193 Finally, this law required the U.S. executive
director of international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary
Fund, to oppose any loan to terrorist-list countries. 194
As the threat by the worldwide jihadist movement became clearer through the
1990's, the Clinton administration implemented a number of counterterrorism
strategies and programs to prevent and deter future terrorism, yet they were largely
ineffective in stopping the attacks on 9/11. This was due, in part, to the fundamental
limitations of deterrence strategies from the Cold War era in deterring non state
actors. The international relations lens assumed that Cold War theories of deterrence
may not be effective against transnational terrorist organizations.

Limits of Tradition Strategies ofDeterrence in Fighting Terrorism

Although the Clinton administration passed a number of new laws and
programs to deter terrorism, these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to the nature
of the threat. In the international relations literature deterrence was a theory
191
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associated with U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and referred to a policy of
massive military retaliation against an attack by a nation state through the use of
nuclear weapons or conventional forces. For deterrence to be effective the state must
be able to convince an adversary that it has the will and power to punish an
adversary. In the past, it was assumed that the primary adversary to the U.S. would
be a nation state not a non state actor such a transnational terrorist network.
Since the attacks on 9/11, it has been argued that the concepts of deterrence
and containment from the Cold War do not work against rogue states seeking
weapons of mass destruction, or against transnational terrorist organizations such as
Al Qaeda. 195 There are a number of arguments that have been presented for why
deterring a group like the Liberation Army or Al Qaeda is difficult. 196 First,
deterring terrorists is difficult because they are highly motivated and therefore
willing to use weapons of mass destruction and give up their lives to accomplish
their goals. Terrorist groups motivated by religious ideologies feel they have nothing
to lose and will achieve martyrdom as a result of their activities. In the 1993 WTC
case, the Liberation Army threatened to attack nuclear sites as well as use suicide
warriors to further their cause.
Second, deterrence policy during the Cold War operated between two major
great powers, while today deterrence policy must address a broad range of terrorist
groups with different goals, ideologies, and strategies that are not always known.
195
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House. Chapter V. Retrieved from: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html.
196
Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins. (2002). Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND. who argue against traditional notions of deterrence.

302

The Liberation Army was a terrorist organization that was a new breed of terrorism
that was not initially recognized by law enforcement or intelligence officials as part
of a larger worldwide jihadist movement until more attacks were carried out be Al
Qaeda in the 1990s. For deterrence to be effective against terrorist organizations the
U.S. must determine the intentions and capabilities of its adversaries. This can be
difficult when such groups operate clandestinely, are difficult to locate, and are
structured as decentralized networks with no clear central command. According to
Ian Lesser, the main difficulty with deterrence is when dealing with individuals and
networks, rather than with nation states or terrorist organizations with hierarchical
structures. 197
Third, effective deterrence requires that the U.S. threaten targets of value to
terrorists. However, determining which targets the U.S. must threaten to dissuade an
adversary from carryirtg out an attack is exceedingly difficult. For example,
targeting training camps in the mountains of Afghanistan in 1998 did not deter al
Qaeda from carrying out future attacks against the US. Fourth, inflicting mass
casualties and infrastructure damage in response to a terrorist attack can create
international outrage and greater support for terrorist organizations. Thus,
identifying a proportional response can be difficult when terrorists operate across
national boundaries and have no moral revulsion against inflicting mass destruction
and casualties against the United States. For.example, in the event of a chemical,
biological or nuclear attack on the homeland by terrorists, the U.S. has declared that
197
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it would respond with overwhelming force, possibly with nuclear weapons. 198 It
would be hard to justify the use of nuclear bombs against civilian populations that
were not directly involved in the terrorist attack.
Finally, deterrent strategies directed against individuals and organizations
should be different than those directed against state sponsors of terrorism.
Deterrence strategies against rogue regimes that support terrorists are more
straightforward and follow the traditional concepts of deterrence. There are a broad
range of punitive and deterrent measures that can be taken against states involved in
terrorism including warnings, cultural, diplomatic and economic sanctions, and
offensive military actions. 199 Deterring state sponsors of terror is critical because
without state sponsors terrorist groups would have a more difficult time obtaining
funds, weapons, materials and secure areas they need to plan and conduct operations.

Summary

In this chapter, the 1993 WTC bombing was analyzed using the
characteristics of Lens (11)-Homeland Security as an International Relations
Problem/Terrorism as War. In this lens, homeland security is linked with U.S.
foreign policy, national security policy and international relations. In this lens,
terrorism is perceived as a strategy of asymmetrical warfare that is used by
individuals, domestic and transnational groups, and nation states to coerce or
198
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intimidate a population in order to obtain primarily political goals. The conspirators
in the 1993 attack, who called themselves the Liberation Army, were waging a one
sided war as part of an offensive jihad against the U.S. and were linked to the
emerging global jihadist network. The nature of the war they were waging was
highlighted in the ideology of their spiritual mentor and leader, Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman. This chapter showed the ideological links of the 1993 WTC conspirators to
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the leader of the Islamic Group, as well as, to Al Qeada
and the larger worldwide jihadist movement.
In addition, this chapter discussed the formation of the Islamic fundamentalist

movement which followed the ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Finally, this chapter lens

links the specific grievances of the WTC conspirators that they listed in their letter to
the New York Times to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
The international relations lens recognizes that there are many possible
causes of terrorism and that environmental conditions such as poverty, lack of
economic development or job opportunities, religion and ideology, and political
disenfranchisement may contribute to terrorist violence but these conditions change
over time. In addition, this lens recognizes there are a variety of international
relations theories than can explain the behavior of non state actors, but this research
chose to focus on realism as a means of limiting the scope of the research.
This chapter highlighted significant events in world affairs that had a major
impact on the formation of the Liberation Army and its affiliated transnational
network. These events included the on going Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Afghan-
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Soviet War, end of the Cold War, the rise of Al Qaeda, and transition of the world
system in an era of globalization.
The end of the Cold War, not only, had a significant impact on the actors
involved in this case, but also, changed the nature of the lens that was being used to
analyze this case. At the time of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the U.S.
was undergoing large scale changes in its national security and foreign policies that
were precipitated by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in
1989. Thus, the dominant theories in use in international relations, as well as,
foreign policy strategies and objectives, were in transition during this time period
and fundamentally altered the international relations lens that was used in viewing
the problem of terrorism. Thus, this chapter told a story of this event through an
international relations lens of the Cold War, as well as, through a post Cold War era.
In the Cold War, terrorism was considered a third tier issue behind the ongoing East-West conflict and relations with our allies. International relations
theories of realism, containment and deterrence dominated the discourse among
national security and international relations scholars and practitioners. However, the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 fundamentally changed the balance of power in
the world system and left the U.S. as the lone superpower. As a result, in the early
1990's there was a search for a new grand strategy in U.S. foreign policy and an
assessment of realism and deterrence as guiding theories in the field of international
relations in the post Cold War era. It is clear from this case that during this transition,
the emerging threat posed by the worldwide jihadist movement was not seen. Even
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more troubling however, is that the new international relations lens that was created
also failed to see this new threat.
The post Cold War era was expected to bring a peace dividend to the U.S.
The end of the Cold War, not only appeared to have brought an end to the East-West
conflict, but also, to have elevated the stature of the United States and the political
ideologies ofliberalism and democracy. With the disappearance of the global threat
of the USSR, increasingly the focus was on the importance of international economic
issues and trade. Under the Clinton administration, globalization theories of
international relations would take center stage and economic issues would be at the
forefront of U.S. domestic and foreign policies.
It was assumed in this lens that globalization theories would help explain the
motivation and behavior of the actors in this case. However, globalization was also a
fairly new phenomenon in the early 1990's and, as such, the negative impacts of
globalization, such as the clash of civilizations was not yet seen at this time. It is
clear from Rahman's sermons that he was anti-American and anti-Western because
he sought to preserve traditional values, practices and beliefs from the onslaught of
secular, Western ideas and practices, but this was the case prior to the phenomenon
of globalization. In addition, the negative economic impact of globalization on the
Third World as described by Stiglitz was not readily apparent until later in the
decade. Finally, there is no clear indication that the WTC conspirators were
motivated to commit violence against the U.S. as part of a backlash against the
forces of globalization being promoted by U.S. policies. Thus, the international

307
relations lens developed initially in the post Cold War era also did not perceive the
growing threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists.
The growth of transnational terrorism would not be at the forefront of U.S.
national security policy until the mid 1990's and later, after the U.S. had faced more
terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Thus, at the time of the 1993 attack, terrorism in
the U.S. even if conducted by a foreign organization, was not yet perceived as a
national security issue that needed to be addressed by our national security apparatus.
The international relations lens assumes that terrorism is an international
relations problem that is best handled by national intelligence agencies, the
Department of State, the Department of Defense and other organizations that make
up the U.S. national security apparatus. Each of these organizations had a
counterterrorism mission at the time of the 1993 attack and was concerned with
preventing, deterring and responding to international terrorism through a broad range
of offensive and defensive strategies. However, most of these agencies did not
respond to the 1993 attack but were utilized after other terrorist attacks against the
U.S. in the late 1990's as the threat of catastrophic terrorism became a growing
concern and priority.
The story revealed in this chapter is fundamentally different than that told in
chapter 3 in which this case was viewed from a criminal justice lens. With the
international relations lens, we gain a broader view of how dramatic change within
the world system can not only alter our own perceptions about new phenomenon, but
also, increase or decrease the enabling environments that breed terrorism.
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CHAPTER 5: 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING
FROM AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War and rise of globalization brought large scale
changes to the global system and fundamentally altered the world order. Among the
characteristics of this new world order were the increasing prominence of
independent non state actors such as transnational terrorist organizations like Al
Qaeda. Today, al Qaeda has evolved into a transnational movement that consists of
a loose network of Islamist terrorist groups which is unique from other revolutionary
movements of the past in that it holds no territory, has no hierarchical organizational
structure, has virtually, non existent state sponsorship, and has operatives which are
drawn fmm throughout the world. 1
In 1993, Al Qaeda was in its infancy as a terrorist organization having been
born out of the crucible of the Afghan Soviet War in the 1980's. In this crucible
grew a worldwide, recruiting, training and financing network that served to provide
an on-going supply of highly trained and motivated warriors to fight against the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan. At the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, this network
infrastructure would evolve into the worldwide jihadist movement represented by al
Qaeda. After the Soviet Afghan War, operatives who were trained or inspired by Al
Qaeda established small, autonomous cells in dozens of countries and regions to plan
and carry out terrorist attacks against the U.S. One such cell was formed in New
York City to carry out the bombing of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

1
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This chapter analyzes the 1993 WTC bombing from an organizational design
perspective, and each characteristic of this lens is used to analyze this event from this
conceptual perspective. These characteristics are summarized in Table 4. Lens III
looks at the terrorism as a network and homeland security as an organizational
design problem. In this lens, it is recognized that terrorist organizations may take a
variety of organizational structures but the dominant structure, in this case, is that of
a network design. From the current terrorism literature, the threat is described as a
network of organizations, groups and individuals that is in conflict with a network of
U.S. government agencies that have missions and tasks associated with preventing
and deterring terrorism, and responding to acts of terrorism when they do occur.
Given the complexity of the problem, this lens assumes that the most effective and
efficient way to coordinate homeland security efforts is through a network
governance structure. An example of such a structure is found in the classic
emergency management network used by first responders, such as the Fire
Department of New York in this case.
This lens assumes that homeland security organizations will have difficulty
tracking and counteracting transnational networks like that represented in this case
because of the ability of these organizations to quickly adapt and change to the threat
environment. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the terror network for which the
1993 WTC conspirators were affiliated was different than past terrorist organizations
in its design, motivation, and tactics, and as such, these types of organizations will
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Table 4: Characteristics of Lens Ill
ANALYSIS

ORGANIZATION

Definition of Terrorism:
Key Characteristics

-Terrorism is seen as a network of autonomous groups
and individuals that are motivated by a common ideology
but may have diverse goals and tactics
-Terrorists are rational actors who organize according to
their mission, tasks, and threat environment
-terrorist organizations have many structures including
hierarchical, umbrella and network structures

Key Theories explaining violent behavior
from the following levels:
Individual
Organization/Group
Nation state
• World System
Primary Homeland Security Strategy
Primary Organizations
responsible

In the terrorism literature, network theories are used to
explain the behavior of terrorist groups
-Includes social network theories

•
•
•
•

•

Goal/Purpose

-Literature from PA and organizational theory used to
explain how US government agencies organize to
prevent, deter and respond to terrorism
-Pre 9/11, FBI, FEMA and State Dept. were designated
as lead agencies; these agencies were organized like
traditional govt1rnment bureaucracies with hierarchical
structures
-First responders using ICS will form the first networks
in responding to attacks
-Given the complex nature of homeland security,
network structures are needed but at time of 9/11 attack
the network governance literature was in its infancy
-Network structures are different than hierarchies but
networks are needed to deal with the wicked problem of
terrorism
-Design, develop and coordinate a network governance
structure including all levels of government, business and
non profits in a collaborative effort to deter, prevent and
respond to terrorism.
-Need to align organizational structures to mission,
strategy, tasks, technology and operating environment
-Organizational culture is important to change efforts and
framing how homeland security and terrorism are
perceived
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continue to pose unique challenges for homeland security. In this case, the members
of the cell involved were successfully arrested and prosecuted, yet, it did not prevent
future cells that were part of a larger network from attacking the U.S. at home and
abroad. At the time of the 1993 WTC attack, U.S. officials were not aware of the
links of this cell to a larger jihadist movement. This was due, in part, to the
weaknesses and gaps in the conceptual lenses that were being used at that time to
understand terrorism as discussed in chapters three and four.
This perceptual gap can also be explained, in part, by the type of
organizations involved in deterring, preventing, and responding to terrorism at the
time of the attack. In this story, U.S. government organizations involved in this case
were structured like classic, bureaucracies and were tasked with responding to a
threat that was part of a complex network. This lens argues that rational,
hierarchical, bureaucratic designs and practices most likely will have limited success
in deterring, preventing and responding to terrorism attacks in the future because
they are not well suited for operating in complex unstable environments. In this
case, U.S. organizations, such as the FBI and the Fire Department of New York,
were effective in responding to this large scale attack on the World Trade Center in
1993, and did not perceive that it was necessary to significantly change their
organizational structures, strategies, technology or culture to prevent or respond to
such attacks in the future until after the attacks on 9/11.
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In addition, this lens utilizes organization theory to understand how
organizational design and structure affects the behavior of the organization as a
whole and that of the individual members. 2 Through the design of organizational
structures and processes of one kind or another, different values can be maximized,
different needs can be served, and different purposes can be achieved. This lens was
developed from organization theories and assumes that organizational behavior can
be explained in part by the formal structure, its published goals and purposes and its
output of goods and services. 3 Thus, each organization involved in homeland
security will define and conceptually understand terrorism differently and, this in

turn, will impact, not only, how they structure their organizations, but also, their
homeland security strategies, processes and policies.
This lens also assumes that each of the organizations involved in homeland
security has unique organizational missions, strategies, technology and culture that
impact its ability to deter, prevent, and respond to acts of terrorism. This is clearly
highlighted in this case with the differences between the FBI and the CIA that are
discussed in this chapter.
The first section of this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the terrorist
organization and network involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This
analysis describes the terrorist cell involved as a network structure linked to a
2
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worldwide jihadist movement headed by Osama bin Laden. This section highlights
how this cell was formed, as well as, the organizational structure and tasks. The
second section focuses on two bureaucratic organizations involved in this case, the
FBI and Fire Department of New York. This section details the response to this
attack by first responders using a classic emergency management network as
represented by the Incident Command System. This section discusses how the
incident command system is a network of hierarchical organizations that is well
suited for a broad range of emergency situations as demonstrated in this case, but
may have limitations when dealing with unpredictable, large scale terrorism attacks
such as that on 9/11.
The final section analyzes aspects of the organizational structure, mission,
strategies, tasks and culture of the CIA and FBI at the time of the 1993 attack
because these two organizations were critical in counterterrorism efforts at that time
and are key agencies in homeland security efforts today. The CIA and FBI
represented hierarchical government organizations that had difficulty implementing
large scale changes and adapting to the new threat environment of the post Cold War
era, which required them to coordinate their efforts with other government agencies.
In this lens, organizations are seen as open systems in which they are both shaped by,
and seek to shape, the environment in which they exist. 4

4
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This approach maintains that organizations are in constant interaction with
their environments, that organization boundaries are permeable, and that
organizations both consume resources and export resources to the outside world. 5
The affect of the environment on federal government organizations is clearly seen in
this case, not only because organizations were adapting to a Post Cold War era, but
also, to the revolution occurring in public management at that time, known as New
Public Management and the reinvention of government.

Terrorism as a Network
In this lens, terrorism is defined and conceptualized as a network of loosely
linked organizations and individuals that are constantly evolving and adapting to the
threat environment in which they operate. Terrorist organizations, like other types of
organizations, adapt their organizational structures to external conditions, as well as,
to their designated goals. Terrorist organizations face significant challenges in
maintaining their operations secret, thus they must always be scanning the
environment to ensure their plans and operations are not thwarted by security forces.
Further, as law enforcement, intelligence and military operations have successfully
found and captured operatives in terrorist organizations, these groups have had to
find new ways to evade authority, to become more adaptable and resilient, and to

Scott, W. Richard. (2003). Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems. (5 th Ed.).New
Jersey: Prentice Hall.
5
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ensure their organization would survive if the main leaders were captured or killed. 6
Thus, they must always consider external conditions such as access to operatives and
resources, danger of exposure or capture, ease of access to a targets, and time
restrictions. As a result, al Qaeda and its affiliates have evolved over the past twenty
years from a hierarchical structure into one which consists of more loosely linked
network structures to survive in a constantly changing threat environment. 7
In the past, terrorist organizations were hierarchical in.structure and often
operated within specific nation states and regions as seen with the Basques in Spain
or Hezbollah in Lebanon. 8 In addition, often these groups were given support,
training and sanctuary by state sponsors. Today's terrorist network is often self
supporting through criminal activities, fund raising, and established business
enterprises. 9 Finally, Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network is also different than past
groups because it is larger, more ethnically diverse, more geographically dispersed,
younger, richer, better educated, and more militarily trained and combat experienced
than the terrorist groups of the past. 10 As a transnational phenomenon Al Qaeda's
infrastructure has proved hard to detect and combat because of its organizational and

6
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operational infrastructure. This was clearly seen with the WTC cell that attacked the
World Trade Center in 1993.

The WTC Terrorist Cell

In this case, the 1993 WTC conspirators were part of a decentralized cell that
was connected to a larger network organization that had similar characteristics as
that described by terrorism scholars, John Arqiliia and David Ronfeldt. In their
study of terrorist organizations, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, define a network as ''a set of
diverse, dispersed nodes that share a set of ideas and interests that are arrayed to act
in a fully 'all-channel' manner. 11 The all channel manner is referring to a type of
network in which information does not flow through a central node, but rather flows
freely in a fully collaborative manner between actors on the network. 12 These
networks have little or no hierarchy or official authority. 13 Also decision making and
operations are decentralized thus tactical operations can be initiated and carried
locally without central leadership. 14
Finally, Arquilla and Ronfeldt described the network organization as having a
decentralized cell structure consisting of a small group of people and a team leader.
The leader is usually the person with the most experience and he or she is
responsible for ensuring the tasks of the cell are carried out and for communicating
11
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and coordinating with other cells. This type of structure was clearly seen in the cell
structure of the Fifth Battalion Liberation Army who carried out the 1993 WTC
attack (see Figure 6).
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was conducted by a small,
autonomous cell associated with the Egyptian terrorist organization, Islamic Jihad
which was associated with Al Qaeda. The Fifth Battalion Liberation Army, who
claimed responsibility for the attack, was more than a locally oriented political
organization that engaged in acts of terror. This group was directly linked to Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Group in the U.S., which
was part of the Islamic fundamentalist movement headed by al Qaeda. Rohan
Gunaratna, an expert on Al Qaeda's organization and history, noted that the Islamic
Group of Egypt merged with Al Qaeda at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
and functioned almost as one organization.IS Al Qaeda has pursued its objectives
through a network of cells, associate terrorist and guerilla groups, and other affiliated
organizations and has shared expertise, transferred resources, discussed strategy, and
conducted joint operations with some or all ofthem. 16 The Liberation Army Fifth
Battalion was part of a complex, adaptive terrorist network of loosely structured
organizations that worked across national borders to promote regional and global
ambitions primarily through violence and surprise attacks.
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Figure 6: The Fifth Battalion Liberation Army Cell

TheWTC
Cell

Cell Leader

The cell structure of the Fifth Battalion Liberation Anny represented the all
channel network which had a clear leader, Ramzi Yousef, who directed the efforts of
the others. This free flow of information was achieved because the actors were
friends or trusted associates that had formed strong social bonds; the actors worked
and lived in close proximity thus coordination was made easier; and the actors had
access to telephones and communication systems that allowed them to share
intelligence, acquire supplies, coordinate their activities, and achieve their goals
without being detected by law enforcement or intelligence officials.

320
The WTC cell, like all organizations, was constructed deliberately to seek
specific goals. 17 In this case the Fifth Battalion Liberation Army was an organization
which was created to coordinate the activity of individuals who sought to destroy the
World Trade Center and kill tens of thousands of people. Though this cell was
completely autonomous from the larger worldwide jihadist movement of Al Qaeda
that had been created in 1989 by Osama bin Laden, they were linked by a
commitment to the philosophy espoused by Qutb.
This organization was a terrorist cell that consisted of the following
individuals: Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed Abouhalima, Eyyad Ismoil, Mohammed
Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Abdul Rahman Yasin, and Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj. Like
all organizations, the individuals in this group had specific tasks and functions that
they completed in the planning and operations phases of this incident. Table 5 in the
following pages summarizes the roles and tasks of each of the cell members, as well
as, their background and links to one another. For this case, the data on the links and
nodes for the WTC cell was available though court records and other government
documents.

17
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Table 5: WTC Cell Members Tasks and Background18
Member Name

Tasks/Role

Background

Ramzi Yousef

-Mastermind; Team Leader, Expert
-Bomb maker
-Purchased bomb making materials,
construct 1500 lb bomb by mixing a
broad range of chemicals;
-Recruited members of the team through
the New Jersey Mosque of Rahman
-Recruited friends, Ismoil and Ajaj to
assist with bomb making
-Coordinated efforts with other
terrorists as demonstrated with hundreds
of phone calls to terror contacts in
Pakistan, Middle East and Philippines
-Coordinated efforts with phone calls to
Rahman
-Drove in the van carrying the bomb on
2/26/93 and identified location in the B2 level of WTC that was to do the most
damage
-Coordinated financial network and
obtained funds from Osama bin Laden
and uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammed
-Escape overseas and continue to plan
and conduct operations until he was
captured in 1995.

Born in 1968 in Kuwait to a
family of mixed Pakistani and
Palestinian heritage
-Were refugees of the 1967
Arab Israeli War
-Yousef s father a member of a
PLO sect
-Student of electrical
engineering at Swansea
University where he joined the
Muslim Brotherhood.
-Attended the training camps
set up by Osama bin Laden to
learn bomb making skills in
Peshawar where he met
Rahman and Abouhalima.
-In early 1991, Yousef tried to
make contact with the terrorist
group, Abu Sayyaf in the
Philippines to discuss using this
region as a launching pad for a
worldwide terror campaign;
Yousef claimed to come on
behalf of Rahman.

Eyadlsmoil

-Drove van filled with explosives to
WTC complex on 2/26/93 with Yousef
-Friend of Yousef that was called in at
the last minute to drive van
-Was to assist Yousef with bomb
making but was arrested by INS at JFK
with a fraudulent Swedish passport
-Carried the bomb making kit in
suitcase of his notes on explosives,
bomb making manuals, and formula
used by the conspirators

AhmadAjaj

18

Born 1966 in the Palestinian
West Bank whose family had to
flee after the Arab-Israeli War
-April, 1992 received training
in explosives at a training camp
in Pakistan set up by Osama bin
Laden.
-Learned to build bombs from
Yousef

Information for Table 5 is summarized from Chapter.s 3 and 4 and uses those same sources of information.
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Table 5: WTC Cell Member Tasks and Background
Member Name

Tasks/Role

Background

Mahmmed Salameh

-Helped mix the chemicals for the bomb
-Acquired the necessary resources to
carry out the attack including the
rented van that carried the bomb, the
rented storage locker for storing
chemicals used in the bomb, and
apartments where bomb was assembled
-Drove the get away car after bombing
-Drove other members to airport for
escape
-Set up bank account for operation
-Conducted surveillance missions with
Ayyad
-Fall guy to be left behind so others
could escape

Mahmud
Abouhalima

-Helped mix chemicals for explosives
used in bomb
-Helped move chemicals from storage
area to bomb making factory or
apartment on Pamprapo Ave.
-Drove in get away car
-Radicalized other as a vociferous
advocate of the struggle against Middle
East governments, and US policies
-Driver for Rahman from 1990-93

Abdul Yasin

-Helped obtain and mix chemicals
-Taught Salameh how to drive van
-Gave FBI info. on case and releases
-Still a fugitive

-Born in 1968 in Amman,
Jordan to Palestinian parents
who were refugees of the ArabIsraeli War
-Came to US in 1988 and did
menialjobs. Was illegal
immigrant at time of bombing
-Close associate of El Sayyid
Norsair who was associated
with the assassination of Rabbi
Kahane in 1990
-Follower of Rahman at the
New Jersey mosque
-Close friends with Ayyad,
Abouhalima and Norsair.
-Provided training in weapons
and guerrilla warfare by Ali
Mohamed
-Born in 1959 in Egypt where
he grew up in poverty
-As a teen joined the Islamic
Group with Rahman as its
leader in Egypt.
-Entered the US in 1985 on a
tourist visa and was given
amnesty in 1986
-Drove taxis in NYC
-Raised money and recruited
young Muslims out of the MAK
office in Brooklyn for the
Afghan mujahidin
-Late 1980's went to Peshawar
and was trained in guerrilla
warfare and fought in the Soviet
Afghan War
-Met Yousef and Rahman in
Peshawar
-Follower of Rahman at mosque
in Jersey City
-Born in 1960 in Indiana to
Iraqi parents; most of his life
lived in Iraq
-Recruited by Yousef in 1992.
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Table 5: WTC Cell Member Tasks and Backgrounds
Member Name
Nida/Ayyad

Tasks/Role

Background

-Set up joint bank account with Salameh
to be used to finance operations. Funds
were received from Muslim
Brotherhood supporters in Iran, Egypt
and Saudi Arabia and Europe
-Helped build bomb since he had
expertise from his education
-Purchased restricted chemicals to make
nitroglycerine thru his job at Allied
Signal
-Conducted surveillance operations with
Salameh and went with him to rent van
-Submitted the letter of the 5ht BN
Liberation Army to New York Times
claiming responsibility for attack

-Born in 1969 in Kuwait to
Palestinian parents who were
refugees from the 1967 War.
-Graduate of Rutgers in
chemical engineering
-Employed as a research
engineer at Allied Signal
-Friend of Salameh, Nosair and
Abouhalima
-Follower of Rahman

Understanding how a terror cell is organized and how these individuals
conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. It is apparent that
terrorist operations involve more than simply employing weapons to produce their
physical and psychological effects. Recruiting, training, information gathering,
assessment and planning, coordination, logistics and command capabilities all play a
role in delivering the terrorist's weapon to its intended target with deadly effect.
In order to be effective in deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, it is critical that
government organizations responsible for homeland security understand how
terrorist networks are formed and structured so counterterrorism and antiterrorism
strategies can be developed and implemented.
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The WTC Cell as a Social Network

Marc Sageman, who studied Al Qaeda as a social network, described hub
leaders, such as Ramzi Yousef and Sheik Rahman, as dynamic, outdoing
personalities with extensive social reach. 19 These individuals, according to
Sageman, are able to attract recruits and help guide them to the training necessary to
participate in jihad. In this case, Ramzi Yousef was the clear mastermind and team
leader of the cell because of his technical expertise in bomb making, as well as, his
social connections to other leaders within the larger jihadist network including Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman and Khalid Sheik Mohammad. Yousef recruited the members
of this cell through the New Jersey and New York mosques in which Rahman
preached, and provided direct training in bomb building.
Sheik Rahman was a key link between the WTC cell and the larger jihadist
network. As the spiritual leader of the Islamic Group in the U.S., Rahman recruited
individuals and incited followers to wage jihad against the U.S. through his sermons
and writings. In affect, Yousef and Rahman served as the "ideological espousers"
and watchdogs-ensuring that everyone maintained the ideological fervor necessary
for the success of the cell and its broader networked organization. 20 This was a
critical responsibility because it ensured cell members retained similar goals, aims

19

See Sageman, Marc. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Chapter 5.
20
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and beliefs which was critical for their success absent the top-down authority of a
hierarchical organization.
Sageman, not only, analyzed the role of hub leaders in his study, but also,
how terrorists act on the ground, how they interact with other terrorists and nonterrorists, how they join terrorist groups, and how they become motivated to commit
their atrocities. 21 Sageman argued that the process of joining the jihad is a three
prong process: "social affiliation with jihad accomplished through friendship,
kinship, and discipleship; progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to
acceptance of the global Salafi jihad ideology; and formal acceptance to the jihad
through the encounter of a link to jihad."22 The most critical element in this process
is the social bonds that are created and which provide members social and emotional
support, development of a common identity and encouragement to adopt a new faith.
In this case, the WTC conspirators joined the jihad as described by Sageman.
First, the initial cell, which consisted of Nosair, Ayyad, Salameh, and Abouhalima,
were friends and followers of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Second, Abouhalima,
Ajaj and Yousef were further radicalized in the jihadist ideology through the training
and shared experiences they had during the Soviet Afghan War. Third, Nosair
heavily influenced his friends, Salameh and Ayyad, to continue the jihad against
Americans after being convicted for crimes associated with the assassination of
Rabbi Kahane in 1990. Fourth, Yousef and Abouhalima had long histories of
21
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association with the Muslim Brotherhood and Sheik Rahman before the attack and
had accepted of the global Salafijihad ideology preached by Qutb and Rahman. In
addition, Yousef recruited usually people for his operations who were friends, such
as Ajaj, Yasin, and Ismoil, and those who were known to be trusted followers of
Sheik Rahman--Ayyad, Salameh, and Abouhalima. To build a 1,500 pound bomb
took a great deal of cooperation, coordination and commitment. The individuals
worked with hazardous chemicals and explosives over a period of months in a small,
cramped apartment. To complete this operation required strong social bonds
between the individuals, and a commitment to the ideology of Qutbism and the
strategic objectives of Al Qaeda and Islamic Group.

WTC Cell Link to the Worldwide Jihadist Network

This group was linked to Al Qaeda through Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who
was the spiritual leader of the Islamic Group in the U.S. from 1990 to 1994. Before
coming to the U.S. in 1990, Rahman had been the spiritual leader of the Afghan
Arabs fighting in Afghanistan and had forged a friendship and alliance with Osama
bin Laden. Following the Soviet-Afghan War, Al Qaeda encouraged the
development of terror networks that arose spontaneously and locally with funding,
training, and sometimes weaponry. 23 In addition, Yousef was linked to Al Qaeda
through his uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammad who later became the mastermind of the
9/11 plot. In addition, a number of the WTC conspirators were trained in small arms
23
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and guerrilla warfare prior to the 1993 attack by Ali Mohamed, a known trainer for
Al Qaeda. These links of the WTC bombing cell to members of Al Qaeda are seen
in Figure 7. 24 The roles and backgrounds of the other key members of this network
are described in Table 6.
Figure 7: World Trade Center Bombing Links

TheWTCCe/1

Spiritual Leader

Khalid Sheik Mohammed
Yousef Uncle
9/11 Mastermind

24

Links based in part of the analysis completed by J.L. Boesen, a CIA analyst in the 1990's. A more
complete chart can be found in: Lance, Peter. (2006). Triple Cross. New York: Regan. 243. Also see
Statement of SA Mary Deborah Doran of the FBI-New York Office. Before the 9/11/2001
Commission on June 16, 2004 where she describes the links between Yousef, KSM, and bin Laden.
At:http://www.9-l1commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/doran statement.pdf. [accessed 2 March 08].
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Table 6: WTC Bombing Links: Description of Key Players
Member Name
Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman 25

Ali Mohamed 26

Khalid Sheik
Mohammed 27

25

Tasks/Role

Background

-Leader oflslamic Group in the US
-Spiritual leader who radicalized young
men in Qutbism through his preaching
at the mosques in Jersey City &
Brooklyn
-incited followers to wage jihad against
the US
-Called Yousef in August 1992 to.
become leader of WTC Cell
-Speeches and sermons used for
propaganda and to recruit followers
Allied himself with bin Laden
And became the spiritual leader of al
Qaeda after war
-Convicted of seditious conspiracy in
Oct. 1995 for NY Landmarks Plot
-Provided training in weapons, guerrilla
warfare, surveillance, explosives to cell
members-Abouhalima, Ayyad, and
Ayyad in 1989
-Served as a spy of Al Qaeda in the
1990's
-Wrote the Al Qaeda training manual
-Stole key training and troop
deployment documents from Fort Bragg
-Provide training and assistance to
Somali warlords to oppose US
intervention in 1993
-Plan and conduct US embassy
bombings in 1998 in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam

-Born in 1938 in Egypt to a
poor family
-Graduated from Cairo
University and became a
teacher and cleric
-Joined the Muslim
Brotherhood and later the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad which
assassinated Sadat
-Was spiritual leader of Afghan
Arabs during Soviet Afghan
War where he helped recruit
people for the cause

-Uncle ofRamzi Yousef who provided
advice and funds for WTC bombing
-In 1994 plotted with Yousef to blow up
US airplanes as part of the Bojinka Plot
-Planned the 9/11 operation with Yousef
-Joined al Qaeda in 1998

-Member of Egyptian Islamic
Jihad led by Zawahiri
-as a former Egyptian Special
Forces officer training nonAfghan volunteers in afghan
Soviet War
-Befriended bin Laden and
served as his personal aid
through the 1990s;
-set up training camps for bin
Laden after war

-Born and raised in Kuwait in
1965; Joined Muslim
Brotherhood at 16
-Fought in Soviet-Afghan War
-KSM planned and handled
logistic for WTC conspirators

Information based on that found in Chapter 4 using those references.
Information on indictment United States ofAmerica v Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed. September, 1998. Located at:
www.intelwire.com. [accessed 2 March 08].
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Table 6: WTC Bombing Links: Description of Key Players
Member Name

Tasks/Role

Background

Osama bin Laden 28

-Leader and founder of Al Qaeda
-In 1980's fought in the Afghan-Soviet
War and set up training and recruiting
centers for the mujahideen
-Formed Al Qaeda following the War
-Provided funds to the WTC cell
-Wanted for numerous attacks on the
US at home and abroad
-In addition to the September 11th
attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, al-Qaeda's anti-American
attacks include the 1998 embassy
bombings in Africa and the 2000 attack
on the USS Cole in Yemen.

Ayman al-Zawahiri 29

-Al-Zawahiri is the founder and leader
of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which seeks
to overthrow the secular Egyptian
Government through violent means
Primary goals today have merged with
those of al-Qaeda, to include attacks on
US and Israeli interests ..

Throughout the 90s, al-Qaeda
provided its affiliated groups
with financing and training
primarily through its bases in
Sudan and Afghanistan. Some
10,000 recruits are thought to
have passed through the
training camps there. Most of
al-Qaeda's members are
veterans of insurgencies and
terrorist campaigns in
Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kashmir,
Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon,
Nagomo-Karabakh, Algeria,
and Egypt.
Born in Egypt in 1953. After
the 1967 war with Israel, alZawahiri became radicalized
and at the age of fourteen he
joined the Muslim Brotherhood.
Two years later he moved on to
join Islamic Jihad. Due to
domestic pressures, he moved
to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s
where he met with the fledgling
al-Qaeda organization and
helped to develop its structure

-A physician, Al Zawahiri is be serving
as both an advisor and doctor to Usama
Bin Laden in Afghanistan
-Provides speeches as a form of
propaganda

27
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In this case, it is clear that the terrorist organization involved was an all
channel network structure that was part of a larger worldwide network of terrorist
organizations dedicated to a radical Islamist ideology. Thus, the challenge for the
federal government was designing the appropriate organizational structure to combat
this terrorist threat and new terrorist threats in the future.

Organizing for Homeland Security
The issue of homeland security is one of many complex problems that must
be addressed by our elected leaders and government organizations at the local, state
and federal level. The coordinated execution of agreed upon policies in homeland
security is the responsibility of a vast network of government agencies, non profit
organizations, and private enterprise working in a concerted effort to prevent, deter,
and respond to terrorist attacks within the U.S. In the field of public administration
there have been a number of fundamental intellectual and practical approaches to
integrating and organizing the function of public administration in the American
system of governance. Among the most enduring models of organizing is the
hierarchical model of governance.

Bureaucratic Structure of the FBI and FDNY
Bureaucratic organizational structures have been the primary design for
government organizations including those involved in this case, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Fire Department of New York. In general to be

331
considered a bureaucracy, an administrative structure must exhibit several basic
characteristics which include: (1) clearly defined objectives; (2) a formal structure
underlying the process and tying together the various component organizations; (3) a
division of labor; (4) set policies and procedures guiding organizational activity; and
(5) a clear chain of command and authority. 30 The FBI certainly had the above
characteristics during the 1990's.
The FBI was the principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice
whose investigative jurisdiction encompassed more than 200 federal laws, including
civil rights, counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, organized crime and
violent crime.31 The FBI's basic authority is drawn from Title 28, U.S. Code,
Section 533, which authorized the Attorney General to "appoint officials to
detect...crimes against the United States. "32 It is pursuant to this clause th~t the FBI
performs most of its work--namely, investigating persons or incidents when there is
reason to believe that a federal crime has been or is likely to be committed. 33
The FBI had a clear hierarchical structure, in which, at the top of the
organization is the Director who was appointed by the President with the advice and

30
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Rourke, Francis E. (1984). Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy. 3d ed. Boston: Little Brown and
Company. Fesler, James W. and Donald Kettl. (1991). The Politics ofAdministrative Process.
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
31
Department of Justice. (September 30, 1996). Office ofthe Inspector General Semiannual Report to
Congress. At: www.doj.gov. [accessed 2 March 08].
32

33

Ibid.
Ibid.

332
consent of the U.S. Senate. 34 Besides the Director, the headquarters,had four main
directorates under which all of its activities are organized. These include the Director
for Intelligence, Director for Counterterrorism, Director for Law Enforcement and
Director for Administration. 35 FBI Headquarters established organizational direction
and priorities, and ensured that the organization is serving its mission in an effective
way while overseeing and managing the field's implementation of priorities through
investigations and operations. 36
Special Agents-In-Charge (SACs) who are the leaders of the 56 field offices,
SACs reported directly to the FBI director. SACs collected information on the
performance of their field offices and passed it up to headquarters. In addition,
SACs played a critical role as a liaison between Headquarters and state and local
government and law enforcement agencies. Each of the 56 field offices was engaged
in investigative and operational activities that supported the programs around which
FBI Headquarters was organized. Nationwide, the FBI conducted its investigations
and operations through 56 Field Offices and over 400 "resident agencies," smaller
offices geographically dispersed around the country which reported to one of the
larger 56 field offices. Each of the field offices had special agents that perform the
basic work directly related to the production of law enforcement and intelligence
services. Agents were sworn law enforcement officers who carry a badge and

34
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weapon and were authorized to make arrests for many federal crimes. The tasks and
functions of the special agents involved in the TRADEBOM case were highlighted
in chapter three.
The Fire Department of New York also was organized in a classic
bureaucratic structure. The Fire Department of New York, like most fire
departments, had a paramilitary structure that possessed rigid lines of authority and a
clear chain of command, a clear division of labor between line and staff functions,
and a comprehensive set of standards procedures and polices that guided all aspects
of the work performed. The Fire Department of New York was lead by a civilian
fire commissioner who was in charge of the department and a Fire Chief who was
the operational lead. The executive staff of FDNY included additional civilian fire
commissioners who were responsible for bureaus within the department, along with
Chiefs of Fire Operations, EMS Command, Fire Prevention, Training,
Communications, and Safety and Inspection Services. 37 Under the Chief of Fire
Operations there were five borough chiefs, each responsible for the five political
jurisdictions within the city. Below the borough, are divisions and battalions that
were strategically placed throughout the city. A battalion consisted of a collection of
FDNY resources or units such as engine or ladder companies that were responsible
for a geographical area of the city.

37

Fire Department New York. (2007). FDNY Strategic Plan. At:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/general/strat plan 2007.shtml. [accessed 10 April 08].

334
The primary responsibilities of FDNY included traditional fire fighting and
providing pre-hospital care, as well as, handling all types of public safety
emergencies, such as, hazardous materials, building collapses, transportation
accidents, natural disasters, and acts of terrorism in New York City. 38
In the WTC case, FDNY was a first responder that was responsibl_e for
establishing the incident command system to organize the fire suppression, search
and rescue, and evacuation efforts in this case. The incident command system is a
well defined, formal, rigid and predictable system of roles and actions designed to
facilitate rational reaction in a highly chaotic circumstance, such as that seen in the
response by FDNY in the 1993 WTC bombing.

Incident Command Systems: Effectiveness of Hierarchical Networks
The study of organizations largely continues to treat networks and hierarchies
as distinct social forms of coordination, but hierarchical networks as represented by
the Incident Command System (ICS) have been a matter of practice for at least 30
years in fighting forest fires. 39 The strength of the network is clearly seen with the
incident command system that is utilized by all levels of government to facilitate
near term and long term operations for a wide variety of emergencies such as
wildfires, terrorist attacks, and flooding incidents. The Incident Command System
or JCS is defined as "a standardized on-scene emergency management construct
38
39
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specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational
structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents,
without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is a combination of
facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures and communications operating within a
common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources
during incidents."40 ICS essentially created a simple command and control system
within which staff from different agencies should be placed. Structurally, the ICS
organizes functions by critical management systems: planning, operations, logistics,
and administration/finance. 41 Each function reports to a single commander who has
decision making power for ICS. The structure of the ICS is seen in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Basic Structure of the Incident Command System

While there are many different elements of an JCS, there are three critical
features that are always present. First, there is a designated chain of command. The
40
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ICS comes together around a problem in which there is one normally pers~n who is
in charge. Second, the ICS is modular, thus pieces of various organizations can be
placed under its command structure as needed. Third, the ICS allows for the prepositioning of supplies and equipment for different emergency situations so scarce
resources can be mobilized to the maximum extent possible. These characteristics of
the ICS were clearly seen in the WTC case. In the WTC bombing in 1993, the New
York City Fire Department was very effective in managing this crisis because they
utilized the Incident Command System.
The City ofNew York Fire Department had responded hundreds of times to
the World Trade Center for minor fires and false alarms since it was first occupied in
1970.42 The bombing on February 26, 1993, however, was the largest incident ever
handled by FDNY until the attacks in 2001 on the same buildings. A 1,500 pound
nitrourea bomb wasdetonated in the B-2 level of the parking garage, causing
massive destruction that spanned seven levels, six below grade. The blast crater was
130 feet wide by 150 feet long and had caused massive damage to the B-2 level. 43
The blast also caused damage to the heating and cooling, electrical, and sprinkler
systems and shut down all elevators in the two towers. Those working in the
affected buildings immediately began to notice the thick, black smoke that was
blowing up the elevator shafts and into their work areas. Evacuation of the buildings
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was made more difficult by the lack of lighting both in the hallways and in the
stairways, and the lack of operational elevators.
The first firefighters to arrive from Engine 6, had to struggle over collapsed
debris and walls, under downed pipes, around burning vehicles, over crushed cars,
and through thick, oily black smoke to get their hoses to the primary fire within the
crater. 44 The smoke and soot from the hundreds of burning vehicles travelled up the
towers through the breached elevator shafts to the upper levels thus forcing an
evacuation and rescue operation. Other responding units immediately began
assisting in fire suppression, and rescue and evacuation operations. FDNY ultimately
responded to the incident with 84 engine companies, 60 truck companies, 28
battalion chiefs, nine deputy chiefs, and five rescue companies and 26 other special
units (representing nearly 45% of the on-duty staff at FDNY. To manage the search
and rescue operations and fire suppression efforts a command post was immediately
established and JCS was implemented.
Despite the complexity of this large scale operation, the command structure
implemented by Chief Fusco followed the JCS model and provided control,
supervision, and coordination (See figure 9). It likewise fixed accountability for
specific tasks necessary to achieve the tactical objectives in each sector. First, Chief
Fusco, established a command post from which to operate. Second, Chief Fusco
divided the command into manageable segments by sector. These sectors were
44
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Tower 1, Tower 2, Vista Hotel, and Below Grade Areas (garage levels where
explosion occurred). The sector commanders were Battalion Chiefs who ran their
own operations but reported their progress, problems, and needs to the command
post. The command post then provided necessary personnel and equipment,
developed strategy, and liaison with other first responders. Like all hierarchical
structures, this ensured accountability, provided a clear chain of communication and
command, and ensured implementation of command strategies and objectives.
Third, to track resources for the incident, a status board was established. The
status board is a feature of all command posts and in this case it was used to account
for units operating, relieved, or staged for this incident. Finally, Chief Fusco
established a liaison officer to coordinate the efforts of FDNY with the
representatives from other government agencies including the Office of Emergency
Management, New York Police Department, Port Authority Police, and NYC
Emergency Medical Services.
In this case, FDNY implemented ICS effectively and efficiently despite the
large scale nature of the event. The operation put out multiple fires, rescued 1,042
injured individuals, evacuated about 50,000 people from three buildings making up
the WTC complex, and coordinated the personnel and equipment of nearly 45% of
the on-duty staff of FDNY over a period of eleven hours. Critics of ICS would argue
that FDNY was successful because "ICS functions best when it is directed at a well
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defined, reasonable consistent or clear prioritized set of purposes."45 In the WTC
case, the FDNY was faced with a disaster that fit the tasks and functions of their day
to day work-namely putting out fires, and conducting search and rescue operations.

Figure 9: FDNY JCS Command Structure46

Significant Aspects of Command Structure
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Despite the successful use ofICS in this case, coordination and
communication were a problem because of the large scale nature of the event.
Among the greatest challenges the Incident Commander faced was in
communicating among units and in coordinating the large scale operation. Chief
Fusko reported that fire department communications were severely stressed in the
1993 WTC incident and that tactical channels were overloaded and ineffective, thus
messengers were used to relay information between sector chiefs and the Incident
Commander.47 In addition, interaction and coordination with other agencies, such as
the New York Police Department, was difficult because interagency protocols were
not followed.
The most serious weakness identified by Chief Fusko about the JCS was that
this command structure had one person managing the incident yet large scale
incidents are beyond the capability of one person to handle effectively. Fusko wrote,
"The incident commander at a major incident has a dual problem: information
overload-too much information coming in and very little or not enough time to
evaluate and act in a timely fashion-and too many chiefs and officials demanding
attention."48 To overcome this barrier, Fusco recommended assigning another staff
chief to assist the incident commander. Chief Fusco in this case is describing one of
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the primary failures of the bureaucratic approach is that of decentralized knowledge
and centralized decision making.
Bureaucratic management systems rely heavily on group decision making
because roles are formalized and knowledge is highly codified, creating a system in
which people are experts in their limited role in the process. 49 This creates the
necessity for knowledge sharing via meetings, command posts, or other
communication tools. While this knowledge sharing helps reduce uncertainty, it also .
requires large amounts of time and effort. The heavy reliance on knowledge sharing
hinders the system's ability to take swift and decisive action. 50 In addition, the
bureaucratic model is based on centralized decision making which is dependent on
open lines of communication, which is often difficult to achieve in large scale
disaster situations. 51 In short, the heavy reliance on centralized decision making and
decentralization of the process or operation are barriers to a swift analysis and
implementation of new information and situations that are often common in complex
environments.
Cyert and March characterized a complex environment as one that includes
rapid change, high volumes of information, high levels of uncertainty, increasing
interrelatedness of parts within the system, diverse assumptions and perspectives,
and continuous new information driving changes in the fundamental structure of the
49
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organizations and institutions involved. 52 A complex environment was the opposite
of a deterministic, predictable and controllable state of affairs. 53 It was, instead, a
system of relationships weaving together, merging, changing, degenerating and
evolving. 54 Thus, a more holistic and organic network structure that is able to
function more effectively in complex, unstable environments should be considered as
a structural approach for managing emergencies in response to large scale terrorism
attacks such as that seen on 9/11. 55
Though the attack on the WTC in 1993, was an event that could largely be
managed by local government organizations and the FBI using ICS, there are
significant weaknesses in the traditional ICS structures that may impact future
response efforts in homeland security.

Weaknesses ofJCS for Homeland Security
ICS is intended to be flexible and widely applicable to different types of
emergencies of different lengths and involving different disciplines. However, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has warned that in certain instances ICS
may have to be adapted: "Acts of biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear
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terrorism represent particular challenges for the traditional JCS structure. Events that
are not site specific, are geographically dispersed, or evolve over longer periods of
time will require extraordinary coordination between federal, state, local, tribal,
private sector, and non-governmental organizations."56 Critics ofICS have expressed
similar concern as DHS on the ability for ICS to effectively coordinate between
organizations and levels of government responding to large scale disasters. In the
1993 WTC case, FDNY largely had to coordinate the efforts of its own organization
with that of other city government organizations.
Based on a number of field investigations of emergency responses done by
the Disaster Research Center (DRC), Wenger, Quarantelli and Dynes concluded that
the ICS might contribute to difficulties in managing disasters. In their view,
implementation ofICS often: (1) meant only that someone took charge of the
disaster site, without using all the mechanisms designed to facilitate site
management; (2) the shifting of command from the initial responder to high level
staff often led to loss of control over the situation; (3) ICS was weak in interorganizational coordination-- for instance, separate command posts were established
by police and fire organizations as in the WTC case, and coordination was even
worse with local emergency management, relief agencies, and volunteers; (4) ICS
was not a panacea for solving communications and intra-organizational problems
and conflicts; (5) unless they had prior experience working with each other, ICS did
56
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not solve problems in incidents involving mutual aid providers and; (7) the command
and control model oflCS did not really work in dealing with civilian organizations.57
They concluded that the "social complexity of disaster occasions preclude the
application of one organizational model to a response which is multi-organizational
in nature."58

Inter-organizational coordination is further hindered by the

fundamental differences in the structure, culture, tasks, and standard operating
procedures of those organizations participating in the ICS. The fundamental
organizational differences between law enforcement, military, and fire service
agencies, and non profit organizations can have a profound impact on their ability to
interact effectively. 59
In addition, the effectiveness of an ICS is contingent on it being utilized to
address problems that are known and that reoccur such as floods and forest fires. 60
The predictability of the problem allows organizations to create strategic plans
during the preparedness and mitigation phases of disasters. However, ICS has
shown to be less effective when it is used against problems that are neither known
nor predictable as we have seen with the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center. Buck, Trainor and Aguirre concluded from their research on the
effectiveness of ICS that it works well when official responders have trained in ICS
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and have a strong sense of community. 61 They wrote, "Many social demands
produced by disasters are too complex and unexpected to be handled by ICS. The
command and control model does not currently, and given the social complexity
likely never will work for all phases of disaster operations."62
Chief Fusco echoed this sentiment in his after action review of the WTC
bombing in 1993 when he complained that cooperation and coordination between
agencies was difficult because interagency protocols were not followed. Fusco
recommended that more drills and training were needed because "during drills,
friendships will be established and maintained, and a deeper understanding of the
other agencies' roles will lead to better interaction during emergencies."63
At the time of both the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center,
ICS was not unified in New York City because NYPD and FDNY had separate
command and control systems which ran parallel to one another in an emergency and
were connected only via liaisons. 64 In fact, FDNY and NYPD rarely coordinated
command and control functions in emergencies which required both groups of first
responders; the result on 9/11 was that important information on the structural
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integrity of the towers form airborne police units never reached the Incident
Commander.65
ICS represents one type of network that is critical in our crisis and
consequence management efforts in homeland security. Yet, all of the preconditions
that make ICS work tend to be absent in many disasters which cross state, regional
and international boundaries, involve many diverse communities, multiple state
agencies, and organizations that may have never worked or trained together. The
threat of catastrophic terrorism requires that we rethink our organizational strategies
for responding to such attacks and identify new ways of coordinating our efforts such
as that represent by network governance structures. New forms of network
structures will need to be created to effectively prevent, deter and respond to terror
attacks in the future. Further research is needed to identify the most effective
network form that should be developed to coordinate the national,
intergovernmental, multi-sector, multi-organizational, and community based
emergency management network.

Network Structures in Homeland Security

In this lens, homeland security is seen as a wicked problem that requires
government organizations to work collaboratively within a network structure with

one another, as well as, with private and non profit organizations to be effective in
deterring and preventing terrorism and responding to attacks when they do occur.
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Collaborative networks are appropriate devices to tackle public management
problems like terrorism. Terrorism is typical of many of the challenges government
has faced. The problem not only spans across multiple nations, but also, spans
bureaucratic jurisdictions within the U.S. The leadership structure of terrorist
organizations is often ambiguous, and terrorists constantly change their methods and
targets; thus the solution is not likely to be found in bureaucratic routines. The
solutions to the problem exist in many disparate pieces of government, all of which
have other important, nonterrorist missions. Ultimately our ability to prevent and
deter terrorism and effectively respond to attacks depends on how effectively we
organize for homeland security. Because networks are seen as flexible, loosely
coupled structures made of autonomous actors, that are "lighter on their feet than
hierarchies" they seemed to be the solution for many social, economic and political
problems societies faced at the end of the 20th century. 66
In this case, network models of governance were not used as they are
understood today because network structures were a relatively new phenomenon in
public administration during the early 1990's. In fact, the concept of network
governance structures was just beginning to be discussed in the academic literature
in the field of public administration in the early 1990's, but the concept was not
prevalent among practitioners in the field.
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Research on network management and network structures in public
management grew primarily out of research on intergovernmental relations in the
1980s' and 1990's. Intergovernmental scholars saw networking as a method of
management to incorporate the complex horizontal and vertical relations necessary
to deliver intergovernmental programs effectively. 67 By the late 1980's academics
were defining typologies and characteristics of networks based on field work and indepth case studies. 68 Networks were studied in public management to understand
how networks functioned, to identify what skills were used in networks versus
hierarchical organizations by managers, and to analyze the impact networks had on
decision making, policy outputs and outcomes, and democratic values of
governance. 69
By the mid 1990's, network research was more evident in public
administration journals and was fueled, in part, by concern over government
reinvention and the hollowing out of the state (with more workers on private and non
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profit payrolls to actually deliver services). 70 According to Milward, the hollow state
refers "to a general-purpose unit of government that relies extensively on contracts
with third parties (non profits, firms or public agencies) to deliver services to
citizens. " 71 In the hollow state, there is a general reliance on contractual networks
rather than hierarchies or markets to deliver government funded services. The New
Public Management movement and reinvention of government, not only, encouraged
new structures for the delivery of services, but also, fundamentally altered tasks,
functions and processes within government organizations.

Impact ofNew Public Management on Government Organizations
During the Post Cold war era of the 1990's, the U.S. was undergoing
significant changes in its foreign and domestic policies as a result of globalization,
the end of the East-West conflict, and advances in communications and computer
technologies. Increasingly the world was becoming interconnected socially,
politically and economically. To better manage increasing organizational
interdependence, government reformers in the early l 990s began to emphasize
process versus the structure of organizations. As Vice President Gore's 1993 report
on reinventing the federal government argued, "in today's world of rapid change,
70
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lightening quick information technologies, tough global competitions, and
demanding customers. Large, top-down bureaucracies-public or private-don't
work well. " 72 Gore further stated that the solution was the creation of entrepreneurial
organizations that were built on four processes: cutting red tape, putting customers
first, empowering employees, decentralizing authority, and re-engineering programs
and processes to produce better government for less. 73 The reinvention movement,
not only, called for large scale bureaucratic reorganization, but also, advocated for
new governance structures such as that represented by a network form as a solution
to particularly complex governing problems.
This idea of reinventing government was made popular by the National
Performance Review (NPR) and the best selling book by Osborne and Gaebler,
Reinventing Government. The National Partnership for Reinventing Government
(NPR), originally the National Performance Review, was the Clinton-Gore
Administration's interagency task force to reform and streamline the way the federal
government works. In creating NPR on March 3, 1993, President Clinton said: "Our
goal is to make the entire federal government less expensive and more efficient, and
to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and
entitlement toward initiative and empowerment."74 NPR was the longest running
reform program in the history of the Federal government, and included large scale
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down sizing of the federal government. For example, the size of the federal
workforce from 1993 to 2000 was reduced by 426,000, making it the smallest it had
been since the Eisenhower administration. 75 In addition, the federal government
eliminated layers of mangers but cutting 78,000 managers.76 Among the government
organizations in this case which were adversely affected by these reinvention efforts
was the CIA.

The Negative Impact of Reinvention on Intelligence .Community
The reinvention of government model of governance was embraced by the
Clinton Administration and had a significant impact on the structure and process of
all federal agencies including those involved with counterterrorism at the time. For
example, the Intelligence Community reported that they had implemented substantial
change in every dimension of its business as part of its re-engineering efforts that
were a result of NPR. 77 As part of the customer focused changes advocated by NPR,
the CIA refocused its activities from gathering intelligence on "Cold War targets" to
emerging priority issues of the 1990's in order to provide greater support to
government organizations such as the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and
Energy. 78
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The CIA underwent massive restructuring as part of its struggle to create a
new, post Cold War identity that was no longer primarily focused on East-West
rivalries but on new and emerging threats from both state and transnational actors.
As part of this transformation, the CIA provided information on the environment,
including hurricanes, floods and environmental pollution, as well as, on economic
and trade issues to government and business organizations. According to Robert
Gates, the CIA was planning in 1992 to devote 40% of its resources to international
economics and only 34% to Russia and other successor states to the Soviet Union. 79
Despite more resources being allocated to global problems such as natural resource
scarcities, economic intelligence and other new areas dealing with global problems,
Gates listed amongst the highest priorities from 1992 to 2005 were intelligence on
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver
them, narcotics, and terrorism. 80
As part of the reinvention efforts the CIA reallocated its resources to new
missions, and restructured major portions of its organization. Much of the
downsizing of the CIA during the 1990's was created by the perception that since the
U.S. had won the Cold War we could cash in on a peace dividend by downsizing
both our military and intelligence organizations. 81
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In addition, to improving processes within the CIA, major restructuring was
completed in one third of the organization, which included downsizing nine divisions
and eliminating 15% of its management positions between 1991 and 1994. 82 Also,
from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to 1995, the CIA underwent a staff reduction
of23ro, reducing its personnel from about 21,000 to 16,000. 83 These personnel
reductions were conducted without any strategic plan to retain the agency's best and
brightest or to realign its skills mix. Rather than weeding out poor performers and
those with outdated areas of expertise, the agency cut its work force solely through
voluntary retirement and attrition. 84 George Tenet, former Director of Central
Intelligence, wrote that the "supposed peace dividend was devastating to the spy
business at a time when it vitality was needed most."85 Tenet further stated that the
intelligence community lost billions of dollars in funding which resulted in only a
handful of new case officers and intelligence analysts being recruited and trained
each year.
The re-invention efforts of the CIA failed to create a more effective
organization but rather, set it up for future intelligence failures by giving the
organization many new additional requirements for information while budgets and
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staff levels were being reduced. 86 The most damaging shortcoming for the CIA at
this time, according to Tenet, "was a lack of an articulated and well understood
strategy for the agency. We had no coherent, integrated, and measurable long-range
plan."87 As a result, during the 1990s, the CIA had to cover more issues with fewer
resources and little guidance about where to focus their efforts.
The result was an organization that no longer had the resources to adequately
defend America. In 1997 the House Intelligence Committee reported that the CIA
was filled with inexperienced officers unable to speak the languages or understand
the political landscapes of the countries they covered. 88 They concluded that the CIA
lacked the necessary "depth, breadth, and expertise to monitor political, military and
economic developments worldwide."89 Russ Tavers, a career CIA analyst, warned
that the CIA's ability to gather and analyze intelligence was falling apart at the end
of the twentieth century and would lead to failures. Travers wrote, "The Community
could still collect facts but analysis had long ago been overwhelmed by the volume
of available information and were no longer able to distinguish between significant
facts and background noise. The data were there but we failed to recognize fully
their significance ... thus intelligence failure is inevitable."90

In hindsight it is easy to be critical of the CIA for its failure to connect the
dots from the 1993 WTC attacks to the attacks on 9/11. However, during this period
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of time the organization was unable to see the emerging threat posed by those
represented in this case because they were undergoing massive organizational
change and because of the inherent weaknesses of their own perceptual lens that
viewed homeland security as international relations problem that was described in
chapter four.

Absence of Network Governance Structure in this Case
New Public Management advocated, not only, the implementation of new
techniques, but also carried with it a new set ofvalues--a set of values drawn largely
from market economics and business management. Among these values were
customer service, total quality management, performance improvement, and the
belief that businesses organizations are better suited to deliver a wide range of
services and programs than traditional government bureaucracies. As a result,
reinvention efforts led to downsizing within the federal government, to outsourcing
or contracting as a means of delivering government services, and to the
establishment of network governance structures. 91
The traditional model for public services assumed that a single organization
would deliver services in a particular functional area. However over the past twenty
years, instead of organizing, providing and managing services on its own,
government at all levels have increasingly turned to contracting out these services,
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most often to non profit, but sometimes to for-profit, organizations. O'Toole
described these networks as "a pattern of two or more units, in which not all the
major components are encompassed within a single hierarchical array ... Networks
are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts
thereof... The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority
bonds, exchange relations, and coalitions based on common interests."92 Agranoff
described networks of public organizations as involving "formal and informal
structures, composed of representatives from governmental and nongovernmental
agencies working interdependently to exchange information and/or jointly formulate
and implement polices that are usually designed for action through their respective
organizations."93 As these definitions highlight, the central characteristic of a public
management network is the connections among people, programs, and organizations
for the purpose of implementing public policy, such as homeland security.
In the organizational design lens, homeland security is seen as problem of
developing, coordinating and managing networks of government, private and not
profit organizations to prevent, deter and respond to acts of terrorism. At the time of
the 1993 WTC bombing, network governance structures as described by O'Tool and
Agranoff were just being discussed in the academic literature of public
administration but had not been by implemented by practitioners as a means of
92

O'Toole, L.J. (1997). Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in Public
Administration. Public Administration Review.57(1). 45.
93
Agranoff, Robert. 2004. Leveraging Networks: A Guide for Public Managers Working across
Organizations. In Collaboration: Using Networks and Partnerships, edited by John M. Kamensky and
Thomas J. Burlin. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 61-102. 63.

357
coordinating the country's counter terrorism efforts. Network structures in this case
were represented by the incident command system used by FDNY in responding
after the attack. In addition, while the FBI temporarily used a law enforcement
network consisting of special agents from other field offices, NYPD detectives and
officers, and ATF officers in conducting their investigation, they were not part of a
larger, on-going multiorganizational, multigovernmental, and multisectoral
networked structure as they are today to prevent future terrorist attacks. In fact, the
organizational structure, mission, and culture of the FBI at the time of the 1993
attack served as a barrier to the creation of such networked governing structures.

Impact of Organizational Design on the FBI and CIA

In this lens, agencies involved in homeland security, such as the FBI and CIA,
are assumed to have unique organizational structures, cultures, missions and
strategies. Thus, individual organizations will perceive terrorism differently and will
design and implement counterterrorism policies that are congruent with their
organization. This has been discussed in previous chapters whereby the FBI largely
perceived terrorism as a crime, while the CIA perceived terrorism as a form of
warfare. These perceptions were framed in part by the unique organizational mission
of each of these agencies.
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The Mission and Structure of the CIA
The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as an
independent agency under the direction of the National Security Council to fight the
Cold War. Its principal mission was to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence within the government."94 The CIA, not only, leads the intelligence
community in coordinating and evaluating national intelligence, but also, is the
principal clandestine collector of intelligence from human sources. During the Cold
War, the primary enemy to the U.S. was the Soviet Union, thus, the vast majority of
CIA resources (60%) were dedicated to collecting and analyzing intelligence on this
threat. 95
At the beginning of the post Cold War era, the CIA was in turmoil because its
strategic mission was unclear and it was seen by its critics as irrelevant in this new
era of peace and prosperity. Richard Kerr, the Deputy Director of the CIA from
1988-1992, stated, "The agency was in as much revolution as the former Soviet
Union, we have lost the simplicity of purpose or cohesion that essentially has driven
not only intelligence but has driven this country for forty-plus years."96 Thus, at the
time of the 1993 WTC attack, the strategy of the CIA as it related to new and
emerging threats such as terrorism was not clear and in transition. In fact, between
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1991 and 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies instituted only a few new programs
dedicated to counterterrorism as they became aware of the growing threat posed by
radical Islamists such as Al Qaeda. In addition, as dangers gathered and the threat
became clearer, much of the Intelligence Community remained largely unchanged.
Zegart argued that among the reasons for the CIA's failure to adapt in the post Cold
War environment was due to the fragmented nature of the intelligence community's
structure.
To accomplish their mission of integrating intelligence efforts across the U.S.
government, the Director of Central Intelligence was assigned two jobs, running the
CIA and "coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of national security."97 Despite, having the
mission of coordinating intelligence activities in multiple government bureaucracies,
the authorizing legislation gave the DCI strong budgetary and personnel authority
over the CIA only. During the Cold War, the number of intelligence agencies
increased yet the CIA's authority to manage them did not. By the end of the Cold
War, the intelligence community had grown to thirteen major agencies-- eight of
these were housed in the Defense Department and controlled by the Secretary of
Defense not the Director of Central Intelligence. In affect, the DCI was responsible
for coordinating the efforts of these agencies but possessed no formal powers over
them. The existence of so many separate agencies and the absence of formal
97
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mechanisms to integrate them became reinforced by bureaucratic procedures over
time whereby each agency developed their own budgets, hired their own staff, set
their own priorities, and established their own unique cultures and processes.
During the Cold War, the fragmented nature of the Intelligence Community
was not a problem because the Soviet Union was a monolithic, visible and static
threat. However, the transnational terrorist threat that emerged in the 1990's as
demonstrated by the 1993 WTC conspirators, was dynamic, multifaceted and
spanned across the world. This new and emerging threat demanded an
unprecedented degree of joint action across U.S. intelligence agencies, yet this
integration was not possible given the structure of the Intelligence Community at that
time.
In the post Cold Ear era, the emerging threat of transnational terrorism was
initially handled by each individual agency with a counterterrorism mission. Each of
these organizations conceptualized the problem of terrorism differently, thus they
developed different policy solutions related to counterterrorism as we have seen in
chapters three and four. In addition, the lenses used by the FBI and CIA in 1993,
served to obscure the new and emerging threat posed by the WTC conspirators, as a
transnational terrorist network. For example, at the time of the WTC attack in 1993,
national security officials were not aware that these conspirators were connected to
larger worldwide jihadist movement. Michael Sheehan, the coordinator of the State
Department's counterterrorism Office during the Clinton administration, said until
the mid 1990's, Washington did not fully grasp that the 1993 attack on the World
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Trade Center was far from an isolated event. Rather, it was the first strike of what
would become a series of such attacks by Islamic militants with increasingly global
reach. Sheehan stated, "We really didn't see it until 1995 or '96. Until then, the
intelligence and law enforcement communities kept insisting this was a lone cell
operation. The really missed it initially."98
The FBI and CIA largely missed these clues because of the way they
conceptualized terrorism at that time as we have seen in lens 1 and lens 2. In
addition, the organization structure, mission, tasks, and culture of these organizations
served as cognitive barriers in identifying and responding to this new terrorist threat,
and organizational barriers to sharing intelligence information. It would take
additional attacks by Al Qaeda through the 1990's and in 2001 before these
organizations fundamentally changed to effectively and efficiently prevent, deter,
and respond to the specific threat posed by al Qaeda and the worldwide jihadist
movement. The next section will look at the organizational structure, mission,
strategy, tasks, and culture of the FBI and how these elements impacted their
perception of terrorism.

Structure, Mission and Tasks of the FBI in a Post Cold War Era
The FBI, like the CIA, had to undergo massive organizational changes in the
post Cold War era in an effort to adapt to the rising terrorist threat. In 1993, the FBI
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viewed terrorism as a crime problem as we saw in Chapter 3 and as such:, was highly
effective at solving a crime after it had occurred but lacked the skill and experience
to prevent terrorist attacks. The primary historical mission of the FBI has been one
of a crime fighter whereby special agents respond to a crime after it has occurred and
slowly and methodically gather evidence to build a case for prosecution, The
mission of the FBI is to uphold the law through the investigation of violations of
federal criminal law; to protect the United States from foreign intelligence and
terrorist activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to federal,
state, local, and international agencies; and to perform these responsibilities in a
manner that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the Constitution
of the United States. 99
This was clearly seen in the investigation of the WTC bombing as described
in Chapter 3. Today the mission of the FBI is "to protect and defend the United
States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the
criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice
services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. 100
Historically, the FBI has taken a traditional law enforcement approach to
counterterrorism. Its agents were trained to build cases and its management was
deliberately decentralized to empower the individual field offices and agents on the
street. In 1993, the FBI was a highly decentralized structure in which power was
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concentrated in the 56 local field offices, each run by a special agent in charge or
SAC. In the investigative arena, the field office had primacy. Counterterrorism
investigations were run by the field, not headquarters. Moreover, the field office that
initiated a case maintained control over it, an approach the FBI called the "Office of
Origin" model. 101 This decentralized management structure allowed field offices to
set their own priorities with little direction from headquarters. While this level of
autonomy and decentralization worked well when the FBI was investigating criminal
cases, 9/11 proved that this organizational technology and structure did not work
well to prevent terrorism.
Criminal cases often took priority over counterintelligence and
counterterrorism activities because of the agency's evaluation system. The Bureau
evaluated field offices and rewarded agents based on statistics reflecting arrests,
indictments, and prosecutions. 102 As a result, counterterrorism investigations were not
given priority by agents because these investigations generally resulted in fewer
prosecutions and fewer rewards for employees. 103 In addition, agents developed
information in support of their own cases, not as part of a broader, more strategic
effort. 104 As a result, information was not shared within the FBI or with other
intelligence agencies. The FBI' s poor information sharing capabilities was also due
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to the outdated information technology system used to manage cases. 105 Often case
information was not uploaded into the Automated Case Support System, thus, field
agents usually did not know what investigations agents in their own office, let alone
in other field offices, were working on. Nor did analysts have easy access to this
information. Thus, it was almost impossible to develop an understanding of the
threat from a particular international terrorist group.
Critics have argued because of its reactive law enforcement culture, the FBI
may not be well-equipped for the preventative counterterrorism mission which is
now its number one priority. 106 The FBI has recognized the need for substantial
change that builds on its existing strengths, but substantially redirects FBI activities
from a reactive posture to crimes already committed toward a proactive posture with
a clear focus on preventing terrorist attacks on U.S. interests. Throughout the 1990's
the FBI adopted new strategies and programs in response to the growing threat from
Islamist terrorists. For example, after the 1993 WTC attack, the FBI established a
Radical Fundamentalist Unit in headquarters to handle counterintelligence,
coordinate intelligence operations outside the U.S., and oversee criminal
investigations of radical fundamentalist terrorists. 107

105

Staff Statement No. 12. (2004). The 9/1] Investigations. New York: Public Affairs. 356.
Pistole, John. August 3, 2004. Assessing America's Counterterrorism Capabilities. FOCH
Congressional Testimony, Committee on Senate Governmental Affairs. From:
http://web27.epnet.com. [accesses 12 February 08]. Strasser, Steven (Ed.) (2004). The 9/11
Investigations. New York; Public Affairs.
107
Strasser, Steven (Ed.) (2004). The 9/1] Investigations. New York; Public Affairs. 4-5.
106

365
Although the 1993 WTC bombing raised the FBI' s level of concern about
terrorism inside the US, its success in investigating, arresting and prosecuting those
involved in the attack showed that its traditional crime fighting practices worked in
fighting terrorism. As a result, this attack did not cause the FBI to significantly
adjust its priorities, shift resources, or transform its capabilities to combat terrorism
more effectively.
In 1994 when the WTC bombing trial was trucing place, FBI Director Louis
Freeh made it clear his top priority would continue to be crime, not terrorism. 108
Freeh reaffirmed his commitment to the FBI's crime fighting mission in 1995 when
he assigned 246 new special to investigate violent crimes, drugs and organized
crime. 109 During Freeh's tenure from 1993 to 2001, the FBI's counterterrorism
budget tripled yet the additional funding did not prevent 9/11 because these funds
were not used for counterterrorism. An independent review of the FBl's
reorganization efforts found that after the 1993 WTC attack, FBI field offices
diverted counterterrorism resources to traditional priorities-violent and organized
crime, drug trafficking and infrastructure protection. 11° Freeh also added additional
intelligence analysts to field offices but they were poorly trained, had limited
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experience, lacked needed information and processing tools and were diverted to
operational support activities. 111
Some have observed that the outcome of the ongoing reorganization activities
at the FBI and its ability to prevent terrorism attacks in the U.S. hinged largely on
the extent to which a cultural shift could be made that accepted its new terrorism
prevention mission and its role in coordinating intelligence efforts with other
members of the Intelligence Community.

Conflict between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Culture
For years the intelligence and law enforcement communities have maintained
a strained relationship and have been reluctant to share critical intelligence
information with each other. 112 In the WTC case this was evident when the CIA
failed to notify the FBI that Sheik Rahman had been given a visa to enter the country
in 1990 though he was on a terrorist watch list. Rahman and his association with
Islamic Group were well known by the CIA. In 1987, a CIA report described
Rahman as "Egypt's most militant Sunni cleric and a close associate of the Egyptian
Jihad organization." 113 This report further highlighted Rah.man's radical ideology
and his hatred for Israel. 114 In addition, when Ramzi Yousef was captured in the
Philippines in 1995, the Philippine National Police found information on Yousef's
111
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laptop on future terror plots, such as the Bojinka plot that were being funded by
Osama bin Laden. This information was sent to the CIA but the CIA failed to share
this information with the FBI. 115 As a result, FBI investigators were not able to see
potential clues and links to new terror plots and organizations.
In 1993, national intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, often did not share
information on national security threats with the FBI because of legal, organizational
and cultural barriers. These agencies had difficulty coordinating their efforts
because of the differences in the roles and cultures of the two communities, as both
had different responsibilities and objectives, as well as expectations regarding
information acquisition and management, and different rules and statutes governing
their intelligence activities.
The culture of intelligence driven organizations differs from those of pure
law enforcement organizations. 116 While (foreign) intelligence 117 organizations are
interested in long-term infiltration, active and passive monitoring, and deterrence, the
law enforcement bias is to arrest and prosecute. Also, the primary goal of an
intelligence organization is to: (1) determine what intelligence should be collected to
advance national interests; (2) systematically collect that raw intelligence; (3) apply
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analytical tools to the raw information in the development of informed judgments;
and (4) to share that finished intelligence with national level policymakers and other
officials with a demonstrated need to know. 118 "Tradecraft" or the how, where and
why intelligence gathering takes place, is of utmost importance. 119 Recruitment of
sources and penetration of groups operating in United States is highly valued by
intelligence organizations.
By contrast, the primary goal of a law enforcement agency, such as the FBI,
was to respond to criminal activities, and to deter future crimes. In general, this goal
was achieved by rigorous investigation of criminal activities and close cooperation
with prosecution. Discrete, individual criminal cases were the driving factor in a law
enforcement organization, while broader trends and relationships among social
variables, such as political, economic, and military factors, drove intelligence
organizations. 120 Also when law enforcement entities operated within the United
States, civil liberties and the rights of U.S. citizens were of paramount concern. As a
result, the FBI was governed by a complex range of investigative guidelines and
polices, and statutes and constitutional limits when intelligence was being gathered
in the United States against foreign agents or U.S. citizens.
In contrast, there were fewer legal restrictions on overseas CIA operations
than FBI investigations at home or abroad. The division of responsibilities between
us Best, Richard A. (December 3, 2001). CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:
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intelligence and law enforcement agencies was based in statutes and executive
orders. The National Security Act of 1947, that established the CIA, specifically
precluded the agency from having any responsibilities for law enforcement or
internal security. 121 There was a concern that "combining domestic and foreign
intelligence functions created the possibility that domestic law enforcement will be
infected by the secrecy, deception, and ruthlessness that international espionage
requires." 122
In the FBI' s old mandate, intelligence was a means to an end of putting
people in jail, whether it was bank robbers or Soviet spies. Because of its unique
(domestic) law enforcement and intelligence mission, the FBI was, for the most part,
the primary consumer of its own raw and finished intelligence, which was usually
used to support a case. The new mandate of the post 9/11 era, of gathering and
analyzing intelligence with the goal of understanding the threat matrix of global
terrorism requires a fundamental change in the culture of the FBI. According to
Director Mueller, the FBI is now moving from thinking about "intelligence as a
case," to finding the "intelligence in the case." 123 Also Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director, Robert Mueller affirmed that they are creating a new
culture in the FBI, one marked by a shift from law enforcement to terrorism
prevention. Mueller said. "We need a different approach that puts prevention above
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all else" and that this would require "a vibrant, active, aggressive FBI headquarters"
that was committed to a "proactive" rather than a reactive orientation and had the
"capability to anticipate attacks." 124
In 1993, the CIA and FBI had distinct missions and roles in national security
that prevented them from sharing intelligence on terrorist threats within the U.S. In
addition, there were clear bureaucratic, legal and cultural barriers which made it
difficult for these agencies to coordinate their efforts in preventing and deterring
terrorism against the U.S. and its interests overseas. In a post 9/11 world, these
organizations have formed intelligence networks with local and state law
enforcement agencies and with one another in an example of how important network
governance structures are for coordinating our antiterrorism and counterterrorism
efforts in homeland security.

Summary
In the organizational design lens, terrorism is seen as a network of
organizations, groups and individuals that are bound by a common ideology but may
have diverse structures, goals and tactics. This chapter described the terrorist cell
involved in this case and its link to Islamic Jihad and the worldwide jihadist
movement of Al Qaeda. The organizational structure of the terrorist organization
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was that of a network, yet those government organizations dedicated to homeland
security were structured as bureaucratic organizations.
This lens argues that rational, hierarchical bureaucratic design structures may
have difficulty operating in complex, unstable environments. As a result, traditional
bureaucratic government structures will have limited success in deterring, preventing
and responding to evolving terrorist networks such as that represented by Al Qaeda.
An alternative way of structuring homeland security organizations is through a
network governance structure. This type of structure would allow multiple agencies
and organizations to build collaborative partnerships in order to improve
coordination across organizations and jurisdictions, to more effectively manage
resources and to enhance planning and communication capabilities.
At the time of the 1993 attack, the notion of network structures in public
management or as governance structures was quite new and interest in this type of
structure was fueled, in part, by globalization and the New Public Management
movement that was implemented by the Clinton administration in 1993. Lens three
provided a rational for network governance structures in homeland security based on
a contemporary perspective. However, at the time of the 1993 attack, networked
structures, as we understand them today, were not in use by those government
organizations involved in this case. The primary network in place that was
successfully utilized was that of the hierarchical network as represent by the Incident
Command System. In this case, JCS was utilized by the New York City Fire
Department very effectively because they were well trained and experienced in the
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use ofICS, and they were dealing with an incident that predominantly required skills
and tasks that they used on a daily basis-namely fighting fires, and performing
search and rescue operations. However, this case does not mean the ICS system will
be effective in managing and coordinating catastrophic terrorism events in the future.
In addition, this lens assumed that homeland security was a problem of
developing, coordinating and managing networks of government, private and non
profit organizations which are in conflict with terrorist networks. Finally, in this lens
agencies involved in homeland security are assumed to have unique organizational
structures, cultures, missions and strategies. Thus, individual organizations will
perceive terrorism differently and will design and implement counterterrorism
polices that are congruent with their organization. This was clearly seen by the vast
differences between the CIA and FBI that were discussed in this chapter. In this
case, the FBI used lens 1 which perceived homeland security as a criminal justice
problem, while the CIA perceived homelands security as an international relations
problem. These conceptual frames were developed from the unique organizational
missions, tasks, strategies, policies and cultures of these organizations.
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CHAPTER 6: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
POLICY: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH
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Introduction

The purpose of this research was to begin the effort to build a theoretical
foundation for homeland security policy by analyzing the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing using multiple frame analysis. To better understand the phenomenon of
homeland security, three conceptual lenses were developed from the academic
literature in the fields of terrorism studies, criminology, international relations,
organization studies, and public administration. These conceptual lenses included:
(!)-Homeland Security as a Criminal Justice Problem/Terrorism as Crime, (II)Homeland Security as a International Relations Problem/Terrorism as War, and (III)Homeland Security as an Organization Design Problem/Terrorism as a Network.
Each conceptual lens consisted of theories, practices, values, beliefs and assumptions
that served to shape how critical events were perceived, and as such, how those
events were understood and the problems addressed at the time of the 1993 WTC
bombing, and for some time thereafter in the form of homeland security programs
and policies.
The first part of this research consisted of developing the theoretical
characteristics for each of these lenses which were described in chapter two. Next,
the research focused on applying each lens to a critical case, the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing. Chapters three, four and five provided a detailed description and
explanation of this event over a period of time using historical data from multiple
sources. This chapter discusses the findings of the research, both those that were
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expected and others that were unexpected, their relevance, and recommendations for
further research.

Findings of the Research

One of the most critical objectives of this research was to move toward the
development of a theoretical foundation for homeland security by identifying the
gaps in some of the dominant theories that have been applied to this policy domain,
as well as to identify areas of overlap in which greater research can be conducted.
More specifically, it has sought to determine what the individual lenses missed, what
they captured, and at least to provide a sense of what could have been seen if the
perspectives had been combined. This research also recognized that there are
limitations to each lens because each academic discipline offers a broad range of
theories that could have been applied to this case. To limit the size and scope of this
research not all of the theories from each discipline were applied to the case. Those
that were used were the ones that seemed from the initial evidence and literature
review to have been most influential with decision makers and scholars. More
research can be conducted by those in criminology, international relations and public
administration on this case and in fine tuning each of the lenses used.
By looking at this critical case from multiple lenses, this research was able to

build a foundation for creating a theory of homeland security policy by identifying
the theoretical and policy gaps that were created when a phenomenon as complex as
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homeland security is analyzed from one perspective alone. Each of the stories told
from the perspective of each of these lenses was completely different as seen in each
of the cases written in chapter three, four and five. This research recognizes that
other lenses could have been developed and utilized in this case, and that a greater
variety of scholarly literature from foreign scholars could have been added to
provide greater depth to the research. The research primarily used U.S. scholars and
government documents because these materials were more readily available to the
researcher.
This research found that the fields of criminology, public administration, and
international relations, each bring unique theoretical perspectives that contribute
significantly to our understanding of homeland security, but that none of the lenses
individually provides an adequate picture of the challenges of homeland security
theory or policies needed to address modem threats. By identifying the theoretical
gaps, as well as the overlaps within each disciplinary perspective, a new approach to
address homeland security can be developed in a more holistic manner to explain this
new phenomenon. While it is but a first step in that direction, the research was
successful in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the dominant lenses used
to understand homeland security, as well as the importance of the critical need to
employ more than one lens to attempt to understand complex, wicked problems such
as homeland security.
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The cases represented in this study show how perceptual filters can
significantly alter how individuals and organizations understand and explain
phenomenon, as well as obscure new phenomenon, that may be an emerging threat to
the homeland. In this case, each of the lenses failed to identify the seriousness of the
new transnational terrorist threat that was emerging at the time of the 1993 WTC
bombing because each lens categorized the event according to its own preconceived
classification systems. In other words, when a new event occurred, such as that of the
1993 WTC bombing, it was identified with a particular event or object that shares
common features with a larger category of events. 1 For example, from the criminal
justice lens, the WTC bombing was categorized as a crime and was handled like
previous domestic terrorism cases using the criminal justice system. David Morgan
wrote that when novel events occur, we make a "quick and dirty assessment of the
novel item, compare it to other items that already exist in well-known categories or
classifications, and then act toward this new item in a manner that is consistent with
our classification. In this way, we expend minimal effort and time in recognizing the
object before responding." 2
As a result, in this case, each of the individual lenses missed key elements of
this event that made it quite distinct and different than previous cases. If government
organizations had taken the time to analyze how this event and its actors were
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different than the past, we may have been better able to predict future terrorist
attacks by similar groups of actors. Each lens, when used alone, captured only a
small part of what happened in the 1993 WTC bombing, what drove those events,
and where those dynamics might come together in the future. The single lens view
severely limited our ability to understand the present or predict the long term threat
that was emerging at the time.
Finally, the study also yielded unexpected but useful lessons about the lenses
themselves. The characteristics of each lens were developed from the academic
literature in a post 9/11 environment, which when applied to a historical event in
1993 did not always fit, or had in fact changed over the time period of this research.
For example, the international relations lens had very distinct characteristics during
the Cold War versus in a post Cold War environment that had to be considered in
this case. It became important to understand the lens at the time of the event and
that, in tum, helped to clarify important changes in the lenses over time.
The following section analyzes each of the lenses used in this case. Each lens
offers scholars and practitioners a broad range of theories and practices that can
inform our understanding of homeland security. In hindsight, it is easy to be critical
of the organizations and individuals involved in this case as many other writers have
done in a post 9/11 environment. However, individuals and organizations were
clearly operating out of dominant conceptual lenses that limited their collective
ability to, not only to see a new and emerging threat, but also to adapt their
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organizational structures, strategies, tactics, processes and culture to effectively
prevent, deter, or respond to this threat in the future.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Criminal Justice Lens
The criminal justice lens defined terrorism as a crime that was a criminal
justice problem that was to be resolved through the use of law enforcement agencies
and the criminal justice system. At the time of the 1993 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center, terrorism in the United States was seen as a criminal justice problem
that was best handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, prosecutors, courts,
and prisons. As a result, the FBI, as the designated lead agency, immediately
controlled all aspects of the investigation-from collecting and analyzing evidence,
to identifying and interviewing witnesses and suspects. The resulting investigation,
arrest and prosecution of the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
highlighted the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and its associated law
enforcement agencies in bringing these types of criminals to justice, as well as, some
significant weaknesses of this perspective for homeland security.
As the 9/11 Commission report highlighted, there were unfortunate
consequences of the successful investigation and prosecution of this case. First, it
created the impression "that the law enforcement system was well equipped to cope
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with terrorism."3 Though the FBI had been the lead agency in managing domestic
terrorism incidents since 1982 and its officials were aware of terrorist threats, they
did not fully grasp the unique characteristics of the new terrorism represented by
Yousef and later Osama bin Laden, as compared to other criminal activity. The 9/11
Commission Report further revealed that neither President Clinton or Congress, nor
the media questioned whether the procedures that put Yousef and Rahman behind
bars "would really protect against the new virus of which these individuals were just
first symptoms. " 4 That is, it was questionable that future terrorist attacks by likeminded individuals would be deterred by the life sentences handed down for those
involved in this attack.
In this case, the FBI did its job as tasked in an effective and efficient manner,
and the criminal justice system succeeded in bringing the perpetrators to justice and
ensuring they were no longer a threat to society. However, the criminal justice lens
focused attention on the individual perpetrators who committed a broad range of
crimes associated with the WTC bombing. As a result, the investigators did not
recognize the significant evidence that they had in hand that could and should have
told them that this was far from a standard criminal justice matter. As Chapter 3
showed, the evidence was there, but those using the criminal justice lens neither
recognized it, nor did they have a framework that might have explained what to do
with it.
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Thus, the larger network of Al Qaeda was not recognized for what it was-a
worldwide jihadist movement. The larger organization with which the Liberation

Army was associated (Islamic Jihad) was not examined and future plans and plots
were not investigated, though there was evidence that had been gathered during the
WTC investigation which showed a much larger transnational conspiracy than the
crime committed in New York. As the 9/11 Commission recognized, the criminal
justice process "was not designed to ask if the events might be harbingers of worse to
come. Nor did it allow for aggregating and analyzing facts to see if they could
provide clues to terrorist tactics more generally-methods of entry and finance, and
mode of operation inside the United States." 5
One of the weaknesses of criminal justice perspective in homeland security
was its inability to see critical linkages between past, present and future terrorist
organizations, plans and strategies. With the conviction of the 1993 WTC
conspirators, it was assumed that the threat was gone because they were in prison.
As a result, the larger transnational jihadist movement, headed by Al Qaeda, was not
examined or investigated by the ~BI, though there was clear evidence from the
Nosair and 1993 WTC cases that a much larger conspiracy was taking place.
The investigation of the 1993 WTC bombing highlighted a traditional law
enforcement approach to counterterrorism as expected in the lens. In this lens, it was
expected that law enforcement agencies would gather evidence, interview witnesses
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and suspects, and apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators. In this case, the FBI
agents in this situation developed information to build a case for successful
prosecution, not as part of a broader, more strategic effort to gather intelligence on a
new threat to the homeland. 6 In fact, little effort was made by the FBI to attempt to
prevent such attacks in the future. Throughout the 1990's, the FBI's approach to
terrorism investigations would continue to be case-specific, decentralized, and aimed
toward prosecution and incarceration of offenders. 7 This focus, on after-the-fact
investigations, resulted in several successful prosecutions but did not strengthen the
nation's or global community's ability to prevent other and even more deadly attacks
as we later saw on 9/11, as well as, in other countries both before and after 2001.
However, Chapter 3 also explained that terrorists are different than other
criminals because their motivations and strategies are different. Terrorists normally
plan their operations and their violent acts are intended to have political and/or social
consequences. The first attack on the World Trade Center showed a great deal of
organization and planning, and highlighted a new form of terrorism that was
emerging which was motivated by both religious and political goals. Terrorists,
unlike most criminals, are motivated by ideology or religion which was seen in this
case. Each of the conspirators was associated with and influenced by Sheik Rahman,
the leader of the Islamic Group, as well as, Qutbism ideology. The grievances of the
group were somewhat highlighted in the letter they sent to the New York Times
6
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following the attack, but their ideology was not clear until it was looked at in greater
depth in the international relations lens. A major weakness of the criminal justice
lens was its failure to see the long term goals and objectives of the conspirators as
part of a growing worldwide jihadist movement.
Since this was the first time a foreign terrorist organization had attacked the
U.S. homeland, the FBI was caught completely off guard. Robert M. Blitzer, former
senior counterterrorism official at the FBI, stated the FBI was "caught almost totally
unaware that these guys were here. It was alarming to us that these guys were
coming and going since 1985 and we didn't know." 8 Michael Sheehan,
counterterrorism coordinator at the State Department during the Clinton
administration stated, "In retrospect, the wake up call (to this new threat) should
9

have been the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing." However, the Clinton
administration, like its predecessors, perceived terrorism primarily as a crime to be
prosecuted and punished, not a threat to national security. 10 As a result, law
enforcement agencies were the lead agencies tasked with managing terrorist
incidents within the U.S., and terrorists were seen as common criminals to be dealt
with accordingly. 11 Law enforcement agencies are responsible for, not only
responding to crimes after they occur, but also to taking an active role.in preventing
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crimes before they occur by planning and implementing a broad range of crime
prevention and intelligence programs. In this case the FBI was aware of the possible
dangers posed by those in the WTC cell but failed to continue to conduct
surveillance after 1989 and to gather more intelligence on those associated with
Sheik Rahman before the 1993 attack.
The criminal justice lens was valuable in that it analyzed the event using
theories from the field of criminology to explain the motivation and behavior of
individual actors in the WTC case, but it was also limited.
In addition, Lens 1 assumed that the causes of terrorism were similar to that
of other crimes and could be explained in part by theories from the field of
criminology. In Lens I, deterrence, routine activity, general strain and crime
prevention theories were utilized to analyze the behavior of the WTC conspirators
and our policy response. Each of these theories was valuable in analyzing the
behavior of the actors involved in this case, and can serve to frame effective possible
policy solutions in homeland security in the future. However, each of these theories
also had some weaknesses when applied to terrorist violence that were described in
· chapter 3.
In classical criminology, the concept of general deterrence assumes that
criminals are rational actors and that crime can be deterred by the efficacy of the
legal sanctions administered by the state. That is, individuals will refrain from
committing a crime because he/she fears the certainty, swiftness, and severity of
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legal punishment. In this case, the WTC conspirators were caught and prosecuted
swiftly and they received life imprisonment. In addition, new laws and stiffer
penalties were passed in 1996. Although these news laws and criminal punishments
do not appear to have deterred Al Qaeda operatives from planning and successfully
attacking the WTC in 2001, it does not mean they have been completely ineffective
in deterring other types of terrorist organizations and their supporters since their
passage.
This case, however, does highlight some of the weaknesses in using criminal
sanctions as a form of deterring terrorists associated with the worldwide jihadist
movement. Part of the difficulty in the area of deterrence is the ongoing clash
among criminal justice scholars and policy makers as to the effectiveness of new
criminal laws as deterrents to crime. Clarke and Newman argued that the idea that
"taking out" the terrorists by arresting offenders is not the same as preventing
crime. 12 In addition, they stated, "Decades of criminological research have failed to
establish a relationship between severe punishment and reduced crime." 13 While
deterrence theory may explain why some criminal behavior is prevented it has
numerous weaknesses when applied to terrorists as discussed in Chapter 3.
Further research is needed on how terrorist organizations and leaders within
these groups make decisions during different phases of an operation. If we are to
thwart terrorist attacks in the future then more research needs to be conducted to
12
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understand the choices these different terrorist groups make at each step of the
way-preparation, target selection, commission of the act, and escape.
Another important contribution from the field of criminology in
understanding the terrorist actors in this case is general strain theory. Strain theory
recognizes that environmental conditions, such as poverty, lack of education,
political disenfranchisement, oppression, loss of status and autonomy, humiliation
and other variables cause some individuals to turn to violent criminal behavior,
including terrorism. In this case, most of the WTC conspirators were born to
Palestinian families during or in the years following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. They
were forced to relocate as refugees to other Middle Eastern countries where they
lived in conditions of abject poverty and/or political oppression. These individuals
chose to adapt to these strains, in part, through rebellion. Merton's conception
suggests that rebellion "leads men outside the environing social structure to envisage
and seek to bring into being a new, that is to say, a greatly modified social
structure." 14 The WTC conspirators were part of a larger worldwide Islamic
fundamentalist movement that was waging jihad against the West, particularly the
U.S. for its support oflsrael and apostate Middle Eastern regimes.
The challenge of using general strain theory is that it has traditionally been
utilized in criminology to explain deviant behavior in the lower social classes in
America and may be difficult in applying across other cultures. In addition, strain
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theory is generally concerned with analyzing individual behavior. Some
criminologists have sought to measure whether a group is experiencing frustration,
but have found it difficult to measure strain directly. 15 Further, research that applies
both individual and group level variables, as well as, economic and culturalstructural sources of strain is needed to advance this theory as it relates to the
behavior of terrorists. Since central grievances should be considered sources of strain
for terrorist groups and movements, research could be conducted on the relationship
between a group's success in resolving core grievances and level of strain.
The criminal justice perspective continues to influence U.S. homeland
security policy because the theories, practices and programs that were highlighted in
this case have made a valuable contribution in understanding terrorism and
identifying criminal justice strategies that have been successful at preventing and
deterring many crimes, including those associated with terrorism. The problem with
identifying terrorism as a criminal matter is that it limits the range of options
available for combating it to those available to law enforcement agencies.
No strategy or program will be 100 percent effective in stopping terrorism,
but those recommended by criminologists and law enforcement professionals will
continue to be critical in our homeland security efforts for the future. However,
criminal justice solutions to homeland security offer one conceptual view which
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must be integrated with other policy solutions including those from international
relations and national security, and public administration scholars and practitioners.

The Strengths and Weaknesses ofthe International Relations Lens
Though the criminal justice perspective was dominant during the 1990's,
after the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the international relations
lens became the dominant perspective because of the nature and scale of the attack
and the forces driving it. As a result, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and overthrew
the Taliban regime that had provided a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and declared a
"Global War on Terror." Before the launching of the global war on terrorism, Carr
wrote, " ... almost all federal funds for antiterrorist efforts were targeted at detective
and intelligence work, while preemptive military strikes against terrorist leaders,
16
networks, or bases were ignored" Applying multiple conceptual lenses and policy

solutions allows us to see the problem in greater detail and craft more nuanced policy
solutions to the complex problem of homeland security. While this research was
informed by the work by Graham Allison in Essence ofDecision, it is to be
distinguished from his excellent study in two critical ways. First, the lenses used to
analyze the event were different than those created by Allison. Second, Allison
stated that each individual lens can tell the whole story. This research showed the
opposite by identifying what was not seen with each lens and clearly shows that
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when used alone, one lens cannot tell the complete story of a complex event or
phenomenon such as the 1993 WTC bombing. This research showed the
international relations lens has its own unique strengths and weaknesses, and was not
able to provide a complete story of the event.
The problem here was in three parts. First, the difficulty for the analysis was
to step out of the post 9/11 perspective to better understand the international relations
lens as it was at the time of the 1993 bombing. The second difficulty was to deal
with the fact that the lens was in the middle of a dramatic transition from one
designed and built for the Cold War and a new one focused on globalization. As
chapter 4 shows, neither lens fit the situation, and nor were they working effectively
at the time. Such dramatic shifts are are not common, but they happen. Third,
because of these difficulties and the limitations of the international relations lens
itself, the importance of using more than one lens becomes clearer.
In Chapter Four, the 1993 WTC bombing was described and analyzed using
the characteristics of Lens (II)-Homeland Security as an International Relations
Problem, Terrorism as War. In this lens, homeland security was linked with U.S.
foreign and national security policies, as well as, dramatic events that were occurring
within the world system, both during and after the Cold War, that increased the
enabling environment which breeds terrorist violence. The international relations
perspective highlighted world events and actors, as well as, environmental conditions
that had a significant impact on the development of the terror cell involved in this
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case, that were largely missed by the criminal justice perspective. However, at the
time of the 1993 WTC bombing, terrorism as a form of asymmetrical warfare was
largely seen as a tactic of insurgent and revolutionary movements located overseas,
or as a tactic of state sponsors to achieve foreign policy objectives that did not pose a
threat to the homeland.
International terrorism was largely seen by Americans as something that
happened outside of the U.S., thus, it was considered a third tier national security
concern during the Cold War, as well as, through the 1990's. As a result, U.S.
national security agencies did not significantly adapt their organizational structures,
missions, strategies and processes to analyze the emerging threat posed by the
worldwide jihadist movement, or to develop and implement significant national
security and homeland security policies to prevent or deter future attacks until after
9/11.
The end of the Cold War and the increased focus of U.S. foreign policy on
economic and globalization issues in the post-Cold War era, greatly altered the
characteristics of the international relations lens, and obscured the growing threat
posed by Al Qaeda. In the years immediately following the Reagan administration,
this lens was extremely influential among policymakers even as some scholars were
moving in other directions. Unfortunately, in part for that reason, the international
relations lens was not able to see the new terrorism threat represented in the 1993
WTC bombing because it was initially limited by a Cold War perspective that saw
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terrorism through the prism of the East-West conflict between the U.S. and USSR. In
the post Cold War era, the international relations lens was in transition and initially
did not link globalization with transnational terrorism. At the time, the old lens was
outmoded and inadequate to address the kind of threat presented in the 1993
bombing. The new lens was not yet fully developed, but it was also destined to be
incomplete and inattentive to key elements of the homeland security challenge.
The international relations lens clearly offers important strengths, one of
which is that, when carefully employed, it considers historical events that can help
explain contemporary behavior. In the international relations lens, historical
knowledge of critical world events, such as the creation of the state of Israel and
resulting Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cold War conflict and the Afghan-Soviet War,
and the end of the Cold War, and the rise of globalization, provides us with a better
understanding of the political, economic, social, mqitary, and cultural forces within
the world system that had a profound affect on nation states, as well as, non state
actors such as transnational terrorist organizations.
Although the international relations lens offered an awareness of a longer
time frame, it was still limited due to the constraints of the Cold War. If a more
effective international lens had been in place at the time, it could have helped to see
the expanded scope of actors involved in this case to include, not only, the U.S., but
also, other nation states and to groups and transnational organizations that spanned
national and regional boundaries. Such a lens would assume that terrorism can be
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perpetrated by individuals, groups, transnational organizations, and nation states.
This case clearly showed the linkages between the Liberation Army Fifth Battalion
terror cell to the Islamic Jihad foreign terrorist organization of Sheik Rahman, and
then to Al Qaeda, the worldwide jihadist movement . These linkages are critical to
understanding the current terror threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
The evidence was there, as chapter 4 shows. However, the Cold War lens
that focused on state actors could not see many of these key features at the time of
the 1993 bombing and the emerging globalization lens was neither fully formed nor
was it designed to see these kinds of factors.
In addition, while the criminal justice lens focused on the psychological and
sociological variables that motivated the behavior of individual actors in this case,
the international relations lens clearly showed that terrorism is a by-product of
broader historical shifts in the international distribution of political, economic,
military, and ideological power. This lens, like the criminal justice lens, highlighted
how environmental factors such as globalization, poverty, deprivation and political
oppression can lead to feelings of intense anger, frustration and humiliation that in
tum may lead to terrorist violence. The power shifts within the global system are
clearly seen when one looks at how the problem of terrorism was perceived during
and after the Cold War.
During the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a third tier issue that was often
thought of in terms of the East-West conflict and the subsequent State sponsorship of
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terrorism. This lens assumed that nation states sponsor terrorism as a form of
asymmetrical warfare, which is used as a tool of foreign policy as a means of
balancing power in the world system. From the Cold War perspective, realist and
deterrence theories adequately explained the behavior of nation states, but did little
to explain the rise of transnational terrorism. For realists, international terrorism was
often perceived as a form of asymmetrical warfare utilized by weaker nation states as
a means of achieving foreign policy objectives. Although realist theory helps to help
the behavior of nation states and why they would be sponsors of terrorism, it does
not adequately address the behavior and influence of transnational actors, such as
terrorist organizations, on the world system. Realist scholar, John Mearsheimer
stated, "I do think that Realism does not have much to say about the causes of
terrorism." 17 Directly related to realism theories were theories of deterrence and
containment. These theories, while adequate for explaining the behavior of nation
states during the Cold War, have significant weaknesses when applied to
transnational terrorist organizations as discussed in Chapter four. This research does
recognize that there are international relations theories, such as liberalism, that
explain the behavior of non state actors, but these were not utilized in this case as a
means oflimiting the scope of the research. International relations scholars could
conduct further research by applying other relevant theories to this case or to this
lens.
17
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This case revealed that the theories and definitions of deterrence from the
fields of criminology and international relations are fundamentally different and that
the traditional deterrent strategies from each of these fields is not likely to be
effective ,against the terrorist threat we face today. That said, the use of these
concepts in both fields offers a useful area for future research in terms of the
development of better understandings of the differences but also of related
conceptions behind these approaches. As President Bush stated, "Traditional
concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics
are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so called soldiers seek
martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness." 18 In a post
Cold War era, the United States faces new strategic circumstances. Although the
U.S. enjoys unquestioned conventional superiority over any potential adversary, it
can no longer count on that superiority alone to deter possible aggressors. The U.S.
must, not only, have the ability to deter aggression from nation states, but also, rogue
states and terrorist organizations who intend to acquire weapons of mass destruction
as a means to counter U.S. conventional authority.
The principal strategic problem facing the U.S. is deterring local aggression
that may include the limited use of WMDs. The traditional response of massive
retaliation is increasingly implausible as a response to the use of WMDs by terrorist
18
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organizations against the homeland. In addition, a punishment based strategy of
deterrence against state sponsors of terrorism may be problematic when terror groups
operate in many nation states, thus making it difficult to determine which particular
state may be directly or indirectly responsible for an attack, or which individuals to
prosecute. Thus, in the age of new terrorism and transnational threats, a new theory
of deterrence needs to be created that includes multiple levels of actors and a broad
range of strategies to counter a wide range of asymmetrical threats.
This case unexpectedly revealed how the end of the Cold War brought
tremendous changes to U.S. national security policy, including how terrorism was
perceived as a threat. Initially, U.S. policy makers did not perceive the growing
threat presented by the worldwide jihadist movement because they were still
operating from a Cold War paradigm, as well as, trying to adapt to a new world order
that was being transformed by globalization.
Globalization has been the focus of ongoing debate and scholarship over the
past twenty years. In this case, the Clinton administration embraced globalization
because it marked the triumph of capitalism and its market economy. Defenders of
globalization, such as President Clinton and Thomas Friedman, presented it as
beneficial in that it would generate wealth and increase economic opportunities,
spread political democratization and cultural diversity, and empowered and
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connected individuals throughout the world in an interdependent network. 19
However, critics of globalization argued that this phenomenon would bring global
fragmentation of "the clash of civilizations," as well as, domination and control by
the wealthier nations states over the poorer underdeveloped ones, thus increasing the
gap between the haves and have nots within the world system. 20
In addition, the processes of globalization have been highly turbulent and
generated new conflicts throughout the world including what Benjamin Barber
describes as Jihad vs. Mc World. From Barber's perspective, terrorism is a reaction
to the international forces of globalization because globalization threatens traditional
community structures based on kinship, religion or ethnicity. In this case, it is not
clear that the 1993 WTC conspirators were motivated to join a terrorist organization,
such as the Islamic Group, as a result of the negative aspects of globalization. The
grievances highlighted in the letter of the Liberation Army Fifth Battalion are related
to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East from the end of WWII to 1993, which was
before the massive changes brought about by globalization. It is possible that the
motivations behind the 1993 WTC conspirators could have been a combination of
anti-Americanism spurred by the desire to change U.S. policy in the Middle East, as
well as, by growing antipathy toward the forces of globalization.
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Since the terror attacks on 9/11, international terrorism has been
characterized, not only, as a reaction to globalization, but also, facilitated by it. 21
The tools of the global information age, such as the internet, mobile phones, and
instant messaging, have led to changes in terrorist methods and enhanced the
efficiency in many terrorist related activities including coordinating operations,
recruiting and training members, raising and distributing funds, and gathering
intelligence on potential targets. 22 In addition, globalization has enabled terrorists,
like private enterprise, to reach across international borders and more easily establish
cells around the world.
Globalization theories, while difficult to apply in the 1993 WTC bombing
case, are important in analyzing terrorism because the two are intricately intertwined
forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century. Because of
globalization, terrorists will have more access to powerful technologies, more targets
and more means of recruitment than in the past. 23 Thus, greater research needs to be
conducted on how globalization and new technologies can be exploited by terrorist
organizations to plan and conduct operation against the U.S. homeland and its
interests overseas, as well as, to radicalize a growing population in the developing
world that is angry and frustrated by the growing economic disparities facilitated, in
part, by U.S. led globalization.
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Like the criminal justice lens, the international relations lens has unique
theories that bring to light a different way of viewing the problem of terrorism and
possible policy solutions to prevent, deter and respond to acts of terrorism. In the
realm of homeland security, it is critical to understand that nature of this threat
within the world system, as well as to the homeland. Thus, international relations
and national security scholars and practitioners bring a very different set of
perceptions, knowledge, and policy solutions to the threat of terrorism that must be
integrated into U.S. domestic policy related to homeland security.
In this lens, homeland security is linked to U.S. national security policy and,
as such, must include those government agencies dedicated to national security, such
as those in the U.S. Intelligence Community, the State Department, the Department
of Defense and the National Security Council. In this case, there was a clear division
between international and domestic terrorism, thus when the attack occurred in the
U.S. it was handled by the FBI. The State Department was the lead agency for
attacks against U.S. citizens or interests overseas in 1993, thus, they played a limited
role in this case. Though the State Department had a limited role in counterterrorism
in 1993, they did play a critical role in identifying terrorists overseas and putting
them on watch lists so they would be denied visas into the U.S. The State
Department failed in this role in this case by allowing Sheik Rahman into the U.S. in
1990 when he was on a watch list. As a result of this blunder, the State Department
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initiated significant reforms to its watch list and visa processing procedures, but
significant holes remained that were exploited by the 9/11 conspirators. 24
In addition, the CIA played a limited role though they had a great deal of
information about the Afghan mujahedeen (from their operations during the. AfghanSoviet War) and about Sheik Rahman and the Islamic Group. In this research, it was
surprising to see the extent of the lack of cooperation and communication between
the FBI and CIA. The conflicts between these two agencies were identified and
explained in chapter 5 when lens 3 was applied and the organizational dimensions of
the case were highlighted.
The international relations lens assumed that national security agencies
prevent, deter, and respond to international terrorism through very different
counterterrorism strategies than that found in the criminal justice lens. In this case,
homeland security was seen as a criminal justice problem, thus, the range of
counterterrorism polices that were considered immediately following this event was
limited. For example, in 1993, the military was prepared to use traditional military
power to retaliate against a state sponsor of terrorism, but was ill prepared to retaliate
against a loose transnational network such as Al Qaeda. 25 In this case, the
counterterrorism options normally used by national security and defense
organizations, such as, covert or direct military operations, economic or trade
sanctions, or enhanced physical security of possible U.S targets overseas did not
24
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occur because they simply were not needed given the success of the FBI in bring the
conspirators to justice.
The international relations and criminal justice lenses highlighted how
'

terrorism is a complicated, eclectic phenomenon requiring a nuanced and
sophisticated strategy that uses a balanced assortment of policy instruments to
address the immediate challenges posed by terrorism, as well as long term strategies
to reshape the current international ·environment which enables terrorist networks to
breed, operate, and expand. Both the international and criminal justice lenses had
theories that looked at the sociological and environmental variables, such as
oppression, poverty, injustice, social status, etc. that breeds anger and frustration
within a population that may lead to individuals joining terrorist organizations and
committing acts of political violence. It is clear from this case that the sources of
terrorism are many, complex, and often unpredictable thus making it difficult to
draw direct correlations between single variables. 26

It is critical is to understand that causes of terrorism have differed across time
because terrorism is partly a reaction to the particular political, social, economic and
historical context within which potential terrorists exist. Thus, what motivated the
conspirators to attack the WTC in 1993, may be quite different that those who
attacked it on 9/11. No doubt there are similarities given the ideology of both groups
of actors and their connection to Al Qaeda, but this cannot be clearly determined
26
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unless a comparative analysis is conducted of the two events using multiple frame
analysis. While analyzing this critical case is an important first step in moving
toward the development of a theory of homeland security policy, more research
needs to be conducted using multiple frame analysis to analyze other terrorist events
against the U.S. and in fine tuning the characteristics of each lens to current realities.
A major challenge of terrorism research is that it spans four levels of
analysis-the individual, the organization or group, the state and the international
system. This research clearly highlighted that not all of the lenses were good at
multilevel analysis. For example, the criminal justice lens focused primary on the
individual actors in the case, thus missing the link to a larger transnational
organization. Using conceptual lenses, such as that used in this research, allows the
researcher to analyze events using multiple levels and to identify critical gaps in
theories, practices and policies.
Many times in terrorism research, policy prescriptions are provided on how
to prevent and deter terrorist violence but little attention is given on how such
policies should be implemented within a specific organizational structure. As we
have demonstrated in lens three, an organization's structure, missions, tasks,
processes, policies, technology and culture influence the ability of an organization to
effectively and efficiently perform a counterterrorism and homeland security
operations.
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The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Organizational Design Lens
In Lens III, homeland security was perceived as an organizational design
problem and Terrorism was seen as a network. This research has highlighted how
terrorism changes constantly, but the same structural principles apply to successful
terrorist groups as to any other organization. Missions and strategies must be
identified, labor must be divided in particular ways, coordination must be achieved
through clear lines of communication, individuals must be recruited and trained to
carry out specific functions to achieve tactical and strategic goals, operations need to
be managed and led for success, and financial and logistical resources need to be
obtained to produce outcomes. The same set of concerns applies to organizations
that seek to engage the threat.
The initial discussion of the lens identified traditional bureaucratic theory and
contemporary network theory as the key problematic but critical elements. Here, as
in Chapter 4, it became clear, first, that the organizational lens has a good deal to
offer and does address important dynamics not considered in the other lenses.
However, like the international relations lens, the organizational lens was in
transition at the time to a new public management approach that focused more on
networks as compared to what existed before. Again, the lens was blurred at the
time because of the major shift, but the study revealed an interesting and unexpected
finding. There was a critical mismatch at the time between the agencies that were
there to maintain security with the almost classical bureaucratic design, and the
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organization of the terrorist networks which clearly had already developed network
theory and practice. The two set of players were operating from completely different
organizational perspectives which only aided the terrorists and made homeland
security more vulnerable.
Understanding how terrorist groups are structured, how tasks are assigned,
and strategic decisions are made regarding targets, methods and tactics, is critical in
shaping homeland security policies and programs. In this case, the individuals
involved in this attack were part of a small, autonomous cell that had the structure of
an all channel network. The WTC cell, like all organizations, was deliberately
constructed to achieve specific goals-namely the killing of tens of thousands of
Americans in an effort to coerce and intimidate the U.S. government into changing
U.S. foreign policy as it related to the Middle East and Israel. Since the perpetrators
were apprehended and prosecuted in the U.S., there is an extensive record of how
this group was organized, how they planned and carried out their attack, who was
assigned specific functions and tasks, and how they were trained and recruited for
this operation.
However, at the time ·of the 1993 attack, network organizational structures
were a relatively new phenomenon in how both terrorist groups were structured, as
well as, how businesses and government organizations were structured.
Traditionally, the basic unit of a terrorist organization has been a cell. The cell
consisted of a small group of people that operated autonomously from the larger
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organization whereby members of the cell do not know members outside of their
own cell. This type of structure ensured the safety and security because a small cell
was hard to detect by law enforcement and intelligence organizations.
In the 1993 case, the cell appeared to operate in plain view of law
enforcement and some were, in fact, detected and investigated by the FBI prior to the
February bombing. For example, cell members, Mahmmed Salameh, Mahmud
Abouhalima, and Nidal Ayyad were observed by a surveillance team of the FBI as
early as 1989 participating in small arms training in Brookhaven, New York. 27 The
FBI stopped their investigation because they were not able to collect enough
evidence to support an on-going terrorism investigation. 28 In addition, such an
investigation required extensive resources that the Special Agent in Charge was not
willing to commit because the priority of the FBI at that time was investigating
violent crime, not counterterrorism. 29
The purpose of the cell structure was to ensure that when members are
captured they were not able to reveal members of their organization outside of their
own cell. In the 1993 case, the Fifth Battalion Liberation Army was a cell that was
completely autonomous from the worldwide jihadist movement of Al Qaeda, thus
when the members were arrested there were few direct links between them and a
larger organization or network. These links went largely undetected by law
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enforcement and intelligence organizations, in part, because of the conceptual lenses
that they operated under as discussed earlier. In addition, the Al Qaeda and the
worldwide jihadist movement was in its infancy as well, thus to expect a connection
to be made by the FBI to this new and developing movement arising out of
Afghanistan is unrealistic. The FBI and CIA thought the 1993 attack was a lone cell
operation and did not begin to make the connections to a larger terrorist network
until 1996. 30 In some cases, links were not made until after 9/11 and the arrest of Ali
Mohamed and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. The jihadists, according to Brian Jenkins,
"can be credited with fashioning a vast, loose, flat network that has reduced the need
for a vulnerable hierarchy."31
Using this lens, homeland security organizations had a difficult time
identifying and tracking transnational terrorist networks, like Al Qaeda. In 1993, the
larger network was overlooked in part by the criminal justice and international
relations lenses at the time. In this case, the conspirators were not identified prior to
the attack as terrorists, thus they were not prevented from carrying out their attacks.
However, after the attack the members of this cell were identified quickly and most
arrested within a few months of the attack. In addition, with information from this
investigation, the FBI was able to link Sheik Rahman with planning another terrorist
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attack against landmarks in New York City in the summer of 1993. The difficulty in
identifying these types of terrorist operations lies in their ability to adapt quickly.
Since 9/11, this network has shown a tremendous capacity to quickly change
and adapt to the threat environment. This ability to adapt makes the structure of the
network itself a problem that needs to be addressed. Brinton Milward argued,
networks in this case are problems. 32 Milward has consistently supported network
structures as better alternatives for solving non-routine, non-standardized, wicked
problems than hierarchical structures. 33 However, these problems were assumed to
be "socially non-reactive." For example, service delivery networks are quite
common in many communities to solve such diverse problems as poverty to health
care. However, in these cases, the actors who inhabit these problems do not
normally resist the efforts of government organizations. However, Milward asks us
to look at "dark networks" or those that are both covert and illegal according to the
social and political environment they act in, as a problem for homeland security
because of their ability to adapt their structures and behaviors to react to U.S.
homeland security and counterterrorism efforts. 34
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Given the network structure of the terrorist threat, as well as, the complexity
of this phenomenon, this lens assumed that hierarchical organizational structures
would have limited success in deterring and preventing terrorism, as well as
responding effectively and efficiently when an attack did occur because such
structures are not well suited for operating in complex unstable environments.
Thus, this lens assumed that the most effective and efficient way to coordinate
homeland security efforts would be through a network governance structure.
At the time of the 1993 attack, the notion of network governance structures in
public management was quite new and interest in this type of structure was fueled, in
part, by the New Public Management movement that was implemented by the
Clinton administration in 1993. Lens three provided a rational for network
governance structures in homeland security based on a contemporary perspective.
However, at the time of the 1993 attack, networked governance structures as we
understand them today were rarely in use by those government organizations
involved in this case.
The attempt at a network that was in place was relatively narrow and with a
very limited purpose. The hierarchical network that was successfully utilized in this
case was the Incident Command System. In this case, ICS was utilized by the New
York City Fire Department very effectively because they were well trained and
experienced in the use of ICS, and they were dealing with an incident that
predominantly required skills and tasks that they used on a daily basis-namely

408

fighting fires, and performing search and rescue operations. However, this case does
not mean the ICS system will be effective in managing and coordinating catastrophic
events in the future. This lens highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of ICS
as a means of coordinating our response to catastrophic terrorist events. Further
research is needed to identify the most effective network form that should be
developed to coordinate the national, intergovernmental, multi-sector, multiorganizational, and community based emergency management network.
Unlike the other lenses, lens three showed the impact of organizational
structures, cultures, missions, and strategies on homeland security. In this case, the
primary agency involved was the FBI, a traditional law enforcement bureaucracy.
This case highlighted how the FBI' s organizational structure was well suited for
investigating and prosecuting individual cases, but it may not have had the capability
or inclination to coordinate a long term counterterrorism program that is critical for
homeland security. Lens 3 highlighted the unique organizational structure, culture,
mission, tasks and strategies of the FBI which were focused on investigating crimes
and not preventing them. In this case, the FBI did not appear to make any effort to
prevent the 1993 WTC attacks and seemed to ignore clear warning signs that
appeared with the assassination of Rabbi Kahane by El Sayyid Norsair in 1990, the
arrival and subsequent preaching of Sheik Rahman of the Islamic Group at a
Brooklyn Mosque from 1990 to 1993, and the observed training ofWTC cell
members by Ali Mohammad in 1989. Although the FBI recognized this new threat,

409

they did not fundamentally alter their organizational structure, culture, or strategies
as it related to homeland security until after 9/11.
In this lens, it was assumed that terrorism is largely defined and
conceptualized by the lead agencies involved in homeland security such as the FBI
and organizations within the U.S. intelligence community. In this case, the lead
agency to manage a terrorist incident within the U.S. was the FBI. As a result, the
criminal justice lens dominated during this time period and counterterrorism policies
reflected a criminal justice and law enforcement approach to counterterrorism and
homeland security as outlined in lens 2. In fact, the criminal justice lens was so
dominant that other organizations with a counterterrorism mission, such as the CIA,
Department of Defense, and State Department, were largely on the periphery or not
utilized in this case. It was not until after 9/11, that the international relations lens,
which depicted terrorists as illegal enemy combatants waging asymmetrical warfare
against the U.S., dominated public discourse on homeland security.
Since, 9/11 there has not been a single lead agency involved in homeland
security but rather a combination including the Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Defense, and Department of Justice. Each of these organizations has
brought its own preconceived assumptions about homeland security which are
largely shaped by their organizational histories, missions, cultures, strategies,
polices, processes, and the environment in which they operate. Some of these
assumptions and their impacts have been observed in this case study. Further
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research is needed that analyzes all of the key federal government organizations
involved in homeland security to assess how their organizational structures, cultures,
missions, and strategies impact our current capacity to deter and prevent terrorist
attacks against the U.S. and our interests overseas. This type of research would help
to identify conflicts between and within organizations that serve as barriers to
effective and efficient implementation of homeland security policies and programs.

Expected and Unexpected Results of the Study

The purpose of this study was to begin to build a theoretical foundation for
homeland security by analyzing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing from three
different conceptual lenses. These lenses looked at a singular event and phenomenon
from vastly different theoretical, organizational, and conceptual frameworks that
clearly highlighted the weakness of looking at a complex phenomenon, such as
homeland security, from one perspective. From the literature review, the researcher
expected that there would be vast differences in each perspective given the unique
characteristics of each lens. The stories presented for each lens are vastly different
and this is represented in Chapters three, four and five. These stories provided a rich
narrative of this event, as well as, a detailed analysis and explanation using theories
from the fields of criminology, international relations and public administration.
This is, of course, a single case study, and its findings are indicative and exploratory
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rather than conclusive, but, like Allison's work, it can provide useful foundations for
the future.
Even so, each lens revealed a picture that was incomplete in itself and
different from the others. There plainly were great gaps when using only one lens.
Taken together, the three perspectives could have informed analysts and
policymakers far more that they were at the time. These were expected findings, but
there were also some surprising findings as well. Consider first the expected lessons
and the surprises.
The researcher expected that the theories used in each lens would explain the
behavior of the actors in the case from a particular perspective. For example, general
strain theory from the field of criminology would provide an explanation for the
anger and frustration felt by the conspirators. However, in the international relations
lens, it was difficult to show how globalization impacted the behavior of the group in
terms of their methods, tactics or motivation. This was due to the limited amount of
information available about the beliefs and values of some of the individuals
involved, as well as, the lack of research during that time period on the negative
impact of globalization on nation states. One of the clear limitations of this study
was the lack of information from those directly involved in attacking the WTC in
1993.
This exercise of applying theories from different disciplines to a new
phenomenon proved very challenging because the researcher was not an expert in
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these specific disciplines and, as such, was not familiar with all of the ways these
theories have been used in each field. However, this research was able to identify
both the strengths and weakness of the theories that were used in each lens which
will contribute to each of these academic fields and perhaps encourage further
research to fine tune and improve these theories as they relate to homeland security.
In addition, the researcher expected that most of the characteristics described
in each lens would be found in the case. For lens (I) in which homeland security as
conceptualized as a criminal justice problem, all of the characteristics are highlighted
in the case primarily because terrorism was largely seen as a crime problem at that
time. However, for Lens (II), homeland security as an international relations
problem, and Lens (III), homeland security as on organizational design problem not
all of the characteristics of these lenses were found in the case. This was due, in
part, because the characteristics were developed from a post 9/11 perspective, and as
such, in 1993 these items were new phenomenon in themselves. For example, the
idea of a network organization structure for both terrorist groups and government
organizations was new and evolving in the early 1990's. In addition, the role of
national security agencies, such as, the CIA and State Department in this case was
not very clear because there was a lack of information available. This could be
because the information is classified or because they had an insignificant role due to
the dominance of the criminal justice lens in this case.
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The unexpected findings in the international relations lens was that that it was
not able to perceive the new threat of transnational terrorism, not only, because the
criminal justice perspective was so dominant at the time, but also because the
international relations lens itself was in transition due to the end of the Cold War.
This finding was critical because it recognized these conceptual lenses are not static
but are adapting and changing to the environment as well.
The most important contribution of this research is that it has recognized that
homeland security is a complex problem that spans many academic disciplines and
organizational boundaries. It encompasses both foreign and domestic policy issues,
and involves government organizations at all levels, as well as, businesses, non profit
organizations and citizens. This research has shown that the issue is so complex that
multiple perspectives are needed to analyze the phenomenon of homeland security
because one perspective simply misses too much, or fails to see critical pieces of the
problem that need to be resolved. Thus, further research needs to be encouraged that
is multi-disciplinary and seeks to break down some of the intellectual, social and
political barriers within the field of homeland security. This requires a focus on
processes and incentives that will bring scholars and policymakers with these
different perspectives together.
There were three surprises that emerged from this study. First, there is the
importance of understanding a lens at the moment in time when it is applied.
Second, there is the importance of the recognition of major change in a lens. In this
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case, there were two dramatic changes in two fields at the same time, both of which
were extremely significant in terms of what was and was not understood about the
1993 bombing. Third, while the researcher expected to find gaps between lenses, it
was difficult to identify overlap between the lenses. This could be due to the
researcher's limited knowledge of the theories used in the academic fields of
criminology and international relations. Further research is needed in partnership
with scholars from these fields to better identify and clarify the overlaps in these
lenses.

Recommendations for Further Research
It is clear from this research that conceptual lenses heavily influence whether
we will be aware of new problems, how we give meaning to what we observe, and
how we perceive or understand new phenomenon. Slow, evolutionary changes are
often difficult to perceive, let alone address because they cut across organizational
boundaries, occur over a period of time that is beyond most planning cycles, and are
often not captured within our mental maps or conceptual lenses that we use to make
sense of the world. To ensure we are not surprised by another 9/11, it is critical that
we continue to broaden our mental models and conceptual lenses as it relates to
homeland security. In the rapidly changing environment of the information age,
problems are constantly morphing into new forms, thus the life cycle of any
particular solution is likely to be very short. Thus, an important challenge for
scholars and government leaders is to lead the process of continuing to analyze our
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existing conceptual lenses as they relate to homeland security, as well as, to lead the
process of constructing new conceptual lenses. A useful next step from this study
would be to apply the lenses to a later event with participation by scholars and
practitioners from the appropriate fields. For example, a study of the later bombings
of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 would be a useful follow-on and would engage
additional international perspective in terms of context as well as content.
Further research is needed on the lenses used in multiple frame analysis in
order to fine tune them to current realities. Also, additional lenses can be added to
the framework such as a bureaucratic politics lens as used by Graham Allison in
Essence ofDecision, and applied to other cases. In addition, multiple frame analysis

can be used to analyze other critical cases such as the 9/11 attacks and a comparative
analysis with this case can be conducted to see how our conceptual lenses and
perceptions have changed over time. A major shortcoming of this research is that it
focused on only one case. While the 1993 WTC bombing was a watershed event for
the U.S. because it was the first time a foreign terrorist organization had attacked the
homeland, further research is needed using multiple frame analysis on other cases.
In addition, further research is needed to understand how these conceptual lenses are
formed and shared, and changed within government organizations, as well as, among
elected officials. This is important because these lenses frame how we identify
problems associated with homeland security and how we choose to solve them.
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Finally, this research clearly showed the importance of using multiple lenses
in analyzing complex new phenomenon such as homeland security. This case
showed that when used alone, each of the individual lenses missed key elements of
the phenomenon and captured only a small part of the problem we were observing.
Thus, it is important to work across academic disciplines and practices in order to
identify the differences between conceptual lenses, and to understand the perspective
of others so that shared mental maps and conceptual lenses can be developed.
Further research is needed to identify how this process of on-going organizational
learning can occur across the field of homeland security. This process of on going
learning is essential in the realm of homeland security so that there is a continuous
succession of long term strategies, instead of reactive, short lived solutions.
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